Did an obscure ROK Navy raid help precipitate the Korean War?

 

An all-but-forgotten South Korean naval raid deep into North Korean waters just after the first anniversary of the First Republic of Korea may have played a key role in prompting Stalin to give a green light for the Pyongyang regime’s invasion of the South 10 months later.

Just after Liberation Day in 1949, a small ROK naval flotilla set out from Incheon, where it had been assembled for the celebrations, to attack the DPRK West Coast fleet anchored in its home port of Monggumpo. The ROK flotilla comprised five former Japanese minesweepers inherited by the fledgling ROK Navy. Unfortunately, the naval raid played directly into the hands of the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung as he made a final behind-the-scenes pitch to Stalin to give a green light for an invasion of South Korea.

The incident also came amid a worrisome series of mutinies and defections in the newly established South Korean military. A purge of the military hastily got underway after the October 1948 Yosu-Sunchon uprising when a whole regiment of 3,000 soldiers rebelled. The regiment was slated to embark for Jeju Island to aid in the suppression of an uprising in which as many as 30,000 people were eventually killed. The raid on Monggumpo came as a total surprise. It was sparked by the defection of the crew of the personal motor launch of General John Robert, commander of the U.S. military advisory group to the Republic of Korea. The defection to the North of the launch was a huge embarrassment to newly elected South Korean President Syngman Rhee, who was trying to consolidate his still-new government.

In addition to several naval defections, three military battalions had recently gone over to the North in separate incidents. The poorly screened South Korean constabulary was riddled with leftists and members of the communist South Korean Labor Party and was highly unreliable.

Rhee personally instructed Chief of Naval Operations Son Won-il to bring back Robert’s motor launch or sink it. As much as anything, the goal of the raid was to “save face” for Rhee’s government. The operation itself was planned by Chief of Naval Intelligence Major Han Myong-soo.

The flotilla was commanded by Lt. Colonel Li Yong-un. When it arrived off Monggumpo, raiding parties embarked in rubber boats from the minesweepers and moved into the harbor. They came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the North Korean warships. The ROK minesweepers then raced into the harbor with their 33mm deck guns blazing.

As it happened, Robert’s motor launch eluded capture. The North Koreans, anticipating that the South would try to mount a recovery operation, had moved it further up the Taedong River.

In all, some 18 North Korean 35-ton-class patrol vessels were sunk or captured in the raid. A few boats were towed back to Incheon where they were later used for target practice.

The reaction of U.S. Ambassador John Muccio was to strongly criticize the raid, calling it a gross “violation of the thirty-eighth parallel” and feared that it could trigger a wider conflict.

The incident was the first punitive operation of the new ROK Navy. Nevertheless, it was buried for decades because of its obvious political sensitivity. The story of the 1949 raid was suppressed since it called into question the official American and South Korea line about the Korean War being an unprovoked communist attack.

The 300 South Korean sailors and marines who participated in the raid were finally recognized in 2010 after the sinking of the Cheonan when the conservative Lee Myung-bak government decided to publicize the raid to make the point that if provoked Seoul could launch a retaliatory strike on its own, just as it did in 1949.

The ROK Navy issued an authorized comic book of the event and announced it was erecting a memorial to the heroes of the raid. The memorial consists of an obelisk atop a stylized minesweeper, showing sailors hurling grenades, and stands at Wolmi Park in Incheon.

The story of the raid raises important points about our received notions of modern Korean history being incomplete, even seriously misleading.

The raid may have played a role in shaping the North’s perceptions of the threat posed by Syngman Rhee, and thus its eventual decision to attack the South. The fact that the raid could be hushed up for so long should also serve as a cautionary tale about false and misleading information during wartime.

John Merrill is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Korean Studies at George Washington University.