Real hardliners on North Korea

By Stephen Costello

The real hardliners in Korea and the US over the past 20 years have been progressives. The real enablers of North Korean nuclear and missile programs have been conservatives. This is not difficult to figure out. Yet somehow, most journalists and commentators remain in the dark about the meaning of their loaded and revealing word choices. Today they also describe progressive policies as “sympathetic” toward North Korea or appeasement toward China. Now that true hardliners are back in office, at least in South Korea, it’s time to remember why that is.

Any definition of “hardline” policy, with its implication of pressure or enticement for change, would have to include policies that force a choice on an opponent or diplomatic partner. Such a definition would have to clearly state that verbal, optical and hollow military shows of force would not constitute a hard line unless they produced the desired change. Only policies and actions that cause another party to rethink, recalculate and adjust his posture would meet the definition. On the ground, only such policies are realistic, in terms of matching statements and actions to goals. One might call those who practice them “realists.”

Students of the past two decades of policy, statements and actions surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK nuclear issues would quickly recognize several things. For instance, the one time North Korea was induced (by a combination of isolation, deterrence and robust, sincere engagement) to adjust its direction was during the 1990s. At that time it could have chosen to continue its isolation, and its nascent nuclear programs. But the physical, political and economic environment surrounding it was carefully arranged, over the course of the decade, to make that choice far worse than the choice of a freeze on arms coupled with believable security assurances, aid, and concrete actions to begin economic development. If the meaning of a hard line is to induce the opponent to change, this was it.

They would also see that when those working engagement policies were unilaterally abandoned by the US, and replaced with policies of verbal, military and economic coercion, the impact on North Korea was the opposite of what was intended. For 16 years the DPRK has built a nuclear arsenal when there was none under the previous policies, and produced a steady stream of ever-more-capable missiles. Certainly such policies can’t be considered “hard” since they required no political courage from the US or others and did not induce any desired changes in the DPRK. Whether those are called soft-line or enabling or just ineffective policies, it should be clear that they cannot be called “hardline.” In fact, due to their exaggerated claims and disconnection from goals, they could be called “romantic.”

After reviewing the diplomatic and historical facts, our students may begin to suspect that for much of the media and expert community, the term “hardline” has lost almost all its meaning. They may even begin to wonder which parties are served by confusion over its use. And finally, they may ask what produces this confusion. Is it just laziness, a failure to do homework, or is it in some cases intentional? Is there a lowering of the bar for the quality of discussion and debate, or an explosion of outlets so that any Tom, Dick or Harry can be published? Unfortunately, these are relevant questions for those reading the news today.

Of course, one explanation may be that journalists and commentators are not really referring to policies at all, but to postures. In that case, Vice President Mike Pence can be called “tough” due to his memorably stern scowl as he looked across the Korean DMZ toward the North, dressed in a leather bomber jacket. In fact he will probably be called a hardliner toward North Korea.

Approaching the summit between President Moon and President Trump in Washington, it seems there will be a cascade of articles pronouncing the US and Japanese postures as “hardline” and the (demonstrably more effective) policies of the new South Korean administration as “wins” for China and North Korea. Obviously, the implication that the US loses with any “win” for China and North Korea exposes a zero-sum view that can’t help policy-makers today. They can’t see the new pressure on the North to freeze nuclear programs, admit inspectors, and respond to humanitarian organizations that will result if Seoul continues with its renewed engagement approach. Or that such pressure would increase substantially if the US joined its ally in support.

The THAAD system will be another test for such articles. This symbol of over a decade of incompetent and badly-anchored approaches by South Korea and the US has now become, inevitably it seems, a treasured requirement for the hapless Trump team, and an ultimate test of the 60-year US-ROK alliance. It is testimony to the lack of ideas in the policy industries that such misunderstandings become conventional wisdom.

Rather, this high-profile group of observers seems to believe in the shallow game of short-term optical posturing, whose audience is domestic, political and disconnected from results on the ground. Or perhaps they still believe in the 1970s game of communist and non-communist states, fighting for the hearts and minds of the gullible public? How else to explain a view that elevates empty and counter-productive displays from the US administration to a gold standard of policy-making; and the engagement approach, already proved effective, and now backed anew by the president and public opinion in Korea, as appeasement of China and North Korea?

But when a debate as important as the one about how to make effective policy toward the Koreas is littered with words cut off from their meaning and impacts, that debate becomes unserious. And if there is anything we need during this age of Trump, this age of middle powers taking on greater responsibility for making and explaining community policy, it is clear, rigorous and serious debate.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.