By Oh Young-jin
North Korea's fourth nuclear test Wednesday forces the world to confront an old question anew: why we can't fix this rogue state once and for all.
It's been more than 20 years since the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the first significant effort to put a cap on the North's nuclear program.
From its Oct.9, 2006, first nuclear test, there have been two more, one each in 2009 and 2013, and followed by the Jan. 6, 2016, test that the North claimed involved a hydrogen bomb. The North also test-fired long-range missiles, which experts say can reach the West Coast of the United States.
The North Korean issue has been too conspicuous to ignore. Then, what has let the North grow to be as big a threat as it is?
To blame above all are competing interests of nations concerned. South Korea has insisted that it is an inter-Korean issue; its ally, U.S. sees it as an issue of changing priority; China, the only benefactor of the North, takes Pyongyang as a frontline province to protect its northeastern flank and Japan maintains its traditional view of Korea as corridor to China.
So to learn from the past mistakes and reconcile these competing views with each other is naturally the first step to resolve the North Korean challenge.
South Korea
South Korea should change its view on North Korea's nuclear weapons programs -- plutonium-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and now one allegedly about hydrogen bomb. So far, Seoul has, with differing degrees of success, tried to portray them as something between international problem and inter-Korean problem. From Wednesday on, the North Korean challenge should be dealt with more as an international one. Seoul should remain as one of the concerned stakeholders in this issue so it will be able to deal with the North less emotionally.
Looking back at how the North has become as big a threat as it is, the necessity for a sense of detachment is clear. The North has adroitly played its hand: insisting on talking to U.S. only and using the South's anxiety to talk with it for handsome handouts.
Also worthy of note is the manifested confusion in Seoul's coordination with the U.S.
For example, the late liberal President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" of reconciliation with the North got sidetracked when the conservative George W. Bush succeeded Bill Clinton as U.S. president and Barack Obama's succession also created a similar problem.
What Seoul requires to do is draw up a part of a North Korean solution that can be accepted to the rest of the concerned parties and that also can be subject to few changes even if there is a change of power, say, in U.S. or Seoul.
The United States
The United States policy toward North Korea for the past seven years under President Barack Obama can be summed up in the phrase "strategic patience", which was contained in a national security strategy document his administration published in February 2015. For the lack of a better expression, this has proved to be a laughable failure. Wednesday's blast in the North's Pungae-ri test site increasingly appears to be from a hydrogen bomb as the North claimed and has set Pyongyang on the path to becoming a nuclear state, whether or not the world recognizes it as one.
As the world is collectively wringing its hands not knowing what to do about the increasing threats from the impoverished rogue state, its young dictator, Kim Jong-un, may be enjoying every moment of it.
This all-too-familiar situation capped by a sense of hopelessness regarding what to do about the dictatorship, has followed three previous nuclear tests conducted by Pyongyang. It is the result of a dereliction of duty by Obama as the leader of the global superpower.
At the start of his presidency in 2009, he offered to talk with the North without any preconditions, but this was met by the North's second nuclear test, which occurred only four months after his inauguration. Since then, his administration had been left rudderless with neither leadership nor interest in its resolution, calling on the North to come back to the long-stalled Six-Party Talks. Obama opted to concentrate on Iran to reach a deal, similar to the Agreed Framework that his Democratic predecessor Bill Clinton had with the North; so emerged the term -- strategic patience -- to cover his inaction on the North.
However, Obama is only one of three U.S. presidents who have aggravated the North Korean problem. His Republican predecessor George W. Bush regretfully applied a domestic spin on the North Korean problem as part of his "anything but Clinton" policy. He designated the North as part of his self-styled axis of evil together with Iran and Iraq and overturned the so-called 1994 Agreed Framework, an elaborate effort made to stop the North's nuclear program. No sooner had Bush's policy started to work by putting a stranglehold on the North's overseas cash flows than he succumbed to a pattern, similar to that of Obama but to a lesser degree, by relenting from its stance and allowing the North to go back to its old habits.
Bill Clinton was credited with making the first deal with the North and his policy appeared to be peaking as he agreed with the approach of the late liberal former President Kim Dae-jung, paving the way for a détente in inter-Korean relationships under Kim's Nobel Peace Prize-winning reconciliatory "Sunshine Policy." Clinton, however, didn't follow through with his efforts and forwent his plan to visit Pyongyang.
History shows that the inconsistency in U.S. policy, which changes from one president to the next, is one key cause of its failure to settle the North Korean issue. Therefore drawing up a policy that can be maintained by a change of power is the key for finding a solution to the North Korean problem. Considering Wednesday's bomb blast, it wouldn't be hard to form a consensus to define the North as a nuclear loose cannon. Obama should try to reset his government's policy accordingly and the president to follow him should pick up where he leaves off. (This section can be read in the editorial under the title, "Obama's fault."
