Moon and Kim: So far, so good

By Stephen Costello

Friday's inter-Korean summit was a very big deal. It has already changed the security, political and economic dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The prospect of unprovoked U.S. military attacks on North Korea, which was always a bluff, is now even more remote.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have taken the lead in determining how the common, shared interests of the North and South can be recognized and advanced. Until and unless they relinquish that political/strategic leadership, they will together determine Korea's immediate future.

The work to rebuild economic and development structures ― first between the Koreas, but soon between the peninsula and China, Russia and Japan ― will now begin among all parties. North Korea and Kim Jong-un will be required to take actions that confirm they are stepping back from confrontation, such as releasing three Americans, accommodating IAEA inspectors, and discussing the capping and scaling back of nuclear, missile and WMD programs.

The three main reasons for the outbreak of diplomacy this year ― U.S. weakness, South Korean strength and North Korean confidence ― were in the air. Among the most striking realizations were these:

Kim made the first move. It is not at all certain that Moon would have done so if Kim had not. Moon was certainly ready to respond, but not to initiate. His caution has sometimes bordered on timidity. Similarly, U.S. President Donald Trump showed no inclination to take leadership of a new diplomatic opening. He reacted quickly, but more out of weakness than strength.

U.S. opposition to practical diplomatic action toward North Korea has been screamingly obvious. Pushback against Moon's engagement posture, his outreach to Kim and his active mediating role has been severe and unrelenting since Moon was elected. Objections have come from White House insiders, top secretaries and advisers, all Republicans and some Democrats, and the great majority of specialists and scholars.

As the North and the South explored a new opening, Trump whined that Moon was an “appeaser.” The cautious change of heart by Trump and the minor adjustments to military exercises were primarily efforts to avoid irrelevance and further international isolation. Vice President Mike Pence's behavior at the Olympics remains the most accurate display of Washington's attitude toward diplomacy.

Moon has thrown Trump a political lifeline. It's hard to overstate the desperate position Trump has put himself in. This directly impacts his Korea policy. His legal and political troubles are one dimension. Abroad, it has become difficult for him to travel, due to the demonstrations he would produce.

Although he has been immune to many arguments for rational and strategic approaches to foreign affairs, from climate change to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, he seems to recognize that he will have no better chance to do something presidential than to accept the opportunity now offered to him by Moon Jae-in. Moon seems to sense this as well. In the run-up to the summit, the Blue House has spent far more time handling Washington than Pyongyang.

Recent past presidents in South Korea and the U.S. have been exposed as small-minded and irresponsible in their failures to imaginatively address lingering dangers and opportunities on the Korean Peninsula. One can't watch the unfolding South-North summit and not be struck by the fact that Lee Myung-bak or Park Geun-hye or Barack Obama could have done this. But none had the courage and vision to do so. The impact of those failures on South Korea has been great, but on North Korea it has been catastrophic.

Moon and Kim had a lot to talk about. This may seem unremarkable, but it should be noticed. Both top officials had taken a long, detailed and serious approach to the subject of Korean reconciliation. On Kim's part, his country's access to economic development and emergence from poverty and isolation depend on it. On Moon's part, his country's strategic viability, as well as its economic future and its democratic identity depend on it.

The simple picture of the open, respectful give-and-take between the two may be the most meaningful and long-lasting result of the meeting. One of the main reasons past U.S. and South Korean presidents were unable to engage with the DPRK was their limited focus on the nuclear issue, even though that would only be addressed in the broader context of economic and security agreements.

In contrast, and like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, Moon has aspects of national reconciliation, industrial development, humanitarian improvements and regional dynamics to discuss with his counterpart.

Sanctions will now return to center stage, as the subject on which diplomacy will move forward or not. This has been the case ever since the U.S. unilaterally began pulling out of the Agreed Framework 17 years ago, destroying a decade of multilateral denuclearization and institution-building.

The substitution of pressure and sanctions, and the dream of North Korean surrender, for the existing and working deals was always doomed. In the best case, sanctions can now be used to leverage a return to the basic bargains of 1994 and 2000.

Moon has cards left to play, but it is not yet clear that he will play them. This is where current multi-summit choreography could break down. It may be a miscalculation by the South Korean president that he can arrange to have the fundamental needs of the South, the North and the U.S. all met in coming agreements.

The U.S. is uniquely untrustworthy, and all players view each other with suspicion. While there has been talk among some in South Korea of a coalition that would verify and formally insure the political stability of any new agreements, there has been very little action. Ironically, one strength of the JCPOA is illustrated by French and German efforts to save it last week.

It would be immensely stabilizing to bring the U.N. into a more active role now. The coalition that would verify any new Korean deals would include China, Japan, Russia, the Europeans, Australia and others. But the institutional capabilities, buy-in and independence of the U.N. are desperately needed. The next month will provide some indication of how that necessary coalition will be assembled.

Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C.