Expressways Accelerate Economic Development

By Andrei Lankov

It would not be much of an overstatement to say that in the 1960s Korea had no roads. Yes, some unpaved roads did exist and were even quite suitable for oxcarts or old decommissioned military jeeps ― in good weather, at least. In the cities, the roads began to be paved around 1920, and the first country road was paved

in 1932, but as late as 1960 almost all roads in the countryside were still dirt tracks.

That year, only 3.7 percent of all Korean roads were paved ― the actual figure was higher since many countryside tracks were included in the statistics. By 1969, the figure had increased to a still unimpressive 6.6 percent. Even for 1st grade national roads which handled the most important traffic, the share of paved roads in 1969 was merely 30 percent.

Things began to change in the 1960s when South Korea acquired new leadership, through President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), who was both an iron-fisted leader and a sincere believer in economic growth.

In December 1964, Park visited West Germany. He was especially impressed by two things there: the sight of the green forested German mountains and the autobahns, the fabled German highways. The sight of wooded mountains inspired him to launch the Korean reforestation program, one of the most successful of such programs in world history. Most mountain forests you see now in the South Korean countryside are actually artificial, planted in the 1960s and 1970s as part of this program. Since the 1700s most of the central and southern part of the Korean peninsula had been a land of barren hills.

However, it was the sight of the autobahns which made the deepest impression on the Korean leader. The president asked countless questions about their design, history and economic benefits. While travelling from Bonn to Koln by autobahn, he even stopped his motorcade a few times, just to have a better look at the road surface and facilities.

When he met German Chancellor Erhard, the man who, as the West German economic minister, achieved the ``miracle on the Rhine,'' Park dreamed of a ``miracle on the Han River.''

Once back in South Korea, Park decided that major Korean cities should also be connected with such roads ― and proceeded forthwith with his hallmark ruthless efficiency.

The emphasis on highways fitted well into the developmental strategy chosen by South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s.

Park paid lip service to the miraculous powers of the free market, but he was hardly a true believer in market fundamentalism. His upbringing in Korea under Japanese colonial rule in the 1930s and his military experience persuaded him that the state should play a major and, if necessary, a leading role in economic development.

This was a major difference between South Korea and Taiwan ― two countries in East Asia which during the 1960s and 1970s looked quite similar. Both were living through an era of rapid economic development and social transformation under regimes which were both non-democratic and pro-Western. However, the government's role was more conspicuous and effective in nation building in Korea than Taiwan.

Essentially, the South Korean state concentrated its efforts on two goals ― first, it encouraged the growth of export-oriented conglomerates; second, it invested in infrastructure projects which were too expensive for individual companies to handle in those times of poverty and capital shortage. Back then many argued that the Korean approach was potentially more dangerous, since it created more opportunities for corruption and misuse of state funds. This might have been true, but now South Korea is ahead of Taiwan in terms of economic development. It might be pure luck.

The idea of creating a network of high-speed roads clearly fitted into the then South Korean developmental strategy. The cost of such a network would be too large for even the biggest Korean companies to handle, and benefits, while substantial, would not be available immediately. At the same time, the government believed that a dramatic improvement of the road network would help boost the economic performance of the nation. The highway network also became a personal pet project for President Park. Kim Chung-ryum, his chief secretary for ten years, once remarked: ``President Park had a religious belief in the highways.''

The highway construction plan was made public in April 1967 when Park was campaigning for re-election. His rule was unprecedentedly strong. He said that immediately after re-election he would launch the construction of highways which would connect Seoul with other major Korean cities.

However, this statement did not produce a wave of popular enthusiasm. On the contrary, the President's initiative was met with much criticism. Even members of his own party, while obediently voting for the project, expressed doubts in private. The opposition immediately launched a campaign against the entire highway scheme. Being an underdeveloped country, Korea, they said, was not ready for highways and did not need them.

The astronomical sums which were necessary for highway construction would be better spent on the improvement of the existing local road network. Opposition lawmakers and pro-opposition media repeatedly remarked that the government in its megalomania wanted to build ``highways for oxcarts.'' Others asked mockingly: ``Isn't our government planning to pay for the construction of pleasure ships for the rich?'' Indeed, in 1967, when the plan was announced, Korea had less than 100,000 cars. Nowadays, many of these politicians and journalists are remembered as wise statesmen and staunch pro-democracy fighters, their stance on the highway construction project and on many other economic developmental initiatives are seldom mentioned. The World Bank joined the chorus of criticism: its study concluded that the project would be ``economically and technologically unfeasible.''

