China’s Myanmar Policy Under Scuritiny

Members of Myanmar’s opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), wearing traditional costumes of Myanmar’s ethnic groups, stand near a portrait of party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in front of the party headquarters in Yangon, during the Union Day ceremony on Feb. 12. / AP-Yonhap

By Jason Qian and Anne Wu

As a political ally and key economic partner of Myanmar's military government, China should continue to actively engage the Myanmar authorities, but also delicately reach out to opposition groups.

In recent years, China's use of peaceful diplomatic ``soft power'' has won it much applause around the world. But one risk is that such applause at times comes from the elite without a grassroots echo.

In dealing with a country like Myanmar, China should consider how its own interests could be affected by a change in that neighbor's political landscape.

China is cautiously taking initiatives to avoid potential setbacks. When China's special envoy Wang Yi visited Myanmar last November, he urged the government to resolve the political crisis through dialogue and to attain political stability soon.

It was also reported that China maintains relations with several former rebel groups that now have made peace with the government, and that China is willing to listen to opposition groups. These are encouraging signs that China is shifting its Myanmar policy to be more flexible.

China should stay in the driver's seat amid international efforts to spur change in Myanmar, using the United Nations at times as a forum to gauge international concerns, to nurture positive cohesion and to measure steps to take.

No country chooses to have its domestic issues internationalized. But Myanmar may accept U.N. intervention as a makeshift strategy to subdue international criticism.

There is a risk to China that if it lets other countries take the initiative on Myanmar it could end up being sandwiched between Myanmar and other major powers.

China would want to avoid choosing sides on Myanmar, so as not to compromise its holistic interests. A more effective route is to manage relations with all to maximize common interest. To achieve this, the motto of ``there are no permanent friends or enemies in international relations'' is the key.

China is seen as seesawing. On the one hand, it insists on non-interference in Myanmar's internal affairs. Last January, China used its veto power, for the fifth time in history, to defeat a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Myanmar's human rights situation.

On the other hand, China helped facilitate two visits to Myanmar by Ibrahim Gambari, special envoy of the U.N. secretary general, after the crackdown late last year on the monks' demonstration.

Ironically the latter resulted from the former, because china's influence stems from its credibility in making friends and refraining from pointing fingers at other countries' domestic affairs. A ``no-preaching'' style only increased china's influence.

A peaceful Myanmar domestic situation and positive Sino-Myanmar relations are important for China's strategic and economic interests. China and Myanmar share a 1,300-mile border.

As in the case of North Korea, China does not want the problems of a neighbor like Myanmar spilling over into its own territory. Myanmar is also part of China's strategic configuration with other regional and international players.

Economically, China has become Myanmar's second-largest trade partner, and the two countries are collaborating on several major projects, including a 1,400-mile oil and gas pipeline that connects China's landlocked Yunnan Province to Myanmar's Indian Ocean coast.

This pipeline will directly transport oil and gas from the Middle East and Africa into China, therefore circumventing the problems of passing the Malacca Strait. Such a strategic project is both a liability and an asset as China tries to leverage Myanmar, given China's thirst for energy and Myanmar's hunger for development.

Because of the interlocking interests, China sees Myanmar as more a problematic neighbor than a threat to international peace and security ― which explains China's aversion to U.N. Security Council actions. But this also underlines the importance of a more proactive policy by China itself.

China's Myanmar policy is facing a bigger challenge with the approach of the Olympic Games. China cannot afford another source of instability in its foreign affairs.

China should pursue an active diplomacy of ``intervening without interfering,'' and try to steer Myanmar authorities toward greater engagement with the opposition and the international community for the purpose of national reconciliation.

Not the least of the advantages for China of such a policy is that it will keep a door slightly open to future alternative prospects in Myanmar.

Jason Qian is a fellow at the Harvard Negotiation Project at Harvard Law School. Anne Wu is an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Wu can be reached at xiaohui_wu@harvard.edu.