By Andrei Lankov
South Korean politicians have one peculiarity not frequently found in other states: they take their electoral campaign pledges quite seriously. Newly-elected president Moon Jae-in seems to be no exception. On the trail he promised that he would reduce the country's dependence on nuclear energy and shift resources to clean energy. True to his word, just weeks in to his new administration Moon halted the construction of all nuclear reactors and introduced a number of measures that more-or-less ensure nuclear energy's limited role in South Korea's future.
The decision reflects the rather curious anti-nuclear bias of the international left often in conjunction with environmental protection groups. Thus, Moon's decision may not be particularly surprising, given that Korean decision makers tend to embrace trendy ideological fashions of Western campuses. However, is an aversion to all-things nuclear sustainable in the long-term?
South Korea has a remarkable history of nuclear energy development. As the country was divided in the late 1940s, upwards of 90 percent of all electric generation capacity ended up north of the DMZ. This led to a chronic energy crisis in the South that took decades to overcome. Indeed, not until the 1970s did many South Korean buildings exceed four floors. They were deliberately built low in order to save on elevators. And many rural villages were without electricity well into the following decade.
South Korea had few rivers powerful enough, or peaks high enough, to match North Korea's abundant hydropower. Instead, Seoul was forced to rely on thermal power stations fueled by imported (and expensive) liquid fuel or locally produced coal of poor quality. (South Korea's coal reserves have long since been depleted forcing the country to import virtually 100 percent of its energy resources). The arrival of nuclear energy in the 1970s was thus understandably met with great anticipation.
The first South Korean nuclear reactor went online in the early 1960s, but only in the 1970s did Korea begin to build nuclear power stations. The technology was provided by the United States, and the Americans also quietly stood guard to ensure that the Korean nuclear technology would not be used for military purposes. It was by no means paranoia: at the time, it was the South, not North Korea that seriously played with the idea of creating an independent nuclear deterrent.
The first commercial nuclear generation began in 1978 and has grown ever since. At present, 29% of South Korean electricity is generated by 24 nuclear reactors at four sites across the country. This is relatively high compared to the United States (19 percent), but low next to France (70 percent). Three stations are located on the relatively remote and sparsely populated east coast, and one is in the south-western corner of the country.
South Korea's nuclear power plants ensure a cheap and abundant supply of energy. Indeed, the average retail price of a kilowatt in Korea is well below the OECD average, and Korean customers pay roughly 40 percent less than their counterparts in the OECD. The end meter price is almost exactly half of the level of Germany. This is a likely reason why Korean cities are truly awash with bright lights and advertising: it does not cost much. Nonetheless, as any reader of Korean newspapers will testify, there is an endless stream of anxiety over what Koreans perceive as excessive electricity prices.
One wonders what the reaction will be then when Korean voters discover the costs of their country's new, nuclear-free energy policy. Though great strides have been made, the reality is that renewable energy remains the most expensive (and least predictable) source of electricity. Though efficiency and cost of solar and wind energy continue to decline, it will not displace nuclear energy on cost and reliability for some time.
The Moon Jae-in administration will have to learn how price elastic Korean consumers are when it comes to energy. Only time will tell, but frankly, I am somewhat doubtful that the country will be willing to pay significantly more to keep the lights on.
Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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The decision reflects the rather curious anti-nuclear bias of the international left often in conjunction with environmental protection groups. Thus, Moon's decision may not be particularly surprising, given that Korean decision makers tend to embrace trendy ideological fashions of Western campuses. However, is an aversion to all-things nuclear sustainable in the long-term?
South Korea has a remarkable history of nuclear energy development. As the country was divided in the late 1940s, upwards of 90 percent of all electric generation capacity ended up north of the DMZ. This led to a chronic energy crisis in the South that took decades to overcome. Indeed, not until the 1970s did many South Korean buildings exceed four floors. They were deliberately built low in order to save on elevators. And many rural villages were without electricity well into the following decade.
South Korea had few rivers powerful enough, or peaks high enough, to match North Korea's abundant hydropower. Instead, Seoul was forced to rely on thermal power stations fueled by imported (and expensive) liquid fuel or locally produced coal of poor quality. (South Korea's coal reserves have long since been depleted forcing the country to import virtually 100 percent of its energy resources). The arrival of nuclear energy in the 1970s was thus understandably met with great anticipation.
The first South Korean nuclear reactor went online in the early 1960s, but only in the 1970s did Korea begin to build nuclear power stations. The technology was provided by the United States, and the Americans also quietly stood guard to ensure that the Korean nuclear technology would not be used for military purposes. It was by no means paranoia: at the time, it was the South, not North Korea that seriously played with the idea of creating an independent nuclear deterrent.
The first commercial nuclear generation began in 1978 and has grown ever since. At present, 29% of South Korean electricity is generated by 24 nuclear reactors at four sites across the country. This is relatively high compared to the United States (19 percent), but low next to France (70 percent). Three stations are located on the relatively remote and sparsely populated east coast, and one is in the south-western corner of the country.
South Korea's nuclear power plants ensure a cheap and abundant supply of energy. Indeed, the average retail price of a kilowatt in Korea is well below the OECD average, and Korean customers pay roughly 40 percent less than their counterparts in the OECD. The end meter price is almost exactly half of the level of Germany. This is a likely reason why Korean cities are truly awash with bright lights and advertising: it does not cost much. Nonetheless, as any reader of Korean newspapers will testify, there is an endless stream of anxiety over what Koreans perceive as excessive electricity prices.
One wonders what the reaction will be then when Korean voters discover the costs of their country's new, nuclear-free energy policy. Though great strides have been made, the reality is that renewable energy remains the most expensive (and least predictable) source of electricity. Though efficiency and cost of solar and wind energy continue to decline, it will not displace nuclear energy on cost and reliability for some time.
The Moon Jae-in administration will have to learn how price elastic Korean consumers are when it comes to energy. Only time will tell, but frankly, I am somewhat doubtful that the country will be willing to pay significantly more to keep the lights on.
Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
