North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is adult in the room

By Stephen Costello

North Korea leader Kim Jong-un has been acting as “the adult in the room” when it comes to practical suggestions for halting his country's nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs, walking them back, and steering the North toward a productive role in the region.

This observation may seem unfair to South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump, who have both spent considerable time and effort working to reach an initial deal that would allow them to reach their objectives.

But if leaders are held to the standard that they should understand the various kinds of power available to them and the practical application of it, and that they must defend “core” interests while seeking to achieve common goals with other key actors, then Kim is leading the way.

Kim has more at stake here than any other leader. He also has the most experienced advisers, and they are generally united on a course of action. All these things result in a leadership that increasingly speaks in direct and uncomplicated language about its goals and needs. Kim is leading, but mostly because Moon and Trump are squandering their assets.

Kim's core interest is probably maintaining power, so he would prioritize an asymmetric reliance on nuclear and missile responses to an attack. He would also protect North Korea's political and economic stability as much as possible. These core interests are consistent with his long speech to the plenary session of the Workers Party of Korea and several statements from high-level officials in the past weeks.

They are also consistent with Kim's intensive bromance with Xi Jinping since their first of five meetings in March 2018. China's role seems to be to guard as much as possible against North Korea's expansion of nuclear weapons and ICBMs, while providing enough dependable economic assistance to maintain stability. A destabilized or desperate Pyongyang is not in Beijing's interests.

Moon and Trump both presented Kim with double-edged opportunities. The economic and human intrusions from South Korea could be accepted if the economic and security gains were sufficient.

The capping and progressive degradation of its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs, including open-ended inspections, at the insistence of the U.S. could be justified if security from attack ― backed by a peace treaty ― could be dependably secured, along with real and dependable paths to large-scale economic growth and international legitimacy. With both Moon and Trump, Kim seemed willing to test the waters.

That was up until the Hanoi summit with Trump. In Hanoi, positions were finally exposed. From the moment of the disastrous and undiplomatic flight from talking by Trump and his delegation, the fundamental weakness and incapacity of the White House's position was clear.

The fact that top U.S. officials immediately and repeatedly lied about that position was more confirmation of its impracticality. The emptiness of the U.S. position had already been signaled by Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Beigun and former head of the CIA's Korea Mission Center Andy Kim in the previous two weeks.

On top of this, reports noted that Trump had been leaning toward crediting the “snap-back” mechanism to protect U.S. interests. As Trump was being hurried out of the room First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui checked and assured Trump that “all” of Yongbyon would be covered in the North's offer to dismantle the facilities. Again according to reports either Pompeo along with Bolton or just Pompeo convinced Trump he would look “weak” if he signed any deal with Kim, well before back-and-forth negotiations could be undertaken.

In light of the developments in Hanoi, it would make strategic sense for Kim to keep his personal relationship with Trump, since it seemed possible that he would be open to an initial deal if not for his advisers. But the conclusion that Pyongyang seemed to make, that beyond Trump there was no support for any deal acceptable to the North, also seems inescapable.

Trump had misunderstood that his highest interest was to stop, cap and begin to roll back the DPRK nuclear program, substituting instead a mythical and false need to show “strength.” His greatest power to get what he wanted was to offer credible relief from major U.N. sanctions, but that was lost on him. And Trump was trapped in the transparently unserious position of maximum virtual economic war combined with diplomacy that has passed, more or less, for U.S. policy since the George W. Bush administration.

For President Moon the Hanoi debacle was also a wakeup call. Moon's deft management of his first summit with Kim, relaying Kim's invitation to Trump, and Trump's dramatic acceptance, could have created a false sense of movement.

The first inter-Korean agreements on conventional tension-reduction and related new ties were formidable. Trump's abandonment of his “fire and fury” and “bloody nose” threats was treated as real accomplishments. However, those empty threats were not succeeding, and he grabbed Kim's invitation like drowning man grabs a lifesaver.

It had been increasingly clear since his election that Trump and his team would not be able to produce any deal acceptable to Washington and Pyongyang. And yet, Seoul continued to rely on them. After Hanoi a reassessment was necessary in Seoul. Has such a reassessment happened?

There is certainly an ongoing debate within the government and among policy circles about how South Korea can pursue its core interests without unacceptable costs. But the realization that Moon must now act as a leader within the U.S.-ROK alliance, and as a key proponent of the interim deal left on the table in Hanoi, is nowhere to be seen.

As Trump was impeached and is undergoing a trial in the Senate, he and his staff and supporters have become more desperate. The impact of this on Korea policy cannot be accurately assessed, but it is unlikely to be good. It is probably not a coincidence that President Moon has been treated badly by the U.S., North Korea, China and Japan in the past year. His impact on South Korea's core interest ― securing peace and economic development on the peninsula ― has seemed to evaporate.

Ironically Moon is the most flexible of the actors in the North Korea drama. He has abundant sources of power to address his main interests and make progress on his main goals. The myth of U.S. abandonment seems to leave Seoul terrified. Repeated bullying by its U.S. ally seems to leave it cowering.

In this environment we should remember that Moon has democratic systemic legitimacy, moderation and administration expertise that far outstrip Trump. Next to Kim, he has more at stake than any other player, but none of Kim's poverty, isolation and weakness. There should be no question at all about who in Northeast Asia could and should be the adult in the room.

Stephen Costello (costs55@gwu.edu) is a visiting scholar at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.