'Seoul should not join US missile defense'

Prof. Kim Joon-hyung

By Kim Joon-hyung

South Korea and the United States plan to decide the timing and conditions for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean troops in the upcoming Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to be held in Washington this month. The meeting will present an opportunity for the two allies to decide appropriate conditions for the transfer. This could mean the issue is tied to the completion of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Kill Chain preemptive strike systems, which are expected to be completed around 2020. If that is indeed the case, then the U.S. will have the upper hand in negotiations and may want to use the transfer as leverage to pressure Seoul into joining its anti-ballistic missile defense system. As the U.S. tries to expand the system across the Asia-Pacific, Korea is considered to have a key role to play. With OPCON remaining in its hands, Washington will continue to have an advantageous position on this strategic project.

South Korea's government has continuously denied participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system, stressing plans to develop its own indigenous system. Despite this, several top military officials in both Washington and Seoul have recommended the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which is at the core of U.S. missile defense. An actual deployment of THAAD will contradict Seoul's denials of joining the system. High interoperability and Korea's dependence upon U.S. military technology has made speculation over KAMD's genuine intentions resurface. In fact, the two sides signed an agreement that called for South Korea to "further the interoperability" of its anti-missile system with that of the U.S. Some U.S. officials are even asking South Korea to move beyond interoperability to integration.

As Washington has already taken the deployment of THAAD as a given, Seoul has started to say it is necessary, while emphasizing that deployment does not mean joining the U.S. defense system. Both countries also claim they have not finalized deployment. However, in May the Wall Street Journal reported that the Pentagon had already conducted a site survey in South Korea to look for potential locations for the THAAD batteries. If THAAD is deployed, South Korea will be the first country outside the U.S. to have it. The U.S. is obviously intensifying pressure on the Park Guen-hye government to accept a role in its missile defense network in the East Asian region. Washington seems very determined to consolidate the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral military cooperation network and outsource its anti-China policy to Japan and Korea, as the U.S. is facing steady cuts in defense spending. Constructing a regional missile defense system is a core part of the trilateral military cooperation. Tokyo joined back in 2005.

China's reaction could provide a major headache for the trio. China is extremely sensitive about the deployment of U.S. missile defense in the East Asian region. Beijing has described it as a means of militarily encircling China. A U.S-led missile system in this region will significantly weaken China's highly valued portfolio of ballistic missiles, which are important tools in Beijing's military strategy in denying U.S. access to China's coastal regions and air space. In this context, Beijing has expressed several times to Seoul that deployment will cross a red line in the two countries' relations.

What should the South Korean government do? First of all, President Park should not take part in the American-led missile defense system and work to subdue speculation over THAAD deployment. From now on, there should be no more behind-the-curtain negotiations - the missile defense issue should be made public. At this moment, a hedging strategy is a better policy option for Korea to take. It should delay the establishment of the containment line the U.S. is pushing for. As the line would almost certainly cause aggravation in Korea-Japan relations, as well as with China, this should allow Korea some latitude in diplomacy. The atmosphere surrounding the Korean peninsula is not very amicable, but opportunities for agreement still remain. The U.S.-China relationship is not bound for confrontation right away, so Korea does not have to choose a side just yet, although Japan has already delineated China as a potential threat and started balancing against it.

Ultimately, the key will be a restoration of North-South relations. First of all, Park Geun-hye government's Trustpolitik diplomacy should become process-oriented rather than pressurizing Pyongyang to surrender. The fact North Korea recently asked for talks is nothing but positive. This might be a disguised peace, but Seoul should resolutely accommodate them and proactively make efforts to improve relations. Also, President Park's unification jackpot (or bonanza) theory should not be part of a unification-through-absorption based on North Korea's collapse scenario, but rather be equipped with practical solutions.

The writer is a professor of Handong University International Politics