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So, it has happened: the KCNA reported that the North Korean navy has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The launch took place in the vicinity of the Sinpo Naval base, located on North Korea's Eastern coast, and the Supreme Leader honoured the event with his august presence.
This is not as surprising as it might appear. For the last few months, there have been a number of leaks about North Korean advances in SLBM technology. U.S. signal intelligence had already discovered a few SLBM test launches, even though these earlier tests did not use actual submarines.
Strictly speaking, the North Korean media somewhat exaggerated their accomplishment: the North Korean engineers did not test a missile, they rather tested their ''SLBM ejection system." Submarine missiles are first ejected from a submersed submarine by the use of high-pressure gas. Only once the missile successfully makes it through the water into the air are the main rocket engines ignited. Thus, the current test has not demonstrated that North Korean missiles can fly long distances and hit their target, but it has demonstrated a significant technical advance nonetheless.
What does this all mean in a strategic sense? Frankly, nothing that is particularly good. The major problem that had faced North Korean strategists was the acquisition of a reliable delivery system for their new unclear devices. It is not enough to master the ability to explode the atom. In order to ensure that nuclear weapons can actually be deployed and used when necessary, a reliable delivery system is a must, and such a system should also be easily defendable.
For a number of years it appeared that North Korea's strategists had opted for the development of land-based, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). However, the Sinpo test-fire shows that North Korean strategists are now considering seriously another option, the use of submarines.
It probably helps that their missile engineers have always been heavily reliant on the design of old Soviet missiles that the North Korean intelligence service somehow acquired in the early 1990s when Russia was in turmoil. It is not known for sure how they did it, but it is known that North Koreans have pretty good blueprints for Soviet R-27 single-stage, liquid-propellant missiles developed in the 1960s and used in Russian submarines until recently. This means that some of the technical problems are not going to become a major obstacle for the North Koreans: they already know how things are done from the available Soviet experience.
Still, one has to admit: the North Korean engineers have again shown their remarkable skills. With some luck, the North Korean navy may have some missile submarines in the next five to ten years. If this is indeed going to happen, it will become a major strategic game changer.
SLBMs have some serious advantages over long range missiles. Long-range missiles are remarkably vulnerable, especially to modern precision weapons, and it takes hours to prepare more primitive ICBMs for launch. This means that an ICBM force can easily be destroyed before successfully deployed in the early stages of a conflict.
Additionally, the track record of North Korea's ICBM tests is far from impressive. Out of the five or six test fires, only one was completely successful.
An SLBM does not have to have a great range or the precision of an ICBM. However, it is not necessary: the submarine is a stealth weapon and it can approach its targets quietly. Of course, it is possible to locate and intercept a submarine, but the chances of success in this endeavour are by no means certain. Last, but not least, all preparations for an SLBM launch can be done away from prying eyes.
All this means that the North Koreans have managed to acquire a highly effective delivery system for their nuclear weapons – or, at least, is advancing in this direction. If things continue unchecked, in a decade or so, North Korea might be in possession of a nuclear weapons system that will constitute a real threat to the United States (or any other nation on earth, for that matter).
Admittedly, given their current situation, it is unlikely that North Korea's leaders will use these weapons for a pre-emptive strike: the deterrence is what they really care about. Nonetheless, the emergence of the North Korean SLBM program presents us with a new and rather unpleasant situation: the proliferation of nuclear weapons, long a nightmare of politicians and strategists, continues.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him atanlankov@yahoo.com.
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