In defense of Moon Chung-in

Moon Chung-in makes points that need to be made, alerting Washington that there is a new adult in the debate over policy in Northeast Asia

By Stephen Costello

Professor Moon Chung-in has been at this a long time. I met him in Washington at the beginning of the Kim Dae Jung administration almost 20 years ago. We know each other, but have rarely met. I’ve been expecting him to bring a muddled message to Washington, trying to please everyone, but I have been surprised.

Moon is making several key points to his US counterparts and audiences. And he is providing a valuable service to his US hosts, helping them to see how South Korea’s new government views it’s and the US’s interests right now. Just as important, he is exposing views among US policy specialists, and taking those views back to President Moon Jae-in and the government in Seoul. If President Moon has decided to come to the US now – even though both administrations are not fully staffed and both need more time for planning – this kind of preview from Professor Moon is absolutely essential.

First, several things should be clear. There is room for new engagement toward North Korea, by South Korea or by Seoul and Washington both. Such approaches – which were the last successful US policies toward the Peninsula in the 1990s – would not break the alliance. Such talk is nonsense. Moon Chung-in can speak his mind as an advisor. The new Seoul government can take his advice or not, but it needs more clarity on policy, not less. Some in Korea are arguing that some kind of “ambiguity” is useful for President Moon to play both sides of some issues. I can’t think of a worse idea.

After the lost decade of bad assumptions and bad analysis leading to bad policy in Seoul, in parallel with 16 years of the same in Washington, ambiguity is the last thing we need. It is also hard not to notice that, after all the repeated declarations from the Donald Trump administration that the Obama (Bush-Obama really) policies are over with, he and his team have come up with exactly the same policy approach. It has been apparent from the start that “all options” were not on the table, after all. Sincere and ambitious engagement to achieve development and denuclearization is an option that never made it to that table. That option never made it to the Bush or Obama tables either.

So clarity is called for, particularly between allies. What has Professor Moon said and done that is so controversial?

He has noted that Korea and the US should consult on limiting or scaling-back military exercises if North Korea will scale back its missile and nuclear testing programs. Limiting US-ROK exercises is a tool that has been used successfully in the past, and could be again. Only those who don’t believe in diplomacy at all could pretend that any change to training would cripple the two militaries or give a “win” to North Korea.

The THAAD decision is another issue that seems to be perfect for misunderstanding and exaggeration. Moon Chung-in has said that there are real reasons for that deployment to be paused, and for it to be considered by the Assembly and in its broader impact on Korea’s interests. It’s their country, after all. Former US Defense Secretary William Perry told groups here last week that if South Korea’s government and public are not comfortable with the anti-missile battery – and all the symbolism it has come to embody – then the US should take it back. Perry is still one of the best thinkers on the issues surrounding North Korea’s denuclearization, and he’s right.

Moon also said last week that the South and North governments should start talking directly if there is a pause in the North’s tests. It is embarrassing to think that there are US policy specialists – in or out of government – who believe this new democratic Korean administration, staffed with some of the most experienced, savvy and level-headed ministers, officials and advisors, should surrender its view of its interests with its Northern neighbor to those of the US administration. In particular, this Trump team has put forward no plan that would attract any other actor in the Northeast Asia region.

That lack of a US plan is where observers should focus. On one hand, the delay in appointing officials with Asia and Korea experience to lead departments and get the policy machinery working is difficult. On the other hand, this basket of policies is just one of many demanding the attention of the US right now. It may not be surprising that the Trump administration’s ability to creatively change the direction of US policy toward Korea after 16 years of drift is not 100%. In that case, it is more important than ever for US observers to listen to the Korean side, and to experienced professionals who know the issues.

For Korea, these policy choices are not a remote game to be played for political or symbolic value. They are the main thing. Professor Moon is giving his US friends a much-needed updating of South Korea’s evolving views, and giving the Korean government a sense of opinions here. He is also paving the way for Washington to welcome President Moon with an increased sense of where the South wants to go.

Who knows? Perhaps the US could benefit in a long list of ways if it were to support its ally and help make President Moon’s new approaches more successful.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.