THAAD, Trump and China

By Stephen Costello

I would rather not write about THAAD, Trump and China. In all three cases, immediate issues are a diversion from the real, central questions. The media is not often good at remembering how we got here. These cases provoke so much confusion that clear thinking is hard. So sometimes we old-timers need to bring up recent history, hoping that the larger picture will become clearer.

Take THAAD. Like nuclear weapons for South Korea, it would never have come up except for bad analysis and the incompetence of leaders. The THAAD deployment is not the problem. The problem is the long trail of bad decisions, faulty analysis and wishful thinking that led to this. “But the North Koreans tested a rocket” is no answer to the question: How could you lack the strength and wisdom to talk directly to your North Korean neighbors for the past seven years? Big and important things require discussion between you, including denuclearization and human rights. There have been, and there could be again, ways to move forward.

Among the costs of the THAAD deployment to South Korea, as some leaders surely knew, is that Seoul can now have no role in advising, confronting or balancing against China’s bad behavior in the region. Regardless of whether that behavior is motivated by strategic security concerns, wounded pride, or misplaced nationalism, Xi Jinping will now act with less regard for what Koreans think. Was this a smart move, balancing real threats against real diplomatic opportunities?

Or take Donald Trump. His misunderstanding of the US-Korea alliance, and his promise to make Korea “pay more” should not be cause for concern. US governments will pay for troops on the Peninsula for a long time, almost entirely due to perceptions of the US interest. Concern over the US’s “reliability” are myths and distractions. In the highly unlikely event of military trouble from either North Korea or China, the ROK military and its US partners will be able to handle it. Because of the failed approaches to the Korean Peninsula over 16 years by presidents Bush and Obama, the North Korean problem can’t get much worse. Even if Trump were elected ― which is highly unlikely ― very little would change.

Far more important to Korea is what to do if Hillary Clinton is elected in November. In that event ― which is most likely - would it really be acceptable for Korea to miss out on opportunities during her presidency? That is what will happen if the next Korean leader cannot accept his responsibility and resume leadership of the Peninsula problem. Clinton and Tim Kaine, her vice presidential nominee, are both lifelong moderate-progressive policy wonks. She would be one of the most experienced and competent people ever to become US president. For Korea, this is not a left-right thing. It is more a matter of military tension vs development and security. More a matter of the dangerous status quo vs realistic progress.

Or take China. South Korean relations with China seem to be deteriorating. But the real expansion and maturing of that relationship began in 1998, when Korea opened a second diplomatic initiative, parallel to the US work that had been done since the early 1990s, and began changing regional power relations. The new rapport was far better for Korea, but was downgraded again by the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008. There is little evidence that the Chinese have ever believed President Park Guen-hye had realistic proposals for improvement, so the failure of her ill-considered ploy to pry them away from North Korea is not surprising. Both sides may make colorful statements regarding the deployment of THAAD batteries, but the relationship has been in trouble for eight years.

Public attempts by the Chinese to bully South Korea ― as they did at the ARF meeting in Laos this week - only serve to expose their insecurity. A country that locks up artists and booksellers, and opposes democratic expression, will always be respectful of South Korean economic vitality and its wide and deep diplomatic reach, but only if Koreans know how to demand it. All countries must protect themselves, but Chinese power will remain limited.

Finally, concern is also increasing in Korea that current trends threaten a Cold War-like division in the region, between China, Russia and North Korea on one side, and South Korea, Japan and the US on the other. It was precisely to make this less possible that the 1994 Agreed Framework and 1998 North-South engagement were negotiated and pursued. When the agreements were opposed and then overturned, beginning in 2001, analysts and diplomats here in Washington publically worried that such a division would return.

Current leaders in Washington and Seoul do not seem concerned about this. Maybe a return to simple blocks of opposing allies makes it easier for them to score political or ideological points. But they will both be gone in 6 and 18 months, respectively. Xi, Putin and Kim will be around for a while. The biggest question is whether the next leaders in the White House and Blue House will do better than their predecessors at providing security and progress. Skill at using power and influence are two of the keys. But a third key is having someone lead the way.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.