China
Chinese President Xi Jinping has a lot at stake in the resolution of North Korea's runaway nuclear program, after the Wednesday blast Pyongyang claimed was from its first H-bomb test.
First of all, Xi has to prove that China is capable of playing a leading role on the international stage. The world looks to Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang to force it to give up its nukes. China is just about the only state friendly to the North and a key provider of fuel and food to the destitute nation that cannot feed its population of 20 million without outside help.
If China halts trucks and trains of supplies heading to the North through their borders, the North can take a direct hit and buckle. Xi has repeatedly vowed to see to it that China follows international norms and fulfills obligations as a responsible member of the global society.
If he sides with the North out of old communist-era camaraderie, it would be as good as his reneging on his promise and set his country apart from the rest of the world. During his past three years as president, Xi has taken his country so far on the path of globalization so, in a way, it is unthinkable for him to go back to the old Chinese isolationist way.
The first responsibility test for China comes at the United Nations where, as one of five permanent members on the U.N. Security Council, it torpedoed efforts to punish Pyongyang for defiantly pressing ahead with its nuclear development. It is a matter of course that its failure to act on the North has contributed to the North progressing so much in its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.
If Xi objects to more U.N. sanctions on the North, it would also run the risk of being held hostage by Pyongyang. Already, rumor mills are working overtime that the North's young dictator, Kim Jong-un, pressed ahead with the Wednesday test knowing that Xi has his hands tied and will, as usual, protect it. Kim has already ignored Beijing's good counsel and gone his way, sending their relations to their lowest point. Before the latest test, he did not even bother to inform China. So the world is closely watching whether China will allow further loss of its face on its supposed ally.
Seoul is eager to see Xi punish the North. Korea has invested a great deal to foster its ties with Beijing, with their economies already intertwined as major trading partners. Xi, meeting President Park Geun-hye, declared Beijing's position of denuclearizing Pyongyang. For one, Park went out on a limb to attend Beijing's Sept. 3, 2015, celebration of Japan's World War II surrender as the only head of state among the U.S. allies. The two expressed their friendship during their summits. Only action will prove Xi means what he says. (This section can be read in the editorial, titled "Text on Xi Jinping).
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. He can be reached at foolsdie5@ktimes.com
North Korea's fourth nuclear test Wednesday forces the world to confront an old question anew: why we can't fix this rogue state once and for all.
It's been more than 20 years since the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the first significant effort to put a cap on the North's nuclear program.
From its Oct.9, 2006, first nuclear test, there have been two more, one each in 2009 and 2013, and followed by the Jan. 6, 2016, test that the North claimed involved a hydrogen bomb. The North also test-fired long-range missiles, which experts say can reach the West Coast of the United States.
The North Korean issue has been too conspicuous to ignore. Then, what has let the North grow to be as big a threat as it is?
To blame above all are competing interests of nations concerned. South Korea has insisted that it is an inter-Korean issue; its ally, U.S. sees it as an issue of changing priority; China, the only benefactor of the North, takes Pyongyang as a frontline province to protect its northeastern flank and Japan maintains its traditional view of Korea as corridor to China.
So to learn from the past mistakes and reconcile these competing views with each other is naturally the first step to resolve the North Korean challenge.
South Korea
South Korea should change its view on North Korea's nuclear weapons programs -- plutonium-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and now one allegedly about hydrogen bomb. So far, Seoul has, with differing degrees of success, tried to portray them as something between international problem and inter-Korean problem. From Wednesday on, the North Korean challenge should be dealt with more as an international one. Seoul should remain as one of the concerned stakeholders in this issue so it will be able to deal with the North less emotionally.
Looking back at how the North has become as big a threat as it is, the necessity for a sense of detachment is clear. The North has adroitly played its hand: insisting on talking to U.S. only and using the South's anxiety to talk with it for handsome handouts.
Also worthy of note is the manifested confusion in Seoul's coordination with the U.S.
For example, the late liberal President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" of reconciliation with the North got sidetracked when the conservative George W. Bush succeeded Bill Clinton as U.S. president and Barack Obama's succession also created a similar problem.
What Seoul requires to do is draw up a part of a North Korean solution that can be accepted to the rest of the concerned parties and that also can be subject to few changes even if there is a change of power, say, in U.S. or Seoul.
The United States
The United States policy toward North Korea for the past seven years under President Barack Obama can be summed up in the phrase "strategic patience", which was contained in a national security strategy document his administration published in February 2015. For the lack of a better expression, this has proved to be a laughable failure. Wednesday's blast in the North's Pungae-ri test site increasingly appears to be from a hydrogen bomb as the North claimed and has set Pyongyang on the path to becoming a nuclear state, whether or not the world recognizes it as one.
