Why Obama continues to back Lee’s NK policy

BEIJING — Just like any two close friends, South Korea and the United States have had their share of differences, including over North Korea. Actually North Korea has been a major source of splits in their friendship, despite the fact that this is a key area where the two are supposed to work even more closely.

Evans Revere

By Sunny Lee

BEIJING — Just like any two close friends, South Korea and the United States have had their share of differences, including over North Korea. Actually North Korea has been a major source of splits in their friendship, despite the fact that this is a key area where the two are supposed to work even more closely.

In 1994, for example, the Bill Clinton administration considered pre-emptive air-strikes on North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear site, without telling South Korea first. Seoul, not Washington, would have been the immediate target for massive retaliation, if the provoked North chose to seek revenge. It made then President Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) indignant.

Late President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was a prime “mismatch” with his U.S. counterpart George Bush, for their entirely different philosophies on North Korea. Kim’s unsuccessful bid in their Washington summit in 2001 to persuade Bush to adopt a policy of engagement and reconciliation with North Korea, known as the “Sunshine Policy,” met Bush’s cold shoulder. Bush’s unflatteringly addressing Kim as “this man” during their official press conference is still remembered to this day.

Bush also called Roh Moo-hyun, who inherited Kim’s Sunshine Policy, an “easy man.” Roh, who was known for his straightforward manner, may have been an easy person to talk to, but not an easy person to agree with on North Korea. Roh fundamentally saw North Korea as an object for change through engagement, while Bush saw it as an object of evil, together with Iran and Iraq.

After “this man” and “easy man,” now there is “bulldozer,” the moniker for President Lee Myung-bak. And here is the big surprise. The relationship between the two countries is the best ever, including their joint posture toward North Korea.

In fact, the U.S. and South Korea have been in total agreement “in every aspect of our diplomacy with respect to North Korea,” said Assistant Secretary of State for Asia Kurt Campbell on Oct. 11.

While media outlets tend to attribute the strong U.S.-South Korea alliance to the personal bonding between Lee and Obama, analysts also point out a “policy shift” on the part of the U.S., which now attaches a paramount importance to keeping and strengthening the alliance as Washington maneuvers its diplomatic chess game in Asia.

“There was a feeling on the part of the (U.S.) administration that while we have been maintaining a strong and high-profile presence in Asia, we have somehow created a perception that we were distracted by other issues such as the Middle East, Afghanistan and U.S. domestic issues,” said Evans Revere, a former top American diplomat in South Korea, who was also the State Department’s director for Korean Peninsula Affairs.

“So, the Obama administration came in to office, determined to push back on that perception and make it very clear that we continue to be, and will continue to be a strong player in the region. We have a major strategic, economic interest in the region. We have a strong and good alliances which we want to keep strong and good. And that has been the constant theme of the Obama administration since the day one.

“Standing by our allies is going to be the continuing centerpiece of this administration,” Revere told The Korea Times.

Observers in both Korea and the U.S. added Washington also learned it was not productive to jeopardize the U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship due to their differences over North Korea, which has been invariably exploited by Pyongyang.

“The central piece of the U.S. approach, one that I agree with and I have been arguing for a long time, is to keep the interests, sensitivities and concerns of our allies fully in mind as we develop our policy. We are doing that. And we are going to continue to do. And I am very comfortable where Seoul is at this point,” said Revere.

Analysts also say the strained relationship, especially with Roh Moo-hyun, taught a good lesson to U.S. strategists: don’t push a unilateral approach to North Korea at the cost of its relationship with an ally.

Another factor, analysts point out is that South Korea’s “value” to the U.S. has increased as Japan, another major U.S. ally in Asia, is experiencing economic downturn and political uncertainty in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami early this year, which has made the U.S. need South Korea more than before.

North Korea’s miscalculation

All these factors, in one way or another, make the U.S.-South Korea coordination on North Korea ever more close and fine-tuned than before. The problem is that North Korea’s strategists perhaps don’t seem to read this changed dynamic very carefully.

“North Koreans are calculating that Seoul and Washington will move into a more conciliatory mood ahead of their respective presidential elections next year. I think it’s their mistake if they think that way,” said Revere.

Pyongyang has been demanding an unconditional resumption of the six-party talks. South Korea and the U.S. have laid out a series of “pre-steps” before the resumption of the talks. These include North Korea’s freezing of its nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment, having IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon to monitor the freeze and a its commitment to the Sept. 19, 2005 agreement, and stopping missile launches and nuclear testing.

Although he recognizes that things are moving incrementally back to the direction of resuming the six-party talks, he remains skeptical. “I would not bet a lot of money that the talks will actually take place any time soon because, quite frankly, the North has not accepted the pre-steps. And if you listen to what North Koreans are saying, they continue to say the talks should resume without any preconditions. The U.S. is very suspicious of North Korea’s motivations,” said Revere.

Pyongyang may also think that the victory of the liberal independent candidate Park Won-soon over Na Kyung-won, from the Grand National Party, may speed up Lee’s image as a lame-duck president and force him to take a more conciliatory tone toward the North for the remaining period of his term.

The North’s logic may be partially gratified as Lee’s strategists, concerned about dropping domestic support, may propose an easing of Lee’s hard-line posture at least in appearance, but not in substance.

Revere hopes North Korea will think strategically, beyond a short-term calculation of exploiting South Korea’s domestic politics, but more importantly to have a long-term view about its eventual destiny.

“North Korea may think that time is on its side. I quite frankly think that time is on our side, in terms of the overall geostrategic environment, the overall economic situation of North Korea and the international pressures North Korea is under,” said Revere.

“The world is changing and this requires North Korea to make some important decisions about its future either under this leader or the next. The North Korean system in the long run is not sustainable unless it breaks isolation. I think they know that. The pressures and isolation North Korea is under are inevitably going to require them to make some tough decisions about changing their system and opening up.

“They may or may not accept that challenge. And if they don’t accept that challenge, they will become more isolated and economically more desperate,” said Revere, adding North Korea’s real enemy is within, not outside.

“We’ve seen other regimes around the world that collapsed suddenly, not necessarily because of outside pressure, but because of internal contradictions. And that, to me, is the biggest challenge North Korea faces, not the U.S., not South Korea, but itself.”