What is the context of S. Korea’s Africa policy?

In keeping with its tradition over the last six years, the just-ended Korea Africa Economic Cooperation Forum was yet another opportunity for Seoul to extend a compelling historical narrative that reconciles empathy with brotherhood as the context for establishing an agenda for dialogue with the powerful African delegation that convened here. I can imagine the usual mantra swirling around Korea’s genuine desire to support impoverished African nations break the cycle of poverty containing politically correct rhetoric about “mentoring Africans”.

By David Alenga

In keeping with its tradition over the last six years, the just-ended Korea Africa Economic Cooperation Forum was yet another opportunity for Seoul to extend a compelling historical narrative that reconciles empathy with brotherhood as the context for establishing an agenda for dialogue with the powerful African delegation that convened here. I can imagine the usual mantra swirling around Korea’s genuine desire to support impoverished African nations break the cycle of poverty containing politically correct rhetoric about “mentoring Africans”.

Whilst this cooperative relationship is still unfolding, now is the opportune moment to conduct a realistic assessment of the expectations that defines this process. Managing expectations is an indispensable prerequisite of every relationship; besides we now live in an age in which it has become fashionable to preach the gospel of “poverty reduction.” If recent events are to be believed, poverty has extended beyond the frontiers of Africa, thanks largely and paradoxically to the Great Recession that has brought austerity to town and now no one is happy. Just talk to my contemporaries in the Occupy Movement and their cousins the “Indignatos” to know that poverty in most rich countries has long ceased to be a rocket science academic topic discussed in glittering lecture halls.

The world is changing at an astonishing speed, ushering us into a critical era of world economic history _ a time when the tectonic plates of economic orthodoxy are shifting. Yet, Africa’s economic vigor presents a paradoxical interlude in its odyssey of being “the forgotten continent” of the 1980s through the 1990s to becoming the new global growth engine. Real GDP in Africa has grown by 4.9 percent during the first decade of this century resulting in a cumulative production output of $1.6 trillion as of 2008. Clearly, the transformation taking place across the continent is phenomenal; largely attributable to fundamental structural reform with a collective net worth far more than any simplistic commodity boom mantra. Under this milieu most analysts believe that Africa’s recent surge holds good long-term prospects.

My contention, therefore, is to contextualize this cooperation in a very realistic manner without being delusional. Seoul’s policies will be better served if it is able to correctly define Africa in terms of what it is rather than what it thinks Africa is. Secondly, it must be forthright in its policy orientation, utilizing concrete deliverables. Thirdly, Seoul needs to assimilate its Africa policy with its overall long-term strategic goals, bearing in mind that Thomas Friedman tells us that the “World is Flat.”

It is common knowledge that Africa is a huge conglomeration of diverse tribal units. Even without these tribal divisions, post-colonial Africa includes the likes of chaotic Somalia on the east coast and the remarkably stable and serene Cape Verde on the west coast. Then there is Nigeria, the most populous African nation and the epitome of Africa’s oil curse, pitched against tiny oil-rich Equatorial Guinea with a population that enjoys one of the highest standards of living on the continent. Angola and Rwanda have both transformed the failures of their bloody pasts into remarkable success stories of economic and social development. The same cannot be said, about resource endowed DR Congo, still saddled with the burden of armed conflict. Again, whilst liberal democracy is gaining ground in Ghana and Botswana, there is a rollback in places such as Ivory Coast, Mali and Zimbabwe. That said, my curious mind is left wondering what policymakers in Seoul really mean by Africa.

No doubt the African continent has been making positive headlines lately. But behind the staggering numbers in growth lies the clumsy omission of a dispassionate interpretation of what all that means. Yes, there is reason to take Africa seriously. Why? China has footprints all over Africa and as the seasoned Zambian development economist Dambisa Moyo wittingly says, “The Chinese are our friends.” Unlike, Seoul, Beijing’s Africa strategy is consistent with its emerging clout as a global power and it can thus afford to throw its weight about in Africa as the Santa Claus of the day. The Chinese have the financial capability to offer African governments a blank check in exchange for influence. Can Seoul afford that?

Within its limited space as a middle power, employing the most appropriate strategic levers will be the real way to go. Rather than overstretch itself into a roof that will shelter the whole African continent, Seoul must seriously consider crafting the architecture of its policy more forcefully. Engaging with African countries should not in any way be misconstrued as the goal but more of a means to achieving mutually accepted deliverables at the behest of Seoul. I am also aware that whatever shape the architectural outlook of this relationship will take will be largely determined by what its stated goals will be. There is a fear that Seoul will repeat the mistakes of its Cold War pursuit of a Hallstein Doctrine approach in Africa, a lingering testament of how poorly Seoul understood Africa back then.

Rather than joining the chorus of development assistance and aid, Korea should use its Africa policy as a means that will enable it to craft a new international norm, one that will be consistent with its status as a middle power. The time is ripe for Korea to incorporate cherry picking in its Africa policy through selective engagement that will strengthen the hands of reformers in the region. Tailoring support to reward those committed to sustainable development will prove to be more effective than going the Chinese way and even more acceptable and humane than the Washington Consensus.

Brotherhood will further be proven by how much Korea will be willing to expend its strategic capital on entrenching its development norms as an alternative to both the Chinese and Americans. Norm setting on the international stage is often shaped by the existing episteme of the day, most of which rides on the back of multilateral cooperation. Africa watchers are already keenly observing how the Busan High-Level Forum is building on its predecessor, the Accra Declaration. In my candid view, this should be the central axis upon which Seoul’s Africa Policy should revolve ― harmonizing it into a realistic entity that will be effective in mainstreaming its overall strategic goals. Seoul cannot afford to invite every African country to the table, because Africans are diverse and bring this diversity with them. Seoul needs to be forthright with what it wants in Africa then go for it.

The author is a copy editor with the Korea Times. He can be reached on alenga.d@gmail.com.