Far-right views among elderly decline with more social interaction, study finds

In recent political discourse, the term “far-right” has become increasingly familiar. Once considered a fringe viewpoint, far-right ideas, often characterized by extreme positions, are now being voiced more openly and prominently. But who are the people who hold these views, and what traits define them?

To explore these questions, Yonsei University’s welfare research center, in collaboration with Korea Research’s public opinion team, conducted a nationwide survey of 1,000 adults aged 18 and older from March 21 to 24.

Following a period of political stability often referred to as the "centrist era" of the mid-20th century, far-right ideology saw a relative decline in influence. However, it began to reemerge prominently in global politics after the 2007–2008 financial crisis.

Events such as the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the storming of the U.S. Capitol in 2021 and Brexit in the United Kingdom symbolize this global shift. Far-right movements are no longer on the margins; they are now seen as active forces seeking to reshape mainstream politics.

South Korea is no exception. A new strain of far-right sentiment has surfaced, fueled by online communities that amplify anti-immigration and anti-feminist views, distrust in political elites and calls for radical systemic reform. The violent incident at Seoul Western District Court earlier this year is seen as part of this emerging trend.

Importantly, far-right ideology is not simply an extension of traditional conservatism. Rather, it is a political orientation rooted in distrust of established elites and characterized by a desire to restructure the current order through authoritarian leadership and radical means.

Those aligned with far-right views often harbor hostility toward perceived outsiders, such as immigrants, accept social inequality as natural and embrace survival-of-the-fittest thinking.

At the same time, they place high value on traditional and conservative norms, including, in the Korean context, staunch anti-communism.

Far-right views rise among young men, elderly

The survey revealed that far-right political views are most pronounced among men in their 20s and those aged 70 and older, with notable gaps across gender, education, occupation and income level.

According to the data, 24 percent of male respondents were identified as holding far-right views, compared to 19 percent of women. In every age group except those in their 50s, men showed a higher prevalence of far-right views than women.

By age, the highest rates were found among those aged 70 and older (29 percent) and among people in their 20s (28 percent), defying the common perception that far-right views are mainly concentrated among older generations. In contrast, people in their 40s showed the lowest rate at just 12 percent.

The distribution follows a U-shaped curve by age, with the youngest and oldest generations showing stronger far-right leanings than those in the middle.

Within the 20s age group, gender differences were stark — 33 percent of men were categorized as far-right compared to 22 percent of women. Similar patterns emerged for people in their 30s, where 21 percent of men were classified as far-right, more than double the 10 percent of women in the same age group.

Educational background also played a role. Far-right views were more prevalent among respondents with a high school diploma or less at 24 percent, compared to 19 percent of those with a college degree.

Occupational differences were equally striking. Among workers in sales and service jobs, 33 percent held far-right views, while the figure dropped to 13 percent for white-collar professionals and office workers — a gap of 20 percentage points.

Income showed a polarized trend. Far-right attitudes were highest at both ends of the income spectrum: 30 percent among households earning less than 1 million won ($740) per month and 27 percent among those earning more than 10 million won.

Self-perception and misalignment

Interestingly, many individuals identified as far-right did not perceive themselves as such. When asked about their political orientation, 36 percent of this group described themselves as “moderate,” and 9 percent even as “progressive.” Only 55 percent self-identified as conservative.

In contrast, among the general population excluding far-right respondents, only 27 percent identified as conservative — roughly half the rate of the far-right group.

The results highlight the risk of relying solely on self-reported political labels to assess ideology, especially among people who primarily engage with like-minded communities, which may distort or obscure their actual ideological leanings.

When asked about who should be held responsible for the recent political crisis and state of emergency surrounding the presidential impeachment, respondents in the general population most commonly blamed the former president and the ruling party, with 42 percent assigning them full responsibility. In contrast, only 12 percent of those with far-right views said the same.

On the other hand, 17 percent of far-right respondents placed full blame on the Democratic Party and the opposition — nearly three times higher than the 6 percent among those without far-right leanings. These findings suggest that the far-right group holds a distinctly favorable view of the conservative political bloc and largely attribute the current crisis to the opposition.

Role of social interaction

The research team also examined whether online activity or social relationships influence far-right tendencies. The findings revealed no significant correlation between online usage patterns and far-right views.

However, personal relationships showed varying effects depending on age and the type of social interaction.

In general, the number of close personal contacts, such as family members, relatives and friends, did not have a clear impact on far-right tendencies.

One exception was among respondents in their 30s. In that group, those who reported more frequent interaction with close contacts were less likely to hold far-right views. Researchers suggest that emotional stability derived from close relationships may play a moderating role against radicalization in this age group.

In contrast, among people aged 70 and older, it was interaction with non-close contacts — people outside family and friends — that had a meaningful impact. Seniors who engaged more frequently with strangers or broader social groups were less likely to express far-right views.

The study suggests that social isolation from a wider community may reinforce extreme attitudes in the elderly.

In short, the effect of social engagement on political views is shaped not just by how often people interact, but also with whom and at what stage of life.

Toward understanding, not polarization

While it would be overly simplistic to conclude that frequent social interaction alone reduces far-right sentiment, the findings do indicate that different generations benefit from different types of social contact.

For people in their 30s, connections with close personal networks appear most important; for those over 70, contact with broader society has a stronger influence.

Ultimately, understanding far-right attitudes requires looking deeper into the emotional isolation, accumulated frustration and sense of disenfranchisement that fuel them.

Examining why certain generations and social groups are more susceptible to these views goes beyond political analysis — it is essential to evaluating the sustainability of Korean society.

The researchers stress the need to address the root causes of far-right sentiment and to rebuild social trust and institutional stability, rather than fueling division or neglecting structural issues.

This article from the Hankook Ilbo, the sister publication of The Korea Times, is translated by a generative AI and edited by The Korea Times.