Coronavirus: Two presidents make the same mistake

People wearing face masks walk past the "I.Seoul.U" sign near Seoul City Hall in central Seoul, Monday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

By Hakim Djaballah

The American politician Benjamin Franklin once said, "By failing to prepare you are preparing to fail," while the French scientist Louis Pasteur added, "In the fields of observation chance favors only the prepared mind."

Geographically, South Korea is in a vulnerable location to many global health threats from emerging viruses such as SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and now SARS-CoV2. Having experienced the global SARS threats in 2002, the country only registered three confirmed cases, with no deaths, over a period of almost one year.

Unscathed and believing that the traditional staple kimchi was responsible for the good fortune and outcome, the government fell short of initiating and investing in a thorough preparedness initiative with appropriate expertise, enhanced surveillance and application of the most effective control measures in case the country was threatened again with another viral attack.

During my tenure as the CEO of the Institute Pasteur Korea, my program called for two new major development areas requiring additional support from the government: training and preparedness for emerging threats, especially in view of the climate changes leading to the emergence and re-emergence of several pathogens.

I recall many discussions with government officials, especially at the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, with members of the National Assembly, the Governor of the Gyeonggi Province and his staff, and with members of the Gyeonggido Assembly seeking additional support to execute the strategy and bring on board international expertise to help with the mission.

What transpired was unprecedented. Instead of providing support and help to achieve the training and preparedness goals of our mission, the doors were shut with no additional support. There was a surprising reduction in the institute's budget approved by the National Assembly and no more funding could be expected from the provincial Gyeonggido Assembly.

These government officials and politicians did not view training and preparedness as critical to safeguard the country's national security and to protect the thriving economy; they must have felt that financial support should go elsewhere and, certainly, not to be given to a foreign research institution with a not-so-welcomed mission.

President Moon Jae-in, left, and his predecessor Park Geun-hye / Yonhap

The first threat came in the form of the MERS outbreak of 2015, a crisis caused by a single Korean national returning from a trip to the Middle East. It devastated the country and for the first time since the Korean War, it tested the government's preparedness to deal with a national emergency in the heart of Seoul. It revealed that the government's emergency response protocols were not adequate to tackle such emergencies and highlighted expertise deficiencies at the Ministry of Health and the Korean Centers for Disease Control (KCDC). Lack of training was one of the biggest issues leading to the many mistakes committed by the government to contain the outbreak.

I would have expected that mistakes such as these would have been learnt, never to be repeated. With the investigational report on the handling of the MERS crisis completed, several recommendations were presented. At the time, many called for the KCDC to become independent and to have its own oversight to make sure that it is well managed, well funded, well trained and has all the necessary expertise it would require. This call fell on the deaf ears of many politicians and government officials.

While living in Seoul, I learnt about a powerful group of right-wing professors and influencers often referred to as "polyssors," meaning professors with political influence and government favors ― the Korean version of the "untouchables."

These polyssors have direct lines of influence at the Blue House (Cheong Wa Dae) and the National Assembly. Their symbiotic relationship with politicians and government officials provides them with most of the research funding and, in many cases, it is up to them to distribute it to whoever they feel worthy of these government research grants.

With a budget of around 6 trillion won, the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) ought to be independent of any influence and less susceptible to corruption and nepotism. Unfortunately, it is not the case and the NRF is also part of the bigger problem within the government.

The real Korean experts will remain silent for the time being in fear of retaliation by these polyssors, who can destroy their academic credibility and careers. These same polyssors wanted the institute I was heading to remain as status quo, fulfilling the desire to having only the impression of an international presence in the country. They stated that the government should not provide research support to foreigners and through the NRF, which they influence and control, they would make sure that very few if any of the current foreigners in the country received such research support.

The country is intellectually rich, with several universities and thousands of professors and experts; many of them have received their training abroad. I visited some universities and was very impressed with their campuses and with the professors I met, who were doing exceptional research work under undesirable and difficult conditions.

As long as the system does not evolve and changes course toward inclusion of all researchers in Korea and gradually eliminates these influential polyssors, the country will never be up to the task. Already, the research of many of these professors has been challenged and found to be fabricated. Furthermore, the biotech and the pharma sectors as well were also found to falsify research and human clinical trial data for the purpose of greed. Many of these companies were founded by these polyssors. This is very damning to the credibility of the Korean scientific community.

