By Kang Hyun-kyung
There has been a gradual shift in the primary role of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) over the five decades since its creation in 1961.
In the past, the NIS, formerly known as the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), was widely viewed as a politically-propelled entity responsible for fanning red scares before major elections to steer public opinion in favor of ruling party candidates.
It was also described as a state apparatus established to spy on and repress high-profile opposition politicians.
But now, few see the spy agency as a tool designed to achieve such covert, unjustifiable purposes.
Agents are facing mounting pressure to transform into warriors in the global intelligence war.
The changing role has gained attention as the nation commemorates the 50th anniversary of the creation of the NIS today.
Recent cases indicate that the spy agency is undergoing a period of trial and error, while striving to adapt to the new environment.
Several NIS agents’ breaking into a hotel room where an Indonesian delegation was staying in Seoul while in town for an arms deal in March highlighted its ineptness.
Their operation was foiled as they hurriedly left the scene after being spotted by an Indonesian official. This drew ridicule from the intelligence committee for the agents’ lack of professionalism.
Last summer, an NIS agent was ordered to leave Libya after he reportedly attempted to gather intelligence on its leader Moammar Gadhafi.
Analysts say civilian political leaders, and the diversification of threats from the traditional Stalinist enemy to terrorism and cyber attacks are the key driving forces behind the demand for the spy agency’s shifting role.
Rep. Lee Cheol-woo of the ruling Grand National Party (GNP), a former veteran NIS agent, said the service began “losing its clout” after democracy fighter Kim Young-sam was sworn in as President in 1993.
The civilian leader ended more than 30 years of military authoritarian rule, which started after the May 16 coup in 1961.
“After democracy was established, people voiced concerns over the role of the NIS in domestic politics. The spy agency was urged to stop meddling,” the lawmaker recalled.
From 1996, the parliament has scrutinized the NIS budget and required high-ranking officials to brief lawmakers on the National Assembly Intelligence Committee about what they do on a regular basis.
Before this, the spy agency was responsible for reporting only to the president.
Rep. Lee said the need for overseas intelligence was another factor that has facilitated the shift in the role of the NIS.
“After the late former President Kim Dae-jung took office, the NIS put priority on gathering intelligence overseas. The first deputy director was appointed to manage operations abroad from that time,” he said.
The KCIA was established in 1961, the year the late former President Park Chung-hee led military forces to overthrow the then government.
The agency was created to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities to help the nation better handle communist threats.
Kim Jong-pil, who later became a politician, was appointed as the first KCIA chief.
In the 1960s and 70s, the KCIA became the command center for national security, and also worked with the Economic Planning Board.
“They were highly centralized organizations, second only in power to the presidential office,” political scientist Kim Choong-nam said. “Park Chung-hee was at the top, directly commanding the twin engines of development and security.”
The immense power of the agency was possible partly because Park placed top priority on nation building.
Communist threats and poverty were formidable challenges facing the general-turned-president.
From May 16 to December 1961, the military arrested 3,300 pro-communist sympathizers.
The “overly empowered” KCIA was doomed to abuse its power in domestic politics.
It meddled deeply into the political process, including elections. The KCIA flexed its muscle in the selection of candidates to run in major elections.
The agency kidnapped high-profile opposition leader Kim Dae-jung in the 1970s in an attempt at political repression.
These incidents gave the organization the dubious reputation of a unit designed to help authoritarian leaders maintain their influence.