Why Trump is losing this game

By Stephen Costello

If it were not so serious, much of the US posturing toward China and the two Koreas in past months would be humorous. But it is serious, far more so than most observers acknowledge. The “stern father” language and demeanor of the amateurs who are now making and promoting US policy is based on a misreading of recent history and a misunderstanding of basic international dynamics.

Any US military “strike” on North Korea as currently contemplated would be illegal. A preemptive strike would not have justification since the much-hyped nuclear-armed ICBM aimed at the US is a distant fantasy. There would be almost no way to establish its existence. A preventive strike is illegal on its face, since it relies on longer-range projections. Such actions while refusing to talk would further delegitimize the US position.

Neither President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, or Vice President Mike Pence has experience analyzing, making or implementing complex US international policy. President Trump has refused to hire experienced professionals with backgrounds in Asia, and listen to their advice. His allies in the Republican-controlled Congress don’t support diplomatic agreements, preferring pressure and military solutions.

As Trump quickly spends down the power and trustworthiness of the US government in the Northeast Asia region, and Korea elects its next president, it is important to remember what leaders and many others in the area already know. Since they know these facts, and US officials apparently do not, agreements with the US on approaches and strategies in coming years will be very difficult.

First, as longtime Korea intelligence official John Merrill noted on the PBS NewsHour program recently, the US is largely responsible for the rise in tensions and the lack of agreements surrounding North Korea. It was the US, not North Korea, that unilaterally walked away from and destroyed one of the most successful and impactful multilateral anti-nuclear and development agreements ever negotiated. This was the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF) that halted DPRK nuclear and missile programs and began to substitute security and economic development.

Secondly, when the US did this, it abandoned its South Korean ally, and acted against the interests of Chinese, Japanese and Europeans who were committed to a regional vision with multiple and extensive benefits.

Thirdly, the result of US actions has been not only that the benefits of growing regional integration and security were squandered, but also that an expensive and dangerous arms race and boiling regional tensions have grown up in their place. It is probably not a coincidence that divisive, backward-looking nationalists have gained power in Japan and Korea in such an atmosphere.

Because DPRK nuclear and missile development has been largely in response to the US abandonment of a working security and development agreement, the justification for a US policy of “increased pressure to force talks” evaporates. And yet, that is the position of the Trump administration. Would it not be more realistic to say we are ready to return to that deal, or something equally satisfactory?

If the US administration was serious about providing a negotiated alternative to its exaggerated rhetoric and theatrical sternness, it would review what worked last time, put together a package of durable, trustworthy and transparent actions that it would take and initiatives it would pursue, and sit down with the North Koreans.

But today there is no sign that such a package is even under consideration. Following a dramatic briefing about North Korea for US Senators at the White House last week, a “joint policy statement” was released. Reading it, a longtime analyst of US policy toward the region remarked, “This almost invites the North Koreans to test another nuclear bomb.”

Despite its disdain for the Obama and Bush administrations, the Trump group has based its approach to the Korea issues on exactly the same myths that its two predecessors embraced. These four are easily debunked:

Myth 1. The North Korean leadership prefers nuclear armament and a “nuclear weapons identity” to security arrangements and economic development. Therefore, increased, even “painful” economic sanctions and isolation must be increased to force it to give in to US demands.

The record shows the opposite is true. Increased sanctions and isolation will now backfire again.

Myth 2. The US has kept agreements with North Korea, but the North has broken them. Therefore, the US cannot trust that the DPRK to honor future deals.

Those who were there dispute this. US rejection of the AF disproves it.

Myth 3. Past US denuclearization policies and agreements with the North have all failed. Nothing has worked. Therefore, maximum pressure must be tried, even though little can be expected.

It is easy to re-discover the success of US and SK policies during the 1990s through research. There was never anything “unilateral” about economic and security inputs to North Korea. It is now crystal clear how valuable those nuclear and missile freezes were, along with increased regional stability.

Myth 4. US policies during the 1990s (and South Korean policies beginning in 1998) gave large amounts of money and aid to the North, but they were failures. Therefore, the Bush policy reversal of 2001, which embraced the idea of pressure and surrender, was necessary.

President Bush and his advisors make clear in their books that they opposed the AF from the beginning, and neither accepted or understood its multiple benefits. Their opposition had little to do with the limited collection of hardware – amounting to a nascent uranium program – that was used to justify abandonment of a decade of multilateral work and over $6 billion invested, most of that from South Korea. They preferred the impression of force and surrender, as they did in Iraq. As Vice President Cheney said at the time: “You don’t negotiate with evil. You defeat it.”

So here we are. Reviewing this history of broken promises, forgotten facts, and tired myths, one has to wonder what the new Korean president will make of it all. Will he agree to follow this US president, the third in a row who has ignored South Korean interests so that he could play badly at having a policy toward the region? Probably not. He had better organize his government well, however, and make sure the public understands Korea’s goals and their benefits. Then he will be able to lay out and drive a plan that makes sense and provides profits for each party.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.