Will we change tactics on NK?

By Stephen Costello

Following the Feb. 7 DPRK missile launch, alarmist voices from top officials have now reached a crescendo. Robert Carlin, perhaps the best North Korea watcher in the US, notes that Kim Jung Un’s behavior is very similar to his two predecessors, and then makes this point: “This ― in some sense the essential interests North Koreans believe they must defend ― is what we have to deal with, difficult though it might be, and scaring ourselves with dancing shadows on the walls of a cave of our own making will, in the end, lead us nowhere good.”

Theodore Postol, MIT professor of science, technology and national security, calls overreaction to the latest missile launch “hysterical.” And that’s actually a problem. We’ve come to expect exaggerations, hyperbole, and pretense from political candidates, but not so much from sitting presidents and their secretaries. Language now being used by those we expect to have level heads has led many specialists to worry that violent conflict is likely. And they’re right to worry. Terms that are fundamentally religious, ideological or moral aren’t very useful in diplomacy and analysis. Is conflict really what officials were elected to accomplish?

This question ― what would it take to force a change in the ROK and/or U.S. tactics toward North Korea ― is probably a good one. It’s good precisely because it is “NOT” the one asked by countless scholarly, journalistic or Korea-specialist voices over the past few weeks. Sure, the usual suspects have occasionally asked what it will take for the U.S. to go back to the Banco Delta Asia “enhanced sanctions.” Some in Seoul have taken a different approach, arguing again that maybe now the ROK should develop its own nuclear weapons. But no one is asking: What would it take to free the U.S. or ROK from their paralyzing ― and expensive ― fear of diplomacy, of talking to the DPRK? There are precedents for talks that lead to limits on weapons.

The answer seems to be, for now, nothing. This missile launch will not change our tactics. That is to say, neither administration has done the planning for, or has considered the pros and cons of, returning to serious discussions with North Korea about nuclear weapons “AND” development “AND” security: The kind of talks that might lead to success. Apparently, such talks would require more courage and self-confidence, and more understanding of strategy, than we have now. It’s been 15 years since the last effort by the U.S. administration, and nine years since the last effort by the ROK administration.

Yes, there was the so-called “Leap Day” agreement of 29 February 2012, in which the U.S. team under President Obama sought to trade humanitarian assistance and an end to overt confrontation for a freeze and monitoring of much of the DPRK nuclear infrastructure. But Obama had already embraced the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld requirement for a punishment/reward or surrender/victory narrative, as well as the unworkable Six Party Talks Framework, both of which made fundamental agreements unlikely, if not impossible. Not surprisingly, the North saw the deal differently from the U.S.

The preference for talking about tactics ― instead of strategy ― has been exposed in endless debates over the role of China. U.S. State Secretary John Kerry directly lectured his Chinese counterpart, suggesting ― as does much of the US policy community ― that he knows Chinese interests better than they do, and that the U.S. is blameless in creating such an explosive environment in the region. South Korean President Park Geun-hye similarly criticized the Chinese, apparently shocked that her tactical-but-not-strategic diplomatic embrace of President Xi Jinping had not encouraged him to abandon Chinese strategic interests in favor of ROK and U.S. political interests. Meanwhile, the Chinese have become more direct about the way they see this game, finally saying clearly that the U.S. is refusing to do what it could to disarm the DPRK.

Last month, several Korea specialists gathered for a drink in memory of the late Ambassador to South Korea Stephen Bosworth. Their backgrounds spanned government, journalism and scholarship. Again and again, the tactical, political and non-strategic nature of U.S. policy came up. A change of approach was not expected, even after the presidential election nine m0nths away. The dispatch of a B-52 bomber on 9 January over Korea was seen as projecting weakness and rigidity, not strength or imagination. That gesture will probably help the DPRK leadership justify its nuclear programs, it was observed.

Much of the current debate over this latest North Korean missile test has a similar feel. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said, “You need to know what you don’t know.”The difference between the approach of China and North Korea on one hand, and the U.S., Japan and South Korea on the other, has rarely been so stark. While the former pursue deadly serious strategic interests, the latter engage in loud-but-pointless posturing, largely aimed at voters back home, and innocent of recent diplomatic history. The tragic and unnecessary mistake over the past four presidential terms in how to handle Korea has exposed the hollow core of the U.S. “pivot to Asia.” In one sense it’s sad for the democracies. Why couldn’t they produce leaders with a bit more experience and ambition at this critical moment? But it’s primarily sad for the North Koreans. They’re the ones who would benefit from enhanced security, development and disarmament. Why aren’t their leaders more confident, worldly, and capable? For now, they’ll have to wait.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.