AnalysisPolitical will, alliance design remain key to OPCON transfer: analysts

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, right, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth shake hands after a joint press conference following the 57th South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul, Nov. 4, 2025. Joint Press Corps

South Korea and the United States have moved toward clarifying a timeline for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington to Seoul. While the Lee Jae Myung administration aims to complete it within its term by 2030, recent media reports suggest the schedule could be pushed forward to 2028.

Security experts say 2028 is a feasible target, but caution that the outcome will depend less on completing military milestones than on political decisions and broader alliance planning.

The two countries are currently working to complete the verification of full operational capability (FOC) this year, the second step in the three-stage OPCON transition process. The results are expected to be reviewed at the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) scheduled for October.

A Defense Ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the focus remains on completing FOC verification rather than committing to a specific target year.

“Whether 2028 is realistic is not something we can determine at this point,” the official said. “Verification must come first, and discussions with the United States will continue alongside that process.”

Under the current framework, OPCON transfer proceeds through verifications of initial operational capability (IOC), FOC and full mission capability (FMC). While the first two stages rely largely on quantitative assessments of command, control and operational readiness, the final FMC stage involves broader judgment about whether South Korea can independently lead combined forces during wartime.

Defense chiefs from both countries agreed at the previous SCM in Seoul last November to push ahead with FOC verification this year, using joint military exercises as the primary testing ground.

Kim Yeoul-soo, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, said debates over OPCON often focus on technical readiness, but political will remains the decisive factor, particularly on the U.S. side.

“Meeting the evaluation criteria is necessary, but it is not the final word,” Kim said. “Even if South Korea meets the requirements, the transfer can be delayed if Washington is hesitant. Conversely, if the U.S. decides to proceed, the timeline can be accelerated.”

Kim noted that past delays were driven less by military shortcomings than by political caution, especially due to concerns that transferring OPCON could weaken deterrence against North Korea.

“There has long been a belief that U.S. command authority itself plays a central role in preventing war [with North Korea],” he said. “Fears that deterrence could be undermined even if U.S. forces remain after the transfer have influenced domestic political debates.”

Analysts say an OPCON transfer would also bring changes to the combined command structure. Currently, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) is headed by a U.S. four-star general, with a South Korean four-star general serving as deputy. When OPCON is transferred to Seoul, that structure would be reversed, placing a South Korean commander in charge of CFC.

Kim said questions remain over whether the U.S. would continue to assign a four-star general to the deputy commander position or shift to a three-star one.

“This is not just about rank,” he said. “It reflects how the U.S. views its future command role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider region.”

Cha Du-hyeogn, vice president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, offered a more cautious view, arguing that the current OPCON conditions may not fully reflect today’s security environment.

Cha pointed out that the IOC-FOC-FMC framework was designed with conventional warfare in mind, even though North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have changed the nature of a potential conflict.

“If we take a conditions-based transfer seriously, we need to examine whether the existing conditions are still appropriate,” Cha said. “Focusing on timelines without reassessing those conditions risks oversimplifying the issue.”

Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said OPCON transfer should be viewed in a broader strategic context rather than debates over specific dates.

“The U.S. has made it clear that South Korea is expected to take primary responsibility for conventional deterrence against North Korea,” Cho said. “At the same time, U.S. Forces Korea are increasingly seen as a regional asset linked to Washington’s strategy toward China.”

Cho also said that, from Washington’s perspective, wartime OPCON is no longer an issue the U.S. needs to hold onto. “Looking at the direction set out in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and the latest National Defense Strategy, there is a growing view in Washington that it would be better to conclude the transfer within the current presidential term,” he said.

From that perspective, Cho said, OPCON transfer is less about whether it will happen; it is more about how smoothly the alliance adapts afterward.

“Whether the target is 2028 or later, what matters is whether Seoul and Washington can clearly explain how the alliance will function after the transfer,” he said.