Will Moon put Korea first?

By Stephen Costello

For years Korean leaders have been challenged to act with the confidence of a rising middle power. The Moon administration is now facing the same challenge, at a time when both the U.S. and China are seeking to bully it and constrict is flexibility. If Korea succumbs to its ally’s “America First” push, and its neighbor’s “China First” insistence, that would not be surprising, but it would waste a great opportunity.

The last time Seoul took a leading role in Peninsula affairs – and as a consequence in regional affairs – was during the 1998 – 2003 period. Even then South Korea was severely limited, and its full potential denied, after the Bush administration’s reversal of policies and interests in 2001. Denuclearization was out; empty unilateral posturing was in. So for only three years of its modern history Korea has acted with the conviction that it can impact the dynamics in Northeast Asia. That period, 1998 – 2000, was the “golden trial,” when regional powers had a glimpse of what their neighbor could do. And it was impressive, particularly when one remembers the difficult conditions of the time.

The new government could return to the work that has been put aside, the plans that have been gathering dust, and the economic and intellectual dynamism that has been bubbling, pent-up, during the past lost decade of backward, ideological and divisive government. There are signs that people and ideas are being used well, that the potential many knew was there is finally being used again. President Moon’s appointments support this effort, and there is a good possibility that the new team will make great progress.

Even at this early point, however, two weeks into the new term, there are some things they should watch out for. Early on, they will have to work with the U.S. It is understandable that the first instinct of the Moon administration is to listen, and to declare that difficult issues can be ironed out. But there is a difference between being polite and being naïve, even in diplomacy. At some point very soon someone with authority in the new Moon team will have to speak clearly and directly to someone with authority in the Trump team. We don’t know if this has happened, but there are no signs of it at this time.

When that time comes, the message from the new Seoul government can be based on several key realities; realities that many others may not know. If there are members of the new government who do not know this background, then a special briefing may be in order.

First, the pressure to force the DPRK back to talks is based on a false and fatal misunderstanding. As leaders in China, North Korea and in the region know, it was the US that walked away from a working agreement with the two Koreas, not North Korea. Since then, the U.S. has been pretending this was the North’s fault, and the North has been waiting for the U.S. to return to an honest and practical deal. For this reason, the justification for the 16-year history of pressure and sanctions in order to make the DPRK admit its error evaporates. It is certainly dangerous and unnecessary for them to do all this testing, but it is not without reason or purpose.

Second, the team under President Trump has demonstrated its lack of staffing and lack of understanding by repeating exactly the same approach of presidents Bush and Obama. “Maximum pressure and engagement” is not a policy, it is a dangerous and expensive fantasy. Perhaps “Strategic Incoherence 3.0” would have been more accurate. As long as Washington thinks it can get away with using the same old explanations for its counter-productive posture, it will not change. Simply put, the Moon administration does not have time for this.

Third, during these years of blame-shifting and responsibility-avoidance, U.S. and South Korean administrations have used the U.N. system to support their positions through repeated sanctions and statements, even while those positions have clearly failed to address the core problem. That problem has always been the U.S.’ inability and incapacity to return to negotiations with North Korea that would sincerely and verifiably deliver security and access to development in exchange for denuclearization and real peace-building.

Fourth, U.N. and Chinese officials, and others, have tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to bargain with the recalcitrant Americans. They have offered some support for increased sanctions, knowing they are impractical, in exchange for a U.S. promise to get back to diplomacy with Pyongyang. Again and again, the U.S. has suggested that it would, but it never has, certainly not in a way that would allow a win-win solution as the previous successful deals did.

Public reports about last week’s visit to the Blue House by U.S. officials, and to Washington by South Korean officials, have seemed clear: the ROK side has given up its goals with North Korea and adopted the failed U.S. and Park Geun-hye approach of maximum sanctions and pressure first, followed by some fuzzy return to dialogue “when conditions are appropriate.” There may be more than this going on, but the signs are not there.

There was a reason why the agreements of the 1990s that worked so well relied on carefully divided responsibilities: roughly, the U.S. would lead denuclearization talks while the ROK would lead North-South economic and conventional forces talks. DPRK leaders know they will not have security without that deal with the U.S., so no South Korean leader should say he can deliver on denuclearization. He can’t. As Kim Dae Jung said to Kim Jung Il in Pyongyang 17 years ago, “Satisfy the U.S. on nuclear issues, and satisfy Japan on the abduction issues. If you can’t do that, then I can’t help you. No one can.”

The Moon and Trump administrations can do this. Both are uniquely unbound by their predecessor’s mistakes. The old division of tasks would work again. “Maximum” or any other new pressure on North Korea will waste valuable time and be counterproductive. But among the two administrations there is only one with the democratic and policy legitimacy, the national interest, the ideas, and the personnel to freeze the pressure campaign where it is, explain where the next steps lead, and take charge of implementing new comprehensive initiatives. That is the one in the Blue House.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at

scost55@gmail.com.