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In many other parts of the world such an observation, irrespective of whether it is factually correct, would generate little public outcry. Indeed, it would be difficult to find an outraged Londoner harboring contempt for Italy when reminded that the United Kingdom used to be part of the Roman Empire ("part of Italy," if you like). Similarly, Russia once was part of the Mongolian Empire, and the United States is a former British colony. These are objective historical observations.
But East Asia is a region where people become enraged over whether a particular type of drum from the early Bronze Age was produced by the Chinese or Vietnamese (this "drum controversy" is hotly debated by patriotic Chinese and Vietnamese scholars). So, the remarks allegedly made by Xi during his Florida summit with Donald Trump prompted a rebuffing from South Korean officials, thousands of pages of op-eds and forum posts, and led to much conversation about the U.S.-Korea alliance among the Korean public. Predictably, however, such outrage fails to resonate with the Chinese, most of whom believe what President Xi said.
The supporting evidence for the Chinese is rooted in the peculiar international system that existed in East Asia for many centuries, often referred to as a "tributary system" by Western observers that often struggle with the conceptual framework. It is not incidental that the first attempt to describe in some detail traditional Sino-Korean relations, published in 1887, starts with the following statement: "The nature of Korea's relations with China has for the last thirty years been a puzzle for [the West]."
While a pillar of the international system of today (in operation since the 1600s) is the concept of sovereign state units and equal interaction and representation between states, the tributary system was, at least in the issues of protocol, firmly based on the assumption that states are not equal. It was accepted that the world and universe could have one and only one supreme ruler who alone could be called "emperor" and who, predictably, was ruling China.
The states surrounding China were seen as junior polities. Their rulers were expected to pay tribute – on various timelines – to the Chinese emperor, and, ideally, sought recognition from him when ascending to the throne. Theoretically, the system had no limit: the entire world was supposed to be within the "tributary system," though it was implied that distant rulers (like, say, the English monarchy) could not realistically communicate with the ruler of the Universe as frequently as desired. Moreover, some distant "barbarian" states were given a pass, so to speak, as their low level of development did allow them to comprehend the wisdom of the system, and hence they could be unaware of the existence of the world's supreme ruler, or, worse still, attempt to challenge him.
The tributary system has ancient (sometimes mystical) origins, but it took its classical shape about a millennia ago. Korea was its most active and eager participant. The Korean kings sought confirmations of validity from the Chinese capital when they inherited power, and the Korean ‘tributary missions' visited China regularly and predictably. Even the title of Korean rulers implied that they were somehow inferior to the Chinese sovereign: they were merely ‘kings', not ‘emperors'.
Does this mean that President Xi was right when he said that Korea was once "part of China"? Not exactly. Like the modern system whose claims of all states' equality are rather shallow, the ‘tributary system' concept is deceptive. The above-described formalities did not imply political or any other type of domestic control. For example, Chinese endorsement of a Korean king was effectively a rubber stamp. Kings were endorsed even when they took power in coups, with no questions asked, and "tributes" were reciprocated by the Chinese with "gifts" of roughly equal value, so all these exchanges were, essentially, thinly-veiled international trade. As illustrated in the abovementioned article published in 1887: "Korea, though a tributary state of China, was entirely independent so far as her government, religion and intercourse with foreign states were concerned."
Thus the roots of the controversy are clear: if one looks at the issues of protocol, it does appear as if Korea for centuries was an extension of China. If one looks at the execution of policy and dominion, however, Korea's independence is equally clear. As one imagines, the Chinese tend to emphasize protocol, while Koreans stress the actual practice. And, since this argument is essentially driven by nationalist emotions, so strong in East Asia, neither side is going to change its attitude.
Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.