The project was indeed expensive. The total cost of the Seoul-Busan highway construction was 43 billion won or 23.6 percent of percent of the entire Korean budget for 1967. The country was still very poor ― in 1969 per capita GNP was just $160. Hyundai Construction Company invested money in the project.

Sacrifices were expected from landowners who were persuaded to sell their land cheaply. Officials appealed to their sense of patriotic duty, and argued that the construction of a highway in their neighborhood would certainly boost real estate prices. The statistics indeed indicate that the average price of land, purchased for the project, was surprisingly low ― out of conviction or fear, landowners did not overcharge.

First Highway

In 1968, the first highway connecting Seoul with Incheon, the major seaport on the West Sea was completed. This short (merely 29.5 kilometers) four-lane highway was essentially experimental, since from the very beginning it was the Seoul-Busan highway which was seen as the project's most important undertaking.

The construction of the Seoul-Busan highway began in February 1968 and proceeded under the relentless supervision of the President himself. The highway was built by 16 private construction companies with the largest role being played by the Hyundai Construction Company, led by Chung Ju-yung, the President's close collaborator and friend.

The army also played an active part in the project and troops worked on the construction site. When President Park visited the construction site ― and he did so frequently ― he ordered his driver to give way to trucks in a symbolical gesture which emphasized the importance of the project.

Under Park's unrelenting pressure, the Seoul-Busan highway was completed in a mere two and a half years ― well ahead of schedule.

On July 7, 1970, the highway was officially opened for traffic, becoming the first full length operational South Korean highway. It has a total length of 428 km with 305 bridges and six tunnels, and still remains the longest of all South Korean highways. It is a bit shorter nowadays, because a section of the former highway has become part of the Seoul City road network. It is also the most important road in the country ― not only does it connect the two largest cities in South Korea, but it also cuts through the most densely populated part of the peninsula and passes in the vicinity of all major urban centers in the country.

It's now clear that President Park's vision, once much derided and criticized, has proved to be correct. The Seoul-Busan highway has become a major engine for the development of South Korea's inner regions, provided cheap transportation between the nation's capital and its largest port and also connected all major South Korean cities. And the oxcarts can now be seen only in the movies. The highway arrived at a good time as well ― in the mid-70s Korean factories began to turn out a fast growing number of cars and without a sound roadwork already in existence, these new vehicles would have been much less useful.

The Seoul-Busan highway, which in the last three decades has been subjected to many renovations, remains the backbone of the South Korean transport network. The experience gained during its construction was later widely used by South Korean engineers who went on to construct an elaborate network of the highways which now connect all major regions of the country.

By the end of 2008, South Korea had 26 highways with a total length of some 3,450 km. Nearly all of them are owned and managed by the state. Every day, the highway network is used by over one million cars and trucks. In spite of it being a small country, the Republic of Korea ranks 11th in the world in the total length of the highway network. This network carries about one third of the nation's daily traffic, and without it Korea would not boast such impressive economic achievements.

Highway Network Had Major Impact on Seoul
The growth of the highway network in the 1970s also had a major impact on Seoul ― it boosted the development of the Gangnam area, the southern part of the South Korean capital. Nowadays, Gangnam is the place where the most expensive neighborhoods in Seoul are located; it stands for rich, privilege and urban sophistication. But back in the 1960s this area, then recently added to the city limits, was a land of vegetable farms.

However, in the mid-1960s the government decided to relocate the major government institutions and a large part of the population south of the river. To a very large extent the decision was driven by military considerations: in case of war, it would be difficult to evacuate Seoul, sandwiched between the DMZ and the Han River.

Thus, big construction projects were encouraged. However, few people were ready to leave the comfort of Seoul downtown and move to distant Gangnam. To encourage the move, the government undertook a number of measures, and the highway network played a major role in their efforts.

The Seoul-Busan highway did not really go into Seoul proper. It ended abruptly at the southern outskirts of Gangnam, technically inside the city but actually far away from ``real Seoul.'' The Central Bus Terminal which served the fast expanding highway network was located nearby ― again, far away from downtown. Nowadays, the massive building of the Central Bus Terminal does not look particularly impressive, but when it was built in mid-1970s it dominated the then empty neighborhood. It was virtually in the middle of nowhere.

Of course this was done on purpose, since technically it would not be much of a problem to continue the highway inside the city. However, the government expectation was that those people whose work or family situation demanded frequent trips to the countryside would find it more convenient and economical to settle in Gangnam.

Nowadays, these efforts appear strange ― not least because these and other measures succeeded in making Gangnam very prestigious and very expensive.