Here Mattis confirms US on sidelines

By Stephen Costello

US Defense Secretary James Mattis confirmed during his visit to Korea that the US is unlikely to join in the game of improving the atmosphere or lowering tension in the Northeast Asian region for the foreseeable future. That was the underlying message of the long-expected but barely-relevant statements from Mattis during his visit to Seoul. Mirroring North Korean claims, the US pledged to respond with overwhelming force if the North launched an attack, and promised that US military backing for Seoul is “ironclad.” While it remains important to deter and answer any real attacks from the North, and to minimize confusion about the new US president, there are more important issues on the table.

Of course, an attack by North Korea is almost as unlikely as an attack by the US, but that’s not the point. These are public rituals which state the truth while masking the ongoing lack of ambition or direction in the White House and Blue House. This is not the fault of Secretary Mattis. It is also not a bad thing. American strategic bewilderment and institutional dysfunction have become the norm. One can sympathize with the US Defense Secretary. After all, what could he be expected to say while Korea’s president is impeached and on trial, and those vying to be the next president represent two or three wildly different conceptions of the national interest? The future of THAAD, OpCon, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, relations with Japan and policy toward North Korea are very much in play.

Resources that the US controls still matter, and they will be required in the future to help move the region forward. But for now it is far better to have the US on the sidelines – engaged in its own domestic struggles over presidential legitimacy, competence and corruption – than to have it stumbling around this region banging into things. Despite Mattis’s support for the THAAD deployment, the next move on the Korean Peninsula will be up to Korea, not the US.

Who has a plan?

Without a cohesive plan for progress – on tension reduction and economic development, just to get started – the US stepped back from the roles of leadership and responsibility toward this region 16 years ago. The lack since then of a cohesive vision for the region has been devastating. The strategic emptiness at the heart of the “Pivot” included the Korean Peninsula. Efforts by Korean leaders to leverage or take advantage of American power in recent years have been unsuccessful, and have revealed some confusion about their own nations’ advantages and opportunities. For the configuration of Korean security this is unfortunate. Practical modernization of force structures, hardware and interoperability are called for, along with trilateral coordination with Japan. But for now such upgrades will wait at least until the next Korean election.

The current situation may still be preferable to the alternative, expected just months ago: an unimpeached President Park and a new President Hillary Clinton. Had that occurred, the anticipated direction of policy regarding Korea was almost certainly toward increased tension and possible confrontation. Now, with new leadership possible in Seoul, and US flexibility and diplomatic prowess further eroded, options for progress have become newly imaginable. They are far from assured, however. Some knowledgeable people in Washington still warn of a 50/50 chance of conflict.

On security the Trump group has begun a tense struggle over China’s actions in the South and East China Seas, both its island-building and claims to the Senkakus. By its nature this struggle will be ongoing and something to be managed, not solved. One anticipated result of Korea’s leadership change is that it could begin to play a role in that management. Which role, and how well it is played, are top questions presidential candidates should be asked today. Similarly, on South Korean approaches to North Korea and Japan, the competence and strategic wisdom of the next Korean government will have outsized impact in the region.

The looming prospect of Korea regaining a measure of strategic independence – possibly under a progressive president – scares the hell out of most mainstream specialists in Washington. Since most of them still justify the US abandonment of the Agreed Framework and of US allies Korea and Japan in the Bush years, and continue to oppose diplomatic activism toward the DPRK now, their fears are hard to credit.

White House and Congress review North Korea policy

The Financial Times reported on 2 February that the White House has quietly begun a review of policy toward North Korea, asking if anything new can be done. National Security Advisor Flynn is reported to be heading it. By doing this, they have already done more than the Obama team did over eight years. Nevertheless, unless they open the discussion up to include the more experienced group of specialists with coherent plans and principles on which to move forward, they are unlikely to do any better than the past two administrations. And they could very possibly do worse.

Also during the past week, the Foreign Relations Committees in both the House and Senate conducted hearings on the subject of “Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options” and “Countering the North Korean Threat: New Steps in U.S. Policy.” Many of us have called repeatedly for such a reassessment since the Bush group in 2001 reversed a working multilateral structure supported by our allies. Unfortunately, the Republicans who now control Congress are unlikely to conduct the kind of brutal and unflinching reassessment necessary. Of the six experts who testified at the two hearings, only one – Robert Gallucci – had the background and perspective to offer useful advice. His full statement is worth reading. It can be found on the Web site of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Nature of the choice

Since the Bush administration dismantled Clinton’s policy of development- and denuclearization-based engagement backed by deterrence, US governments have had two basic choices: the Clinton approach, with its list of successes and accomplishments, and the Bush and Obama approach, with its list of repeated failures. Among the Bush/Obama failures is the emergence of a North Korea with nuclear weapons and multiple delivery systems. Difficult as it is, the choice is not rocket science. Nor is it a “choice among bad options,” as so many observers and commentators claim, or one between progressive and conservative visions.

Rather, it is a choice between addressing a dangerous problem – with massive costs to the region – responsibly and with imagination and courage, or failing in the primary duty of leaders to improve what can be improved.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.