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A TV screen shows file images of U.S. President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, July 22. The case for South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons is still strong despite its trilateral partnership with the U.S. and Japan, according to Cheong Seong-chang, author of the new book, "Why We Should Become a Nuclear Power." AP-Yonhap |
Expert calls trilateral security ties 'short-term pain relief,' calling for solution for root cause
By Jung Min-ho
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Cheong Seong-chang, an expert on North Korea at the Sejong Institute, a think tank |
But any sense of security brought about by the partnership should not fool anyone given the root problem left untouched, said Cheong Seong-chang, author of the new book, "Why We Should Become a Nuclear Power."
In a recent interview, Cheong, an expert on North Korea at the Sejong Institute, a think tank, called that diplomatic deal "a short-term pain relief," which would wear off as soon as North Korea carries out its next nuclear weapons test or Americans elect their next leader ― quite possibly Donald J. Trump. Unless Seoul finds a fundamental solution, he added, the question as to whether it can defend itself from the North Korean nuclear bombs with little or no U.S. support will keep coming back.
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"Why We Should Become a Nuclear Power" |
The expectation that one party can win all future elections is simply not realistic, he said. By the time Seoul faces the next Trump-like leader, Pyongyang's nuclear threat will have reached even greater levels, he added.
In the book, Cheong argues that any diplomatic effort to convince North Korea to give up nuclear weapons development will fail as it has over the past several decades. The only way to achieve it is, ironically, for South Korea to build its own, he said.
He proposes a four-phase strategy in which the government declares its intent to withdraw the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) under Article 10, which allows member countries to leave if adherence to the pact would jeopardize national interest.
If North Korea continues provocations, the South should take the next step by implementing the plan and demonstrating intent to develop nuclear weapons ― under the condition that it would halt the process at any time if the North returns to negotiations.
The third stage is to start building nuclear weapons. By this stage, South Korean authorities should have reached a deal with Washington for cooperation such as the connivance the U.S. gave to Israel when it was unofficially building nuclear arms.
The fourth and final phase is to begin negotiating with North Korea as a nuclear-armed state for nuclear disarmament on both sides. If the North agrees to get rid of all nuclear weapons, the South should do the same. But a more realistic goal would be to reduce the number of weapons to fewer than 10. He described this as a state of "semi-denuclearization" where both face significantly lower risk of war and destruction as a result of the "nuclear balance" and a limited number of nuclear warheads deployable.
"The ultimate goal is peace," Cheong said. "For that, we need nuclear weapons."