What Seoul needs to do to become ASEAN's reliable strategic partner

This is the last in a series of contributions on prospects of ASEAN-Korea relations in 2021. ― ED.

By Choe Won-gi

The inception in 2017 of the New Southern Policy (NSP), the signature foreign policy initiative of President Moon Jae-in, has opened a new chapter in Seoul's relations with ASEAN. To date, it remains the most successful and active foreign policy initiative under his administration. While the COVID-19 pandemic posed serious obstacles for implementing the prior pledges of the NSP, Seoul nevertheless came up with a new implementation strategy, "NSP Plus," which modified and updated previous programs of the NSP in order to meet ASEAN's urgent needs to deal with the public health crisis as well as new demands and priorities in the COVID-19 era.

Choe Won-gi, professor and head of Center for ASEAN-India Studies at Korea National Diplomatic Academy

The NSP as Seoul's new regional strategy has been well-received by Southeast Asia, and quite successful in producing substantial deliverables. For example, ASEAN rose to the rank of Korea's second-largest trade partner by 2019. Along with the highly proactive summit diplomacy, the Moon administration reinforced its ASEAN-related diplomatic infrastructure, including the creation of a new independent bureau dedicated solely to ASEAN and Southeast Asian affairs at the foreign ministry in Seoul. Furthermore, Seoul's NSP aspirations culminated in the special Korea-ASEAN summit held in November 2019, which will be recorded as the biggest diplomatic event under the Moon administration.

However, there are some serious challenges that Seoul needs to address in order to realize the aspirations underlying the NSP.

First, it is absolutely necessary for Seoul to continue to invest in and build on its prior pledges and commitments. It is essential for Seoul to lock in its forward momentum and make sure that the NSP will survive the incumbent Moon administration. Also, because Korea is in a unique position as a role model of development, Seoul needs to continue sharing its rich developmental experiences so that they can be fully leveraged by ASEAN in their efforts to close development gaps.

Second, by design the NSP is devoid of any substantive security elements in its operational programs. In an effort to minimize the risks of being drawn into the quagmire of the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, Seoul designed the initiative as a purely functional cooperation agenda with ASEAN, by setting aside sensitive strategic issues from the NSP's "peace pillar" on purpose. By contrast, Seoul chose deliberately to prioritize development cooperation as the central venue of engagement with ASEAN in order to capitalize on its developmental experiences.

As a consequence, issues of regional security and strategic cooperation are largely absent from Seoul's NSP drive. This imbalance in the design of the NSP is somewhat crippling. For example, according to a region-wide survey released in January 2020 by a Singapore-based think tank, ISEAS Singapore, contrary to Seoul's desire for a strategic partnership with ASEAN, Korea was perceived by Southeast Asians as the least "preferred and trusted strategic partner for ASEAN" among ASEAN's seven external partner countries.

To the extent Seoul keeps a blind eye to the issues of regional strategic concerns, and fails to play its role in contributing to peace and stability in the region, it seems hardly possible for Seoul to be accepted as a reliable strategic partner to Southeast Asians. Seoul needs to take a more balanced and proactive stance toward regional security affairs by expanding the "peace pillar" of the NSP beyond non-traditional security issues.

Finally, Seoul needs to make greater efforts to improve its strategic options and capabilities by actively seeking ways to enhance strategic cooperation with ASEAN. While Korea and ASEAN are divergent in their strategic perceptions and security priorities, Seoul and many Southeast Asian states are like-minded in that they wish to avoid being forced to take a side in the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry.

However, Seoul has yet to make full diplomatic efforts to turn this strategic convergence into some coordinated actions that would help enhance its strategic autonomy. Seoul needs to articulate its regional cooperation strategies more clearly and make concerted diplomatic efforts with ASEAN in this regard. Also, it is necessary for Seoul to deepen its engagements with ASEAN in various regional strategic forums such as the East Asian Summit and to make greater efforts to build strategic consensus with regard to emerging regional architectures.

Seoul needs to deal with these challenges in the years to come if it wants to secure strategic space and autonomy by forging a stronger partnership with ASEAN in an era of great power rivalry.

Choe Won-gi is a professor and head of the Center for ASEAN-India Studies at Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

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