Could China execute a special forces operation like the US precision Maduro abduction?

This image shows Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro arrested in a U.S. military operation in Caracas, Venezuela, Jan. 4. Captured from U.S. President Donald Trump's Truth Social account

The extreme precision of the U.S. in its Venezuelan operation shows why nations must be able to execute a complex special surgical strike, according to analysts who said China had long pursued the capability but had yet to master it.

In a complex joint endeavour integrating its air force, navy, intelligence agencies and space and cyber units, the U.S. military's elite Delta Force special mission unit completed its precision raid in Caracas - from infiltration to exfiltration - in less than three hours, abducting Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his wife and taking them to the U.S.

"Operation Absolute Resolve" was a culmination of years of developing multi-domain operations, lessons from decades of global engagement - both successes and failures - and the advanced integration of intelligence from many sources, according to Joshua Arostegui, chair of the China Landpower Studies Centre at the U.S. Army War College.

Thanks to China's rapid military modernisation, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has many of the assets the U.S. showcased in Venezuela, including fifth-generation stealth fighters, modern naval systems, cyber and electronic warfare platforms, advanced helicopters and precision munitions.

But there was a critical gap between China and the U.S. in integrating them for "all-domain operations", Arostegui noted.

"The ability to effectively enable the 'convergence' of the different domains [that] those weapons and systems use or control is what differentiates the U.S. military and the PLA currently," he said.

Despite years of efforts to improve its own all-domain operation capabilities, the PLA would still "struggle" to carry out a stand-alone special operation similar to the U.S. model, rather than acting as part of a larger campaign, Arostegui added.

Structure

China is estimated to have between 20,000 and 30,000 special operation personnel, reportedly consisting of its most qualified and highly trained officers and soldiers and equipped with advanced weaponry. They are tasked with three primary missions: direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism.

An apparent limitation of the PLA's special operation forces, as highlighted by the Pentagon's China Military Power Report 2024, is their fragmented command structure and logistics support.

The PLA Ground Force's 13 group armies, along with the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts, each maintain a Special Operations Forces (SOF) brigade. In addition, SOF units are assigned to the navy's marine corps, the air force's airborne corps, the rocket force's reconnaissance regiment and the People's Armed Police (PAP).

"There is no national-level special operations command responsible for all SOF activities. PLA SOF does not have organic or dedicated infrastructure or support and, therefore, must rely on conventional forces to support their missions," the report said.

It said the major overhaul of the PLA since late 2015, while emphasising joint operations at the theatre-command level, did not create joint task forces to encourage increased coordination between the services.

Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval vessels Type 052DL guided-missile destroyer Tangshan (D122), right, and the Type 903A replenishment ship Taihu(K889), sail in False Bay, outside Naval Base Simonstown, Cape Town, South Africa, Jan. 6, 2026. EPA-Yonhap

The Chinese military also lacked a dedicated unit for more strategic-level missions, said Dennis Wilder, a professor at Georgetown University and a former Central Intelligence Agency official.

"China does not have the equivalent of Seal Team Six or Delta Force for this kind of strategic insertion," he said.

The structure showed a continued expectation that special operations units were designed to support conventional forces or their service branches, Arostegui noted.

In earlier PLA writings detailing plans for a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan, special operations units were expected to "harass" the adversary behind enemy lines to create an operational opening for the main ground forces.

Since mid-2025, changes in state media references to the PLA group army-level SOF brigades have sparked speculation about further structural reforms. However, no details have been disclosed, and there was still no evidence that SOF personnel now fell under a dedicated special operations headquarters, Arostegui said.

Beijing views Taiwan as a part of China to be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the U.S., do not recognise the island as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

Tensions across the Taiwan Strait have escalated since 2016 when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power on the island and as Beijing has ratcheted up military pressure in recent years to warn against separatist moves in Taiwan.

Taiwan's national flag is raised during an early morning flag-raising ceremony after China's Peoples Liberation Army said it would conduct live-fire drills in five designated maritime and airspace areas around Taiwan, in Taipei, Dec. 30, 2025. AFP-Yonhap

Hardware capabilities

The PLA lacks adequate aviation assets to carry out long-range insertion of special forces to conduct strategic-level direct action or reconnaissance, mainly relying on helicopters to transport the SOF units for airborne and air assault missions, according to the Pentagon report.

Regarding a cross-strait VIP capture operation in particular, PLA SOF units were also constrained by limited helicopter numbers, Arostegui said.

"While SOF personnel train with affiliated aviation units, they do not have their own organic heliborne lift, leaving them unable to train regularly with such capabilities," he said, adding that the U.S. helicopter pilots in the Maduro operation were trained for such risky manoeuvres and missions.

Ni Lexiong, a professor in the political science department at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, said Washington's electronic warfare, which suppressed Venezuela's radar system, and aircraft stealth capabilities played a major part in securing air superiority - capabilities that Beijing still needed to improve.

"Electromagnetic suppression technology, namely electronic jamming or electronic warfare, and its air force's stealth technology, coupled with America's battlefield experience - these are three crucial dimensions [for the strike]," Ni said.

A bomber takes off from an undisclosed location for drills east of Taiwan, in this screenshot from a video released by the Eastern Theatre Command of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), Dec. 29, 2025. Reuters-Yonhap

Experience

In listing major international deployments the PLA special forces had taken part in - including earthquake search and rescue in Nepal, war evacuation in Yemen, counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and border reinforcement after a clash with India - the Pentagon report concluded that, despite unilateral and multilateral training, the PLA lacked real-world combat experience.

Arostegui said that in terms of individual target hunting and seizure missions, some special forces teams in western China might have experience in missions against suspected terrorists or insurgents.

"But those types of missions would be much smaller in scale and limited in the need for joint integration," he said.

Although the PLA was not likely to be currently capable of carrying out a US-style precision strike operation, they had other options to complete a "decapitation" if ordered, although probably with much higher collateral damage, Arostegui added.

"It could still have a similar effect but would not be as complex."

The PLA has conducted simulation training in recent years, with state media stating that the military's training base in Zhurihe in Inner Mongolia features life-size mock-ups of Taiwan's presidential office and parliament.

But no information has been revealed on exercise scenarios carried out by the PLA there.

Members of the People's Liberation Army stand as the strategic strike group displays DF-61 nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, Sept. 3, 2025. Reuters-Yonhap

Intelligence

Analysts pointed out that the success of the Delta Force operation was paired with a crucial strength - America's ability to gather intelligence - a power that the PLA must strengthen to chase its biggest rival.

Song Zhongping, a former Chinese military instructor, said PLA special forces had sufficient capabilities and had been tested through their anti-terrorism actions. However, intelligence would be a key factor in whether the PLA could achieve a lightning strike or a "targeted elimination".

"The U.S. military, comparatively, achieved this through the coordinated efforts of various agencies and intelligence departments, obtaining comprehensive first-hand intelligence. Additionally, they secured the support of informants to ensure the precision of their intelligence," he said.

Wilder also highlighted the importance of intelligence in the Caracas operation. He said it succeeded because of "superb covert intelligence gathering, months of careful preparation, the use of offensive cyber and electronic warfare".

"The relevance is that China has a long way still to go to reach the U.S. gold standard," he said.

Read the article at SCMP.