As the world is collectively wringing its hands not knowing what to do about the increasing threats from the impoverished rogue state, its young dictator, Kim Jong-un, may be enjoying every moment of it.
This all-too-familiar situation capped by a sense of hopelessness regarding what to do about the dictatorship, has followed three previous nuclear tests conducted by Pyongyang. It is the result of a dereliction of duty by Obama as the leader of the global superpower.
At the start of his presidency in 2009, he offered to talk with the North without any preconditions, but this was met by the North's second nuclear test, which occurred only four months after his inauguration. Since then, his administration had been left rudderless with neither leadership nor interest in its resolution, calling on the North to come back to the long-stalled Six-Party Talks. Obama opted to concentrate on Iran to reach a deal, similar to the Agreed Framework that his Democratic predecessor Bill Clinton had with the North; so emerged the term -- strategic patience -- to cover his inaction on the North.
However, Obama is only one of three U.S. presidents who have aggravated the North Korean problem. His Republican predecessor George W. Bush regretfully applied a domestic spin on the North Korean problem as part of his "anything but Clinton" policy. He designated the North as part of his self-styled axis of evil together with Iran and Iraq and overturned the so-called 1994 Agreed Framework, an elaborate effort made to stop the North's nuclear program. No sooner had Bush's policy started to work by putting a stranglehold on the North's overseas cash flows than he succumbed to a pattern, similar to that of Obama but to a lesser degree, by relenting from its stance and allowing the North to go back to its old habits.
Bill Clinton was credited with making the first deal with the North and his policy appeared to be peaking as he agreed with the approach of the late liberal former President Kim Dae-jung, paving the way for a détente in inter-Korean relationships under Kim's Nobel Peace Prize-winning reconciliatory "Sunshine Policy." Clinton, however, didn't follow through with his efforts and forwent his plan to visit Pyongyang.
History shows that the inconsistency in U.S. policy, which changes from one president to the next, is one key cause of its failure to settle the North Korean issue. Therefore drawing up a policy that can be maintained by a change of power is the key for finding a solution to the North Korean problem. Considering Wednesday's bomb blast, it wouldn't be hard to form a consensus to define the North as a nuclear loose cannon. Obama should try to reset his government's policy accordingly and the president to follow him should pick up where he leaves off. (This section can be read in the editorial under the title, "Obama's fault."
China
Chinese President Xi Jinping has a lot at stake in the resolution of North Korea's runaway nuclear program, after the Wednesday blast Pyongyang claimed was from its first H-bomb test.
First of all, Xi has to prove that China is capable of playing a leading role on the international stage. The world looks to Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang to force it to give up its nukes. China is just about the only state friendly to the North and a key provider of fuel and food to the destitute nation that cannot feed its population of 20 million without outside help.
If China halts trucks and trains of supplies heading to the North through their borders, the North can take a direct hit and buckle. Xi has repeatedly vowed to see to it that China follows international norms and fulfills obligations as a responsible member of the global society.
If he sides with the North out of old communist-era camaraderie, it would be as good as his reneging on his promise and set his country apart from the rest of the world. During his past three years as president, Xi has taken his country so far on the path of globalization so, in a way, it is unthinkable for him to go back to the old Chinese isolationist way.
The first responsibility test for China comes at the United Nations where, as one of five permanent members on the U.N. Security Council, it torpedoed efforts to punish Pyongyang for defiantly pressing ahead with its nuclear development. It is a matter of course that its failure to act on the North has contributed to the North progressing so much in its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.
If Xi objects to more U.N. sanctions on the North, it would also run the risk of being held hostage by Pyongyang. Already, rumor mills are working overtime that the North's young dictator, Kim Jong-un, pressed ahead with the Wednesday test knowing that Xi has his hands tied and will, as usual, protect it. Kim has already ignored Beijing's good counsel and gone his way, sending their relations to their lowest point. Before the latest test, he did not even bother to inform China. So the world is closely watching whether China will allow further loss of its face on its supposed ally.
Seoul is eager to see Xi punish the North. Korea has invested a great deal to foster its ties with Beijing, with their economies already intertwined as major trading partners. Xi, meeting President Park Geun-hye, declared Beijing's position of denuclearizing Pyongyang. For one, Park went out on a limb to attend Beijing's Sept. 3, 2015, celebration of Japan's World War II surrender as the only head of state among the U.S. allies. The two expressed their friendship during their summits. Only action will prove Xi means what he says. (This section can be read in the editorial, titled "Text on Xi Jinping).
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. He can be reached at foolsdie5@ktimes.com
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