Why unlock North Korea?

By Stephen Costello

Why do we care about North Korea? Why not let it stew in its isolation and wait ― however long that might be ― for some change there? Why should leaders in South Korea, Japan or the U.S. spend precious political capital on bringing about disarmament and development in that odd place?

One reason we watch and obsess over developments in North Korea is because, geographically, strategically and politically, it matters. If the two Koreas were to find a way to begin talking honestly and solving the big outstanding problems that divide them, major political, power and infrastructure projects would quickly take shape and become viable again. The vast difference between a Korean Peninsula that remains technically at war and one that is cooling and recognizing some essential common interests is, well, a game-changer, as they say today.

Geography. To name just a few political or security dynamics affected by such a change, there are U.S.-China relations, China-South Korea relations, Japanese-Korean relations and U.S.-Korean relations. In the commercial or strategic arena there are Japan-Korea railways, Korea-China and Korea-Russia railways. This is along with natural gas and various other energy production and transmission schemes, as well as a host of related development projects in North Korea. All the local parties know this, and in fact many of these projects have been on the books for decades. Many Northeast Asians know that regional integration made a great difference for the history of Western Europe after World War II and that, though different, a regional evolution here would be just as momentous.

History. Another reason is because there was a tantalizing test from roughly 1994 to 2001, and it was extremely successful and held great promise. It is not necessary to overstate the test’s achievements, since although they were great and remarkable, they still fell short of the lock on progress that ― in one way or another ― all parties aimed at in those years. Key non-political actors in U.S.-North Korea and South-North diplomacy during those years have recently reminded us that North Korea kept most ― and the most important ― promises it made during this period. For those wondering if progress on the big issues surrounding North Korea is possible, the diplomatic history is promising.

Leadership. A further reason to analyze North Korea is that today’s leaders work in the shadow of leaders from those years, whether they acknowledge it or not. They should make appropriate comparisons between the two, and draw some lessons. This logical and necessary guidance is routinely ignored by much of the media and many scholars, but it is required nonetheless. During Kim Jong-Il’s leadership, a great deal was invested in him by the U.S., South Korea and other parties. In 2000, he showed the capability to take new risks for progress, however haltingly.

Bill Clinton had his weak points, but he also expended great efforts for Korean denuclearization and development, and with amazing deftness, from 1992-2000. The political environment for him was just as daunting as that faced by Barack Obama. Conservatives in Congress were exaggerating missile threats from China and North Korea all during the 1990s. The Rumsfeld Commission on missile defense in 1998 and the Cox Commission of 1999 both advocated unfettered missile defense and disparaged President Clinton’s achievements with North Korea. Top notch diplomatic professionals worked hard to make this happen. Gallucci, Bosworth, Laney, Einhorn, Perry, Sherman, Albright, and many others in the U.S. devoted their careers to making these agreements work.

Kim Dae Jung was the critical link between U.S. demands to roll back missile threats and end nuclear weapons development in North Korea on one hand, and that country’s demand to be accorded a route to energy, development and normal, non-hostile relations with the U.S. The Agreed Framework of 1994 was the U.S.-North Korea structure, and North-South Engagement of 1998-2001 was the inter-Korean structure. In the decades leading up to his presidency, there was no one Kim would not talk to and learn from about these issues. During the 1990s, I watched this first-hand in Moscow, Bonn, Lisbon, Cambridge, Seoul and Washington.

Finally, the policies and strategies employed at the time contrast very much with today’s official expressions. Both the KEDO enterprise of 1995 and the South Korean engagement initiative of 1998 were based on specific views and analyses that today are largely absent from official thinking. In contrast to today, they understood and built into their diplomacy a requirement that North Korea must be led to international institutions and standards, and the potential development future they represent. Today official language consists of narrow, exclusive and frankly mythical objectives which lack practicality and realism.

North Korea has resisted being unlocked because it represents at least two fundamental challenges to democratic leaders in the U.S. and South Korea. First, engaging them for strategic gain requires a longer-term mindset and the capability to politically promote a practical vision. This is very hard work, and requires great preparation and a strong and deep team. Few politicians are up to it. Secondly, North Korea issues demand a wide-ranging reassessment of national interests, capabilities and roles on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. That assessment ― similar to the Australian and New Zealand whole-of-government interest assessments of the past few years ― also takes intellectual vigor, bureaucratic and structural cleverness, and analytical professionalism. Until Cheong Wa Dae and/or the White House can muster that focused intensity, North Korea ― with its potential to unlock multiple security and development advances in a crucial region at a critical time ― will remain too difficult for leaders to tackle.

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.