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| File images of, from left, U.S. President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are displayed during a news program on a screen at Seoul Station, April 27. AP-Yonhap |
Yoon needs to raise approval rating to sustain coordination on N. Korea, China and Indo-Pacific initiatives
By Kim Yoo-chul
South Korea has clearly shifted the political focus of its regional strategy to supporting "strategic clarity" from "strategic ambiguity." The key question now is what the deliverables will be from the policy transition and how the incumbent Yoon Suk Yeol administration will solidify its alignment with the rules-based international order.
Given Washington's focus on prioritizing President Joe Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. has been playing the role of facilitator in terms of improving Seoul-Tokyo relations to the greatest extent possible, as its alliances with South Korea and Japan are surely two of the most critical relationships in the world.
Within that context, from the U.S. standpoint, Seoul-Tokyo relations should not be dragged down by historical disputes, because maintaining a solid Washington-Tokyo-Seoul relationship would advance mutual interests in keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open.
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| From left are Korea Society Policy Director Jonathan Corrado, Council on Foreign Relations' U.S.-South Korea Policy Program Director Scott A. Snyder and American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow Zack Cooper. Courtesy of Corrado, Snyder, Cooper |
Despite heavy domestic backlash, Yoon was the first to offer South Korea's decision to drop a demand that Japanese firms compensate South Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor. Plus, Seoul will establish a government-backed foundation with private companies making their financial contribution.
It remains uncertain whether Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will set Tokyo's position regarding the possibility of the Japanese companies' participation in the soon-to-be-established foundation during his two-day working visit to Seoul from May 7. Multiple opinion polls showed about 60 percent of South Koreans oppose Yoon's plan.
As the U.S. and South Korea celebrate the 70th anniversary of their alliance and 2023 also marks the first full year under the Joe Biden administration in Washington and the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in Seoul, Biden wanted to signal the final transition from an earlier period of relations under former presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in, during which bilateral rifts and geopolitical uncertainty shook the foundations of the alliance to a degree not seen in decades.
From South Korea's standpoint, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, North Korea's evolving nuclear threats and China's military assertiveness in Northeast Asia ― particularly the ongoing pressure on Taiwan ― raised worries that the U.S. responding to China's military aggression against Taiwan could occupy Washington's resources, promoting North Korea to use that chance to possibly attack Seoul.
"South Korea's consideration of nuclear options is Seoul's message to Washington hoping to get the U.S.' firm security assurances. This was a key prerequisite for the Yoon administration before acting and taking political risks when it comes to the improvement of Seoul-Tokyo ties," a senior aide who handled Seoul's East Asian policies under Moon, the former president, told The Korea Times.
"As Washington views President Yoon as the final piece in the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo jigsaw, Biden has to show his full appreciation of Yoon's intent to take huge political risks in resolving historical disputes between Seoul and Tokyo by offering a set of controversial measures to Japan."
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| In this photo provided by the South Korean defense ministry, from top left, U.S. FA-18, F-35B, F-16 fighter jets, KC-135 tanker, and Republic of Korea Air Force F-15K, KF-16 and F-35A fighter jets fly over South Korea during a joint air drill, April 21. AP-Yonhap |
Jonathan Corrado, a policy director at the New York-based nonpartisan think tank, Korea Society, assessed that the Washington Declaration is not intended to provide security reassurances, because he views it will genuinely give South Korea "more insight and input" into the thinking around the use of nuclear weapons.
"The U.S. could involve South Korea more in the strategic decision-making process around potential nuclear use and it seems like there will be special attention paid to increased coordination on extended deterrence during the summit. South Korea's independent acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is unlikely to affect Kim Jong-un's strategic calculus in the short term," Corrado said, adding that the development of South Korea's own independent nuclear arsenal could strain Washington-Seoul relations by stoking concerns about unintended escalation.
"South Korea should consider the downsides of nuclearization that some experts have pointed to, including damage to the global nonproliferation regime, a potential hit to South Korea's civilian nuclear industry, and the tremendous costs of developing nuclear weapons. The way to address North Korea's threat is through strengthening alliance capabilities, information sharing, consultation and tabletop exercises," the director said.
Need to secure solid public support
Now, Yoon and his administration are pressured to improve public perceptions of its foreign policy agenda, because when it comes to South Korea's relations with the U.S., Japan, China and North Korea, it's fair to say that there is a high degree of domestic political polarization.
Maintaining a high approval rating, therefore, matters the most as Yoon and his administration's foreign policies are normally affected by South Korean public opinion, according to Scott A. Snyder, a director of the U.S.-South Korea Policy Program at the New York-headquartered Council on Foreign Relations.
A low approval rating is not always a key constraint in terms of a state leader's ability to move forward with foreign policy initiatives. But if Yoon's job approval rating remains continuously low, it could make his administration much more cautious in managing and even handling key diplomatic challenges that are domestically sensitive.
Yoon's approval rating has stagnated to the upper 20-percent and low 30-percent range since he was elected a year ago.
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| President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a meeting at the prime minister's official residence in Tokyo, March 16. Reuters-Yonhap |
"Washington officials want to avoid a high degree of domestic political polarization regarding South Koreans' growing request to go nuclear. The Washington Declaration is aimed at addressing South Korean concerns about extended deterrence. But because both ruling and opposition parties will have to go into election mode, which will happen April 10 next year, if Yoon fails to increase his approval rating, then this will affect the results of next year's scheduled election and it's also possible for Yoon to turn toward hawkish in nuclear options to avoid political paralysis," the aide said.
A 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that more than 70 percent of South Koreans support the idea of their country possessing its own nuclear weapons.
The main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) has 169 seats, followed by the ruling People Power Party (PPP) with 115 seats in the National Assembly. The DPK's popularity rating stood at around 35 percent, followed by the PPP between 31 percent and 33 percent, multiple poll results showed.
"You are grappling with the costs of independent nuclear acquisition. I believe the White House has indicated the two presidents intend to deepen joint nuclear planning for extended deterrence purposes and that the U.S. is offering its strongest statement in support of nuclear extended deterrence for South Korea and that South Korea is reiterating its commitment to uphold the NPT. We shall see whether this works," Snyder said. The NPT stands for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former U.S. official at the White House National Security Council, said the launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group is aimed primarily at dispelling South Koreans' concerns about the U.S.' level of security guarantee.
"Of course, Tokyo might seek similar assurances from Washington, but I think U.S. leaders will see these two issues as largely separate. Although of course it is easier for the United States to provide these assurances when its allies are getting along," he said.
Cooper stressed it does not make sense for Seoul to pursue a "nuclear sharing" deal seen as in NATO, as some NATO members actually have their own nuclear weapons. "The two arrangements are necessarily quite different, but the logic is similar since both are efforts by the U.S. to bolster confidence in extended deterrence after an adversary gains a secure second strike capabilities," he said.
