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Lately, it seems that more and more, the necessary changes and advancements in Korea seem to be put off until the next President takes office in February 2018. Economic, social, justice and diplomatic policies need attention and upgrades. The independence and professionalism of the National Assembly, justice system, Supreme Court and intelligence agency urgently need strengthening. As Prof. Lee Dong-geol of Dongguk University business school recently put it, “I would be worried about having to endure two more years of this, if the implosion of the political opposition didn’t make me concerned that we might have to endure seven more years.” He makes a good point.
Yet, Korea’s political and democratic problems are also part of a larger movement. Some have argued that, in the second decade of the new century, it has become harder to be a leader. Instant, multi-platform news and higher expectations that are more urgent also contribute, they say. In his book “The End of Power,” Moises Naim argues that power isn’t what it used to be. “Those in power today are more constrained in what they can do with it and more at risk of losing it than ever before.”
Others document a broad trend toward autocratic, anti-democratic rule across wide parts of the globe. This trend is clear in the promotion of laws and regulations against civil and human rights and against democratic freedoms. At the Newseum in Washington, a large, wall-sized map tracks press freedom around the world according to the watchdog Freedom House. South Korea stands out in yellow, along with India and Mongolia, as “partly free.” Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Papua New Guinea are green and “free.” China, Russia and North Korea, well, you know what red means here. The Freedom House report on Freedom in the World in 2015 was subtitled “Discarding Democracy/Return to the Iron Fist.”
But we should exercise some skepticism about Korea’s direction. Each democracy has its own reasons for stalled progress and retreating democratic structures. Income inequality has sharply increased and power elites have bent systems further to support rapacious unfairness. Perceptions of risk and reward have changed among the haves and have-nots. The U.S. struggles with these trends just as many others do.
The responsibilities and requirements expected from leaders in the “middle powers” of Japan, South Korea and Australia have increased as their capabilities have grown and the big powers have stalled. It may be that the qualities required for leadership are much the same as they have always been, but systems are making it harder for truly prepared candidates to be elected. And it may also be that the kind of leaders who prepare themselves for power by doing things, planning, traveling, studying and listening, have always been few and far between.
In this context, the exit of Moon Jae-in from the major opposition party in South Korea may be a good thing. In a broad sense, the opposition forces have spent far too much time dealing with personalities and empty symbolism, and too little time on remembering and refining their policy identity. And that should be the central objective, the opposition’s policy identity. “Values” are nice, but are too easily manipulated, as we have seen in the past few years.
The opposition should also give itself a break. It has suffered repeated body-blows since its heyday in the late 1990s. At that time, Korea’s example of relatively non-violent change from authoritarianism to democracy was a great source of pride. Its recovery from the 1997 financial crisis led to Chinese asking for financial advice. Its president began dealing with North Korea and won the Nobel Peace Prize. But in 2003 incoming President Roh Moo-hyun decided to burnish his image as “clean” by attacking the president and party that had just supported him for election. Aside from its unfairness and probable illegality, this did several things. It took the spotlight, and the heat, away from the still-powerful forces of authoritarianism and anti-communist conservatism, at a time when they were tipping precariously between the dustbin of history and a comeback to respectability.
Splitting the party also broke much of the institutional continuity and trust between pre-2003 and post-2003 progressives, and at a critical time. It crippled the only forces that could have managed Korea’s political and policy abandonment by its U.S. ally, rendering them almost powerless in the face of President Bush’s Korea policy reversal, already into its third year. Most devastatingly, it substituted personality and grievance as the basis of political power for the carefully constructed policy platform and pan-ideological alliances of the Kim Dae-jung, Kim Jong-pil, Park Tae-joon alliance. Kim Dae-jung was a big personality, but he always grounded his power in broad, consistent policy terms.
Then, in the sixth year of the progressive civil war and three months apart, the two top generals Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung died, leaving their forces leaderless and exhausted. Their troops have fought on relentlessly, some better than others, but the war has yet to end. So there are reasons for progressives, all across society, to be tired, angry and divided.
In modern Korea there are certainly figures who are ready to lead a revitalized democratic party. We could name several. Ahn Cheol-soo and Ban Ki-moon may not be among them. The need to protect democracy and grow Korea’s economic and diplomatic power is a major challenge for the next Korean president, but they can be met. And although personality is important, policy intelligence and intellectual self-confidence will more likely determine who can win elections for the Assembly this year and for the Blue House next year. The turn away from a careful, modern and inclusive policy vision broke the opposition 13 years ago. Now, that vision has to be updated and restored in order to define the broad progressive movement and offer a winning political deal to the voters.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.