Abe, Park, Obama and current debates

By Stephen Costello

Recent commentary surrounding Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the U.S. and the ongoing diplomatic strains among Japan, Korea and China have exposed several ongoing debates about events in the region. Several points are relevant.

One, the success of Abe’s U.S. visit could only occur during a time when China is seen as trying to push around its neighbors. If the agenda were to cover issues other than security and the anti-China TPP, other criticism of Abe may have been made. The success of the Abe visit could also only occur when U.S. officials are singularly concerned with the optics of strength, security and military friendships with its allies in the region. These are narrow and simple organizing principles ― the kind that are politically easiest for the American, Japanese and Korean leaders. They are the largest part of the U.S. rebalance toward the region.

Two, the smartest U.S. Northeast Asia-watchers have been warning during the Obama years that the U.S.-China relationship needs far deeper engagement and careful management than it is getting. They have warned again and again that the leadership groups in both capitols are looking at each other in zero-sum terms. This is why the AIIB fiasco is so important, because it shows a mind-set that is uncomplicated and zero-sum, and that infects much of what the White House does in Northeast Asia.

Three, because of a primarily security-centered approach, the U.S. administration has never been very concerned about the domestic support, historical controversies or anti-democratic aspects of its Japanese or Korean allies. That is also why it is seemingly unaware of the pressure building in both countries for a new degree of independence and flexibility in foreign policy. It will resist those pressures and expect obedience and loyalty. When Prime Minister Abe declined to join the Chinese-led AIIB, he said pointedly, “The U.S. can count on Japan to be loyal.”

Four, ironically, President Park Geun-hye has for years played the same “security” and threat card in her relationship with her U.S. counterpart. It is therefore inconvenient for her administration to object to the Abe government’s enhanced military capabilities. The security card Park has played has served to greatly limit her diplomatic movements. In addition, she did not attend the Moscow summit on May 9, dropping one of the only venues where her geographic location, economic vitality and ability to play diplomatic “chess” would have made player.

Five, last week in Washington I talked to two of the best academic and former government thinkers I know about the Korean position. One said, “I hate to say this, but I don’t think President Park has it. If she wanted the U.S. to play a supporting role in Korea-led diplomacy toward China, North Korea or even Japan, the U.S. would say yes!” The other one was even more pessimistic, and he is a centrist. He said, “Many people have been saying that Ms. Park is saying the minimum she needs to in public to pretend that she has plans for North Korea. In reality, she has none.”

Six, Japan-watchers, Korea-watchers and Washington-watchers all have trouble talking about politics, but politics are at the heart of current trends. In both political and policy terms the challenge is like walking and chewing gum at the same time. Can we do what we must to insure security, while at the same time lean far forward ― as any strong, self-confident leadership would ― to reduce tension and modernize? Of course the Chinese threat must be watched and managed, and the North Koreans must be deterred from any violence. Careful military upgrades, in both hardware and cooperative agreements, are appropriate in both Japan and Korea. But the threat and security narrative has for decades been the preferred ― and central ― story of different power groups in the two countries. In both Japan and Korea today they wield strong influence within the Prime Minister’s and President’s offices. They eagerly buy and deploy military hardware, demonize their critics, try to control the media, manipulate textbooks, and use security as a weapon against their legitimate political opponents. In Korea they also oppose realistic diplomacy. Rather than being realists, they are more accurately seen as stubborn fighters for impractical, outdated, unrealistic principles.

Seven, President Obama has been particularly rigid in his foreign policy toward this region, despite his more progressive leanings in other places. He has eagerly embraced the threat and security organizing principle, just as the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld group did before him. On the day he walked into the White House in January 2009 his top Asia director rebuffed a suggestion by the State Department to tell the North Koreans the relationship was under review and there would be general policy continuity. Jeff Bader, Senior Director for East Asian Affairs in the NSC, felt Seoul had “permitted excessive accommodation of Pyongyang,” and was determined that Obama not “chase after dictators.” (See Jeff Bader, “Obama and China’s Rise” from the Brookings Institution); so much for the myth of an “outstretched hand.”

Eight, there are certainly dynamics at work in Northeast Asia with economic, trade, development and security implications. But the range of options to deal with them is vast, and it includes many obvious diplomatic and symbolic actions, and many that do not involve military force or the threat of force. That fact demonstrates that one of the chief reasons for today’s insecurity in the region is that like-minded groups are setting national policy in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington. The stresses we see are driven by different causes. But the reaction to them is a natural outgrowth of the worldviews at the top.

The scientific, technological, imaginative and modern options that are not being used are an arsenal that the next group of political leaders may choose to use. Whose job is it to discover who is talking about these unused methods and initiatives and get them closer to public attention, closer even to political power?

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.