NSC adviser: 'Mr. Invisible' no more

By Stephen Costello

National security adviser Chung Eui-yong has emerged from obscurity, and he has offered three ideas for us to think about as we review developments on Korea during this past year. Of course, Chung has not been completely obscure during the 19 months of the Moon Jae-in presidency.

From all accounts he has been intensively involved, in one of the most critical and responsible offices in the South Korean administration. The reference to him as “Mr. Invisible” most likely reflected his modesty and his low profile while in such a high-profile job.

I knew Chung as the energetic leader of an Asian political party conference, founded 18 years ago. I still use the bag he gave me, bearing the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) logo. We had good discussions then, but I have not met him in many years.

It was certainly surprising to see him in the glare of White House lights, announcing the most improbable news that Chairman Kim Jong-un had offered to meet, and President Trump had accepted, back in March. Considering what Chung has seen, and what he has been involved in as National Security Office adviser, his views should be taken very seriously.

The three points he made in a short interview recently were significant not just because they clarify how the year's diplomacy looks from the vantage point of one of its most intimate participants. They're also significant because they push back at, and refute, some popular narratives about South Korea's actions, and its interests.

Chung also makes his points in language that is clear and forceful, in contrast to many other government statements over the year. He joins Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon as another surprising, and late-blooming, first-rate spokesman for Seoul's engagement with North Korea and its alliance with the U.S. at this critical time.

The first point is that the new engagement between the South and the North has progressed to the point that the denuclearization process “has begun to enter an irreversible phase.” Most of the press will not understand the point, and will say Chung is dreaming, but the point is important.

If Pyongyang returned to nuclear and ICBM production, the requirements from both the North Korean leadership and from its weapons production systems would be extremely daunting.

In the new context of the beginning of beneficial interactions with Seoul, and of support from China and Russia, such an about-face is ― if not unthinkable ― almost impossible. Anti-agreement groups in Seoul and Washington both insist instead that it would be easy, and that weapons work would continue despite any deals.

The second point is “Most of all, the greatest achievement of our government this year in the international and security areas is the fact that we have eliminated the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula.”

Chung's point here is powerful in a political sense and a practical sense, even if it is not entirely true in a strategic sense. That's because “the risk of war” was a typically Trumpian hollow scare tactic, which allowed him to then “solve” the problem he had created.

Practically speaking, Chung is right here again, because the web of meetings, agreements and altered relationships begun by the two Koreas has made a return to the real dangers of 2017 also extremely unlikely. In political terms, both the Trump and Moon governments can legitimately claim this, regardless of the messy details, and that is important to both.

The last point is that “we have not only maintained the foundation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance but also strengthened it. There have been many misunderstandings and concerns about the alliance, but the cooperation system between the two remains firm. The alliance remains firm.”

On this point Chung is pushing back against what we could call “the fragile alliance trap.” The idea that the alliance will crumble if Seoul does not give in to Washington's demands is an endlessly repeated warning from opponents of deals with the North and conservative voices in the U.S. and Korea.

But South Korea can carry U.S. interests in the alliance, particularly when it is Seoul's responsibility to do so. The alliance has endured misguided, authoritarian and corrupt presidents on both sides, and is still solid. A clear-eyed drive by Seoul to lead policy now will update, rather than injure it.

Judging from the leaks and sniping among South Korean government figures there is probably ongoing debate about how best to work this “alliance cooperation system.” That's appropriate, because the next few months are where this administration either takes more responsibility and leads the alliance or buys the false narratives of “war is possible” and “the alliance is fragile.”

The former will mean deciding and saying clearly that South Korea will lead the denuclearization and development drives for the benefit of Seoul and Washington, and then doing it. The latter will mean allowing Pompeo and Bolton, and a broken U.S. policy-making process, to impede these efforts, and leaving major progress to the next Seoul government, or the one after that.

Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.