German unification and Seoul’s short-lived ’Sunshine Policy’

VIENNA — The German unification experience clearly shows that a policy of economic engagement and reconciliation is the right mojo to bring North Korea down. Yet South Korea’s two previous administrations didn’t do a good job of effectively marketing the idea to the domestic voters, a fatal mistake that led to a “premature” termination of their flagship Sunshine Policy, observed a German expert on North Korea.

Ruediger Frank, expert on N. Korea at the University of Vienna

By Sunny Lee

VIENNA — The German unification experience clearly shows that a policy of economic engagement and reconciliation is the right mojo to bring North Korea down. Yet South Korea’s two previous administrations didn’t do a good job of effectively marketing the idea to the domestic voters, a fatal mistake that led to a “premature” termination of their flagship Sunshine Policy, observed a German expert on North Korea.

“I grew up in East Germany, watching West Germany’s television, receiving various kinds of goods from my West German relatives who visited us. We also exchanged letters,” said Ruediger Frank, a German expert on North Korea who teaches at the University of Vienna, in an interview.

Those pretty ordinary activities of exchange between the two Germanies had extraordinary consequences: the collapse of communism in East Germany. When asked whether South Korea’s Sunshine Policy had been accomplishing the same goal, he answered, “Definitely.”

Even South Korea’s pop group Girls’ Generation have reportedly become a smash hit in North Korea, while Pyongyang’s rich kids are said to learn how to “dance like South Koreans,” from private tutors.

Frank believes South Korea’s capitalistic influence on the North let North Koreans “guard down.”

“The Sunshine Policy had been the most effective tool that influenced North Korea. All the changes in North Korea we see now are the results of the Sunshine Policy, including marketization, consumerism and increased dependency on external input,” he said.

Yet the very policy of engagement and reconciliation with North Korea has many critics too. And the most vocal ones are none other than those within South Korea.

“The Sunshine Policy was very badly marketed domestically in South Korea,” said the German scholar. “There is a perception that it was a very naive policy. I don’t think so.”

“Somehow,” said Frank, “there was an impression created by the government then that, by being nice to North Korea, the North would in turn be nice to the South. In a socialist country, of course, it doesn’t necessarily work that way.”

This insight into the behavioral modality of the socialist system has been mysteriously lacking in the reflections of Sunshine Policy advocates.

“Sunshine Policy” became a much-maligned term in South Korea’s conservative camp. There were accusations that economic aid South Korea provided to the North was being diverted to the military and even to the North’s nuclear development programs.

“It would have been important to tell the South Korean public that the expected impact of the Sunshine Policy would be changes in the North Korean society, not necessarily the North’s posture toward South Korea,” Frank said.

Today, the Sunshine Policy is seen by hardliners as the very thing that has propped up the hobbling regime that would have gone defunct by itself, if left alone.

Frank said the South’s government at that time should have made it clear to the public that giving economic aid to North Korea was not directly aimed at winning the hearts of the North Korean leadership.

“What you’re doing is that you’re infecting the (North’s) system with money. You’re creating a foundation for corruption and inequality in North Korea, which leads to unhappiness. You’re creating a market-based economy in North Korea, which underscores individual entrepreneurship, as opposed to the state-led economic initiative of the past. This message should have been communicated to the South Korean public,” said Frank.

Voters were also disenchanted by the lack of transparency of the Sunshine Policy.

“Part of a good marketing strategy is simply for you to say honestly what you’re doing,” said Frank.

“For example, the government could say, “We’re paying this and that amount of money to North Korea. We hope this will have this and that effect. At the same time, we’re aware that it might have a different effect than what we had expected, but we think itstill worth the risk. Of course, if you say that you will have critics. But nobody can later blame you for not having been honest. So, this is something that I would recommend to the next South Korean government. That is, to have maximum transparency on its North Korean policy,” he said.

Recently, there was a great cacophony in both Seoul and Washington among pundits on whether it would be appropriate to provide aid to intractable North Korea, whose food situation has worsened. As a person who grew up in East Germany where he experienced food shortages, Frank doesn’t see the matter as a subject for intellectual heavy-lifting but as a simple moral obligation.

“Seoul shouldn’t be hesitant in providing food aid to North Korea, even if it doesn’t have a total control over how it is distributed,” he said.

He offers one simple and one complicated answer to his argument. “The simple answer is that if somebody is hungry, you just have to help him. There is no other way, especially when they are fellow Koreans. What else could you do?”

A more complicated answer was that the aid, rice for example, in one way or another will find its way to the market in North Korea, propagating capitalism and also partly sowing a seed for social discontent or emulation by the deprived toward the privileged class — the same intended effect of the Sunshine Policy.

South should claim “ownership” of North Korea issue

As a person who grew up in East Germany, studied at Kim Il-sung University, and witnessed the German unification, Frank confesses that he is “emotionally attached” to the divided Korea issue as well. He is keen to draw German unification experience and see what can be applied to the Korean situation as well. Actually, there are many. And one of them is the ownership issue.

“West Germany always made it clear that the unification of Germany is the German question. If a country wants to talk with East Germany, it must talk to West Germany first. South Korea should claim ownership to the Korean question too,” he said.

On this matter, he said, the current Lee Myung-bak government is doing a much better job than the previous progressive administrations that advocated the Sunshine Policy.

“At least, it’s now clear to the U.S. and Japan that if they want a certain initiative with North Korea, they must first consult Seoul first.”

Frank also gives the Lee administration a certain amount of credit for not wavering in its hardline posture toward the North.

“If you do hardline today and appeasement tomorrow, you lose your credibility. You gain respect by being tough, constant and true to yourself.”

Frank then takes his argument one step further, which is bold and counter-intuitive. He says in fact Pyongyang might better appreciate the Lee administration’s hardline policy than the Sunshine Policy, noting how much havoc the Sunshine Policy wreaked in North Korea.

“North Korea is a society that has little experience of how to react to friendliness. My impression was that Pyongyang was running out of ideas on how to avoid the friendliness of the Sunshine Policy, which was very deleterious to the North Korean society. Then came Lee’s hardline policy. With Lee, North Korea is back to the game they know how to play. They receive less economic support, but politically it has become much easier for the North to maintain the system. So, in a way, I think the North Korean leadership is probably even happier now with Lee’s hardline policy.”