Is North Korea nuclear state?

By Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

This is the third and last article in a series of opinions aimed at shedding light on the era of Kim Jong-un, who ascended to power in the recent Workers’ Party Congress in North Korea. ― ED.

Recently we have seen Kim Jong-un hint that North Korea could and would be a responsible nuclear state. We have also see Presidential candidate Donald Trump say publicly that he would meet with the North Korean leader. We have even heard rumors that Hillary Clinton is considering the use of the Iranian template for a “nuclear freeze” involving North Korea. Thus, one must wonder, what are the advantages (if any) to North Korea as a nuclear state, and is it even in the realm of possibility that Washington, Seoul, and others would recognize North Korea as a nuclear state?

First of all, if one is to look at the possibility of North Korea “freezing” its nuclear program, one does not need to seek out sophisticated international relations theory, or even lay out a framework of analysis that uses other agreements as possible templates. All we have to do is look at past precedent. North Korea has ― over and over again ― violated agreements made with not only the United States, but neighbors in the region. Anyone who has followed North Korea’s foreign policy as it relates to nuclear weaponization since 1990 (or before) should understand that the reclusive state has no intention of eliminating its nuclear weapons no matter what agreements are reached with outside nation-states. There are several reasons for this…

The first reason that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weaponization programs is because it is a legacy of the Kim family. Initiated by Kim Il-sung, brought to fruition under Kim Jong-il, and advanced to more sophisticated capabilities in terms of not only the power and sophistication of its weapons, but the platforms that would carry them (ballistic missiles and submarines carrying SLBM’s) under Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s nuclear weaponization program has become part ― a key part ― of the legitimacy through which the Kim’s rule the DPRK.

The second reason that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weaponization program is because the government in Pyongyang understands that these weapons present a legitimate threat, not only to South Korea, but to Japan, and ultimately (with long-range ballistic missiles) to countries as far away as the United States. The leadership in North Korea realizes that nations such as Libya (a nation that dealt away its nuclear weapons program) have ended up “on the short end of the stick.” Pyongyang understands that giving up nuclear weapons accomplishes (at least in the minds of many in the leadership there) nothing except to put the ruling government in a position of increased vulnerability.

The final reason North Korea will never give up its nuclear weaponization program is because of the financial gain that it offers, not only to Kim Jong-un, but to the elite that support him. Since at least 2003, North Korea has been cooperating with Iran on a variety of initiatives for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. Pyongyang has provided raw materials such as uranium to Iran. It has provided technicians, engineers and other experts to Iran to support such key developments as the design of a 500 Kilogram HEU warhead for a medium range ballistic missile (the No Dong ― called the Shahab-3 in Iran). North Korea has even built sophisticated underground facilities for Iran’s HEU facilities, reportedly capable of withstanding “bunker buster” munitions. North Korea reportedly was paid around $2 billion from Iran to build Syria’s plutonium nuclear facility (destroyed by the Israeli Air Force) ― thus leading to the assessment of Iran perhaps seeking a dual-track nuclear program as Pyongyang has done. Indeed, as North Korea advances its nuclear program, and Iran advances its own program, cooperation, proliferation, and large-scale sales are very likely.

Given the rogue behavior we have seen the North Koreans conduct since the end of the Cold War, one key fact should be obvious. North Korea will never, ever ― as long as there is a DPRK ― give up its nuclear weaponization program. Kim Jong-un is running his government in essentially the same way his father and grandfather did. And yet, he continues to have a much weaker power base then both of them. This means he quite simply cannot survive without having the power legitimacy that nuclear weapons give him.

So what should the United States (soon to have a new President) and its key ally in Seoul do about this? The first thing that must be understood is that no matter what talks are held, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not going anywhere anytime soon. The second thing that must be realized is that freezing of North Korea’s nuclear weapons simply means we are continuing to allow them to exist ― only to be “unfrozen” at some date in the future that fits Pyongyang’s foreign policy (this should be kept in mind for Iran as well). The third thing that must be realized is that a policy of containment will work if it is actually initiated in an effective manner ― meaning that we must give sanctions time to work. And finally, we must realize that trying solutions that have failed in the past will get us nowhere in the future. If Kim Il-sung would not trade away his weapons, or Kim Jong-il, than why would the third Kim (Kim Jong-un) deal away these weapons? It’s simply not going to happen.

As we move toward the future, in my view, it is important to take a realistic, pragmatic approach to policy that deals with North Korea. The DPRK is a rogue state. Unless and until the government there changes its policy, its behavior, and its aggressive, sometimes violent behavior, North Korea needs to be contained, and sanctions (and other initiatives) need to be enforced.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of political

science at Angelo State University, and is the

author or editor of six books on North Korea,

most recently “North Korea and Regional

Security in the Kim Jong-un Era: A New International

Security Dilemma.” Contact him at

bruce.bechtol@angelo.edu.