Nothing new in NK leaks

By Andrei Lankov

The leak of the classified U.S. diplomatic cables to the website WikiLeaks is, undoubtedly, the major news of the last week. It also might be seen as the greatest diplomatic scandal of all time.

North Korea also received its share of attention after the WikiLeaks scandal. Among other things, the leaked cables reveal that the U.S. diplomats discussed North Korea’s future with their Chinese colleagues, and that the Chinese were not only highly critical and disdainful of the Kim’s family regime, but did not make secret their assumption that in the long run it has no future and is bound to collapse. Furthermore, at least some Chinese experts implied that sooner or later Korea would be reunited under Seoul’s control, and were doing their best to ensure that such a unification would not damage China’s interests.

These revelations are presented by the media as great sensations. But nobody who ― like the present author ― interacts with Chinese officials and experts regularly is going to be surprised by this news.

The Chinese officials and experts have been talking like this for years. They usually did so behind closed doors, to be sure _ but even this was not always the case. For example, in April this year a group of well-connected Chinese experts, essentially quasi-officials, made very similar points when they were addressing a conference in Seoul. Back then, nobody took notice. Now, this is suddenly seen as a sensation.

May be, a habit to vilify China, now the major rival of the U.S., is somehow responsible for this. If China is indeed as bad as hosts of the right-wing talk shows insist, it is supposed to support the Kim Jong-il regime almost by default. But China is neither good nor bad. It is a normal authoritarian nation state which advances its interests with necessary ruthlessness and determination.

For China, North Korea has always been a borderline case. On one hand, it serves as an important buffer zone near the Chinese border. It also helps to maintain the division of the Korean peninsula which allows Chinese diplomats to use the complicated situation to their own advantage.

On the other hand, North Korea might frequently be embarrassing, its provocations create tensions which are not good for the Chinese economy, and its nuclear program is threatening the non-proliferation regime (and China, like any other legitimate nuclear power, does not want too many countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons). On balance, the majority opinion in the Chinese political circles is that North Korea is worth supporting for the time being, but ensuring its survival with Chinese taxpayers’ money is not a major priority of Beijing’s foreign policy.

On top of that, Chinese officials and analysts generally agree that in the long run the current North Korean regime is not sustainable. Some might still harbor hope that it can be persuaded to reform itself, but by now the numbers of such optimists are dwindling. So, the regime collapse seems to be a distinct possibility, almost a certainty.

And here comes the question: what to do about North Korea? The current Chinese approach is to keep it afloat as long as it does not cost too much and does not imply serious political risks. It helps to maintain a buffer zone, and also to postpone the unification. As long as the current high-speed economic growth in China continues, the Beijing policy makers have good reason to believe that the later unification will happen, the better China will be equipped to influence unification conditions.

But what to do when the final crisis eventually comes? It seems that the Chinese side has at least three possible lines of action. First, they can dramatically increase their support and use a lot of money to bail North Korea out of trouble. This seems to be the least likely option: costs are considerable while benefits are doubtful, and the final success of such efforts is by no means certain.

Second, China might get involved with the crisis politically and perhaps even send its troops to the collapsing North and/or try to install a pro-Chinese puppet regime in Pyongyang.

Finally, China might just write bankrupt North Korea off, and negotiate such conditions of unification which will suit Beijing most. In order to negotiate such conditions, the Chinese officials have to talk to those who will be in control of the post-collapse North _ the South Koreans and Americans. It seems that currently the majority of the Chinese politicians favor this latter option (admittedly, this attitude might change eventually).

The not-so-sensational WikiLeaks cables once again confirm that this is the option the Chinese were exploring. They sent signals that they were looking for post-Kim solutions which would be acceptable for Beijing as well as well as for Washington and Seoul. Nothing surprising.

And what impact will these revelations have on the relations between China and North Korea? Time will tell, but in all probability, the actual impact will be small. The North Korean leaders had no illusions about the Chinese attitude to their regime, and the common people are unlikely to learn about the cables any time soon.

Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.