Washington think tanks misunderstand Korea

By Stephen Costello

Some of the smartest people work at Washington policy institutions. They have experience, extensive and relevant backgrounds, and detailed proposals that are unavailable elsewhere. They’re called think tanks for a reason. It is not really possible to label them collectively.

They also have their blind spots. Some have fallen victim to an oppressive “group think” that has infected specific policies over the years. Some have been “captured” by political, power or ideological groups. They may have accepted funding from interested parties, and then directly or indirectly produced biased reports. Some have hired former officials and others who have a consistent history of being terribly wrong on the most important questions of U.S. policy in recent years. Some are very insightful and useful in some areas, while being ideological and misleading in others.

Among the issues that continue – rightly – to produce great arguments and emotion are how to treat Israel, and the Israel-Palestine question. Is the Iranian state evil, and how could the U.S. strike a deal with its leaders? How should we view quality-of-life and the government/industry balance in western and northern Europe? How aggressive should we be in opposing China’s actions in the South China Sea? Should we care about democratic backsliding around the world, particularly among our allies? Has Obama now sold out the Cuban people, or opened the door to positive change there?

But among the most contentious issues has been: what is the best approach to North Korea? This often comes down in practice to who can be toughest on North Korea. Is it “pro-North” and appeasement to advocate diplomacy and deal-making with the DPRK? In other words, if one advocates effective denuclearization, so that it would lead to economic opening and greater attention to human rights, is that appeasement? And if one advocates increased isolation, insecurity and military intimidation toward the DPRK, which enables an expanded, region-wide nuclear arms and missile buildup, prolongs poverty and does nothing for human rights, is that smart, principled and tough diplomacy? This may sound comical but it is not far from the truth in Washington today, and it is deadly serious.

As you can see, these arguments are similar to those in Seoul. Another widely repeated claim is that the North “will never give up” its nuclear weapons: As if that can be known now. Or that the DPRK continually threatens the US with attack, for no reason but its craziness. The defensive rationale for most of its rhetoric is routinely ignored. Still another is that it is unpredictable. Another is that our ally South Korea has not switched its policy, and changed its interests. Or that the health of South Korea’s democratic system or the ideology of its leaders are unrelated to its policy position toward North Korea.

And finally my favorite, that the North walked away from a decade-long negotiated deal with the U.S. that provided billions of dollars in energy plant construction, unprecedented diplomatic access, and interaction with the international system, just so they could pursue a speculative, nascent, hidden enriched uranium processing operation. Very many scholars say they believe this. That by itself is worrisome.

Connected to the last one is the assumption, clear in almost all arguments on the Korea issues, which the U.S. has always acted in good faith and with a consistent policy position. To admit that American policy changed, or changed radically, or changed only because we had an election, would be to allow some reason for North Korean distrust toward the U.S. Instead there is never any reason. They’re just crazy.

All this reduces much of the output about Korea in Washington to ideological, political or otherwise shallow scholarship. In many ways we could say this just doesn’t matter. Except for three elections that may change the calculus of what is regarded as in our interests.

First there were the recent elections of National Assembly members in South Korea. Two things stand out: First, the opposition of relatively progressive parties the Minju and People’s parties, captured most of the votes, giving the largest share to the democratic opposition for the first time in 16 years. This could shift the tone and content of policy debates away from mostly punitive actions toward North Korea to some form of contact, meetings, and joint economic projects. Such a shift would run counter to current U.S. policy and preferences for the past 15 years, and require multiple consultations.

The second point that stands out from the April elections is that the People’s Party won seats mainly in Jeolla province, the long-time bastion of progressive leaders, including Kim Dae-jung, but it won them largely by taking away conservative votes. So although the progressive Minju Party of Korea won more seats in the Assembly than the ruling Saenuri party (123 to 122), the addition of the People’s Party (38 seats) means that it cut deeply into the conservative lead that had developed since 2007. This could be an indication of a changed calculus for the all-important presidential election at the end of 2017.

The second election that may change U.S. and South Korean views of national interests was the US primary election, or series of elections. Likely nominees for the presidency are now Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The election of either would pose challenges to the next Korea president. If it is Clinton, there is no clear indication yet what she learned from Bill Clinton’s Korea policies, George Bush’s radical reversal of those policies, or Barak Obama’s surprising embrace and doubling-down on the Bush assumptions.

If it is Trump, there is no indication that any senior party or policy leaders in Korea know how to talk about the reasons for the U.S. investment in Korea and Korea’s investment in U.S. forces. As Korean parties and politicians jockey for advantage in the December 2017 race, the prospect of U.S. ambivalence or disinterest should inform their views. Trump’s suggestion, echoing recent statements from President Obama, that Korea is something of a “free rider” should cause Koreans to consider whether it is time to finally accept the responsibilities and requirements of the middle power they now are.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.