Four years later, the country is finding itself in the midst of a second "viral attack" in less than a decade. I ask for the whereabouts of these "polyssors" during such crisis and for those who received money to develop vaccines against the MERS-CoV virus. They should be in the front lines to work with and help the government to manage the unfolding threat and provide contingency plans as well as therapeutic interventions to contain the spread of the SARS-CoV2 and treat infected patients exhibiting the COVID-19 symptoms.

I faced them during the MERS crisis of 2015 when they publically challenged our predictions on the virus mutating in Korea, only to be contradicted by their own research findings showing that indeed the MERS virus had mutated in Korea.

Though the leadership of my institute was handed to a local professor with expertise in virology, it seems no major research findings have emerged to help with the current crisis. Boiling the hepatitis virus in water to show it can still be infectious, as an example, is hardly the warranted research when Koreans are being infected by the SARS-CoV2 virus and dying from the COVID-19 disease. It is a shame that with all the investments made by taxpayers in Korea, not much help was provided in return and at a time of need.

Are the government's actions thus far failing because of a lack of local expertise to provide advice in real time or simply the ultimate lack of preparedness? It is difficult to say due to the absence of full transparency, but as of a few days ago, we can attest to the fact that both cases may well be in play.

Dispatching the country's minister of foreign affairs to the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva to discuss global health issues is highly unusual at this stage of the outbreak and a strong indicator of despair on the part of the Moon administration. I cannot imagine how WHO can help South Korea at this late stage of a crisis heading toward a real threat of a pandemic. The global spread of the SARS-CoV2 virus continues regardless of WHO efforts ― the virus is now in Egypt, Israel, Iran, Italy, Oman and Afghanistan.

Two presidents presiding over the national emergency response body on unfolding health crises to do with MERS under President Park Geun-hye in 2015; and now SARS-CoV2 under President Moon Jae-in. Without a comprehensive preparedness plan in place, it is not surprising that similarities can be drawn between how the two crises have been managed. Both seem to share lack of preparedness and expertise to deal with the threat.

The trust in the Moon administration is fading faster with the surge of citizens' frustrations and concerns. The number of confirmed cases keeps growing. Blaming the spread on churches and places of worship is one of the biggest mistakes and harm Moon has done thus far. Is Moon fully aware that his actions could fuel the trajectory toward to a real pandemic in the country?

I wonder who the polyssors are advising him to make such radical decisions at a time where he should be calling for calm, unity and help from international experts to provide second assessments of the crisis at hand.

With elections scheduled soon, sovereignty and blame will become themes for some seeking office for the first time or those seeking reelection, while ignoring the consequences of their actions fueling conspiracy theories against their opponents. I also worry that the ongoing fear may play a role in tainting people's political choices and opinions for the good of the country; perhaps the elections should be postponed for few months.

It is also the right time for a radical policy change and a complete overhaul of the national emergency response; it is time for government officials to stop wearing those yellow jackets during crisis management ― the color has not been good to South Korea it seems, and by no means a sign of good faith or trust in the national emergency response body.

As I said, the coming days remain critical to inform on the trajectory of the crisis and the government must do more. I also fear that, unlike five years ago, this time we may end up with a much larger problem of a real pandemic. Perhaps it is not too late to form an independent commission of Korean and international experts to assess this urgent situation and provide decisive directives and a course of action to curb this threat, with sovereignty issues put aside.

Moon may have climbed a mountain thus far, according to some, to look over his shoulder for what he has accomplished; but in reality, he went up a hill refusing to look on the other side for a reality check on the magnitude of this unfolding crisis before him. He may be unaware that he is fueling a momentum, not knowing where it will land, and with a potential of a severe consequence in the form of a pandemic during his presidency. It is not the legacy one would like to leave.

I have always found South Korea to be very welcoming and rich with the most resilient people I have met. The country is prone to such avoidable viral attacks and outbreaks targeting humans and animals alike.

The political system has failed the people at two time points in the country's history, putting national security at risk. Innocent people have died and some are dying unnecessarily. History is repeating itself. This time, President Moon has gone too far with his rhetoric of blame. This will not help heal the country; it will divide it for sure at a time when unity, prayers and support are called for.

Hakim Djaballah is a former CEO of the Institute Pasteur Korea.