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On March 2, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution that introduces new sanctions against North Korea. Resolution 2270 is by no means the first document of this kind: every new nuclear test resulted in yet another U.N. resolution and set of sanctions.
However, Resolution 2270 is unusually tough. It might be the first time the U.N. Security Council has introduced measures that can hit the North Korean economy really hard.
The resolution itself envisions several bans (on top of the bans that were introduced earlier), but two bans are of special significance. First, it unconditionally bans North Korean exports of gold, vanadium and titanium ores and rare earths minerals. Second, the resolution bans the export of iron ore and coal as well, but this ban is conditional: according to the article 29(b), the coal and iron ore can be exported for purposes unrelated to the nuclear and missile program.
Apart from Resolution 2270, South Korea and the United States undertook unilateral measures. South Korea closed the Gaeseong industrial zone that brought up to $100 million a year into the North. The U.S. introduced "secondary sanctions'' against people and companies engaged in financial transactions with North Korea or employing North Korean workers (export of workers has become a major source of income for North Korea in recent years).
In general, if these measures are fully implemented, North Korea is bound to face a crisis. Coal is its major export item, constituting about 40 percent of all North Korean exports, while minerals amount to the two-thirds of North Korea's entire exports.
Of course, diplomats assure us that ''sanctions will not hurt common people,'' but this mantra, obligatory in our politically correct times, should not be taken seriously.
Of course sanctions will hit common people and will probably reverse the improvement of North Korea's economic situation that began about 10 years ago and sped up under Kim Jong-un. It remains to be seen, of course, whether such sanctions will influence government policy on the nuclear issue. Most likely they will not.
However, one should not forget that Resolution 2270 has a loophole the size of floodgates: the caveat that coal and iron ore exports can be allowed if the earnings are not used for further development of the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
North Korea, in spite of all the recent changes, is a closed country, where the government is quite capable of hiding all internal structures. Documents can be easily forged, while officials and North Korean employees will say to foreigners exactly what they are ordered to say. In other words, normally there is way to verify whether profits from a particular deal are going to be used for the prohibited activities or not. Thus, in every case the buyer will have to decide.
In this case, buyers are going to be overwhelmingly Chinese. China is not nearly the sole trading partner of North Korea (some 90 percent of the total trade volume), but China also needs North Korean coal. Thus, the future of the North Korean economy largely depends on what position China will take.
So far, it appears that China is inclined to be tough. Many observers were surprised that China voted for Resolution 2270, and the first reports seemingly indicate that China is serious about enforcing the bans as well. However, will this resolve continue for more than few months? This is an open question.
On the one hand, Beijing is annoyed by North Korea's risky behavior and brinksmanship. China, one of the five officially recognized nuclear powers, does not like nuclear proliferation. Last but not least, China is annoyed because North Korea's antics create a reason (or excuse) for the U.S. to maintain and increase its military presence near China.
On the other hand, China does not want instability or even regime collapse in North Korea ― which excessive pressure might produce. So far, China has been careful not to overplay, and one can suspect that the same policy will be followed now.
So, if the sanctions create an excessively hard situation in North Korea, China is likely to take a softer approach ― and Resolution 2270 gives Beijing an opportunity to do so. Nonetheless, for the time being the Chinese message to Pyongyang is clear and tough.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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