Diplomatic incoherence

By Stephen Costello

The most vexing problems of Korean diplomacy depend fundamentally on sequence. Yet that is precisely what is left unsaid by officials who prefer to pretend at policy rather than do the work. In some cases, the issue of sequence is what divides two views or options for action. Sequence in policy is highly political. It is also very much based on power and confidence.

Much of the comment about President Park Geun-hye’s visit to Beijing avoids this necessity. Is it really progress for the Korean leader to urge again and publicly her Chinese neighbor to do what she will not do? Or is it the same “optics of submission” that have animated Korean policies since 2008? Those who expect a “flurry of diplomacy” in the coming months may be disappointed, because the requirement to treat North Korea as a legitimate partner is a prerequisite, and it is not in sight.

What comes first, denuclearization or North Korean development? Who gives in first so that a North-South summit can be held, South Korea or North Korea? What should be the goal of diplomacy between the two Koreas, reunification or rapprochement and common interests? What should the South Korean government prioritize, “no daylight” between itself and its U.S. ally, or progress toward the first North-South summit in eight years? More to the point, what comes first, denuclearization or planning for development and interaction?

To hear officials talk, both are priorities. There is no choice. But of course the sequence of values or actions is at the heart of the matter, and is the first test of leadership, seriousness or policy coherence. If denuclearization comes first, then that is really a waiting/surrender game. If the stronger party requires the weaker party to provide it with political cover in order to hold a summit, then there will be no summit. If we focus on unification on South Korean terms, there will be no diplomacy toward rapprochement. If South Korea follows blindly the contradictory impulses of distracted leaders half a world away, there will be no engagement.

South Korean leaders continue to hope for renewed U.S. “engagement” or “attention” to their longstanding and inevitable first priority ― relations with the North. Both parties urge this, inattentive to the ironies of doing so. But Bill Clinton and Kim Dae Jung will not return. If the Democrats in the U.S. retain power, there is no evidence that they will recall the logic and strategic value of the 1990s multilateral engagement, despite its similar rationale to the Iran and Cuba initiatives. Hillary is no Bill, to paraphrase Lloyd Bentsen about Dan Quayle. The virtual collapse of a Democratic Party foreign policy is evident in the battle over the Iran deal and the rhetoric of Secretary of State John Kerry. If the Republicans win, that prospect is even less likely.

For Koreans then, the question will end up as one of preparation, political ability and guts. Priorities and sequences. Only a South Korean leader can lead parties back to some end to tension and some beginning of security. It is unlikely President Park’s Beijing optics will do that.

There is also a generational change under way in Seoul, within political parties. New figures may take a fresh look, remember lessons from the past 20 years and begin talking about modest, realistic but game-changing initiatives. They will understand that Korea’s next big play cannot be out-sourced, and cannot be based on ideological myths. When new leaders make this move, all their partners and allies will notice. Doubts about the “loyalty” of the ROK President will be swept away in Washington, replaced by a scramble to capture the strategic windfall. In Beijing old debates will intensify, requiring confirmation that they too will benefit. And in Tokyo, relief will be quickly followed by commercial and diplomatic “resets.”

In all this it is valuable to remember the relative order of the Northeast Asian region. Despite its multiple difficult trends, it is not facing the disorder of North Africa or the Middle East. Its immigrant problems are real but pale in comparison to Europe’s. As John Merrill noted in his AsiaEast.Org discussion, North Korea’s human right abuses would be quickly eclipsed if military confrontation broke out on the Korean Peninsula. The expanding disaster would not spare China or Japan, although it may spare the U.S.

Presidents Park and Barack Obama are so much alike, we should notice their similarities as we consider their successors. The paralysis in North Korea policy. The U.S. administration’s inability to notice Seoul’s drift away from democracy. The Korean administration’s inability to notice Washington’s wildly swinging and then falsely unambitious policy. The complicity of both in anchoring policy and public diplomacy in transparent myths. In our systems, for better and for worse, when it comes to strategic choices, it is all about the leaders.

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web

and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused

on security, development and politics in Northeast

Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He

can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.