Should President Park go to Moscow?

By Stephen Costello

Korean President Park Geun-hye faces a defining choice regarding her appearance at the Russian celebration of the end of World War II in Moscow in May. Because of regional power dynamics; the current state of political needs and requirements in East Asian, Russian and American capitals; and because Korea’s interests are clearly at stake; the decision could boost the President and Korea, or it could diminish them both.

Various parties have put forth reasons for Ms. Park not to go. It is said that she should not offend the U.S. President, who will stay away as a protest against Russian actions in Ukraine. There are pitfalls if she sees the North Korean leader, and if expectations are not met. Sensitivities are also raw with the Japanese leader, so that could go wrong. Meeting with the North Koreans and Russians at this time could provide propaganda opportunities to them.

Many others support the trip. For better or worse, it is a test of the Park presidency as she enters her third of five years. She will not have another term to sort out Korea’s interests in all this. This is one of the greatest opportunities in her presidency to make a point about power and about Korea’s place. Geography and economics are on her side. All other parties need her. Not only that, but the timing is important. If she decides earlier to go, that shows commitment and decisiveness, and allows the maximum leverage of her substantial economic, political, and agenda-setting power. If she decides at the very end, as her foreign minister has suggested, some of that power will have evaporated.

Is Park Geun-hye East Asia’s Angela Merkel? The comparison is imperfect, but reveals important facts. The Asian region has no obvious parallel national leader with German Chancellor Merkel’s power and visibility. That power comes primarily from Germany’s economic might, its central geographic location in Europe, its historic ties with Russia, and from Merkel’s close relationship with U.S. President Obama. It also comes from the Chancellor’s personality. Similarly, Park represents Korea’s economic might, its geographic centrality in the region, and her close relationship with Mr. Obama.

Can Korea act as a middle power or not? Because of the statements from some in the US government and among specialists, it is clear that some would discourage Ms. Park from going. All countries must show a “common front” against Russia’s Ukraine actions, according to this view. This has imbued her decision with an unwelcome degree of meaning. Perhaps, however, it is a welcome chance for her to make her and Korea’s independence clear. Chancellor Merkel and French President Hollande met President Putin in Moscow. Ms. Park should be trusted to protect her interests.

In power relationships with Putin, Obama, Xi, Abe and Kim, Park can help set the terms of discussions with them. Preparation work on these meetings should begin now, which is one reason to accept early and plan extensively. Expectations can be set low; exchanges of views can be valuable.

Park’s leverage will increase with the U.N., ASEAN, and the EU. There is a long list of items for the group to address. However, stern recommendations on Ukraine to Mr. Putin, and Northeast Asian cooperation led by Korea, should be two priorities. President Park’s active involvement will increase her value to the U.N., ASEAN and even her counterparts in the EU.

There are practical aspects to meetings in Moscow for President Park. She could jump-start transportation and energy projects with Japanese, Chinese and Russian meetings. She could speak – and listen – to President Putin on Ukraine. She could show solidarity with both the anti-invasion principle and the view of Russia’s fair interests. She can gather views among neighbors about both Ukraine and broader settlements in East Asia. She could come with ideas, draft plans, graphic depictions, visions of the future. In one sense, there is a blank slate aspect to having this meeting in the spring and without the sanction of a leading institution or western government. There is a lot of Asian business to discuss.

Meet with the North Koreans. In a political sense, the Moscow meeting is the best of both worlds. At this point we should not expect Kim Jung Un to travel. Perhaps Choe Thae-bok, Ri Su-yong or Kim Young Nam will be sent in his stead. President Park’s planning could take either eventuality into account. Even if Chairman Kim does come, the meeting can be called a “side meeting” rather than a “summit.” That is Ms. Park’s option. The more important issue is how to handle the meeting, what to discuss, how to set the stage for a future summit, and what to say about the meeting afterwards.

Finally, for potential presidential candidates from either political party, this choice is a valuable test of what they would do, and how they see Korea’s options, dangers, and opportunities. How can they be helpful and supportive today? If they are tentative, confused, or need advice from public opinion surveys, then they are clearly not ready for leadership. Ms. Park can be gracious to her host, and also have frank discussions over policies and futures. She can gather important impressions of Mr. Putin and other leaders. There are very few opportunities to meet her counterparts this way, on relatively neutral territory. She should decide early, plan extensively, gather political support at home, and go.

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.