Who decides China’s policy on North Korea?

‘Zhonglianbu’ most influential in decision-making on Pyongyang

By Sunny Lee

BEIJING — China issued an unprecedentedly strong condemnation against North Korea in the aftermath of the North’s nuclear test in October 2006. Characterizing Pyongyang’s move as a “flagrant” (“hanran” in Chinese) act surprised even some Chinese experts on North Korea who couldn’t believe their foreign ministry would use such an “undiplomatic” term.

It turned out that the term was not decided by the foreign ministry, but was given from “above,” according to a source familiar with the situation.

“The foreign ministry had to use the term because it was the expression used by the top leadership, which was very angry about the North Korean nuclear test,” the source said. “The foreign ministry just carried out the instruction.”

This episode begs the question of “who” in China then makes foreign policy decisions on North Korea.

Although educated guesses lead us to think that matters concerning relations with “foreign” countries are supposed to be dealt with by the “foreign” ministry, outside observers for years have also speculated that China’s ministry may not be the main player in architecting the country’s major foreign policy on North Korea.

“Based on my research, the senior Chinese leadership tends to listen more to the opinions of ‘Zhonglianbu’ pertaining to the matters on the Korean Peninsula,” said Linda Jakobson, director of the China and Global Security Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

“Zhonglianbu” stands for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The title is so long that even foreign scholars of China prefer to go by its shortened Chinese moniker.

“Zhonglianbu is especially influential in the decision-making processes with regard to North Korea, more influential than the foreign ministry,” said Jakobson.

For example, whenever Kim Jong-il visits China, it’s Zhonglianbu, not the ministry, that arranges all the logistics.

Zhonglianbu handles the relations between the Communist Party in China and other political parties abroad. This party-to-party relationship has been the particularly pronounced backbone of maintaining China’s traditional ties with North Korea through the latter’s Workers’ Party.

The heads of Zhonglianbu and the Workers’ Party are usually privileged to see the top leader of the other country during their visits.

For example, in February, Hu Jintao greeted Kim Yong-Il, director of the Workers’ Party’s International Department, and remarked, “The Sino-North Korean friendship is a precious wealth of the ‘two parties’ and two peoples.”

Likewise, in August last year, Wang Jiarui, director of Zhonglianbu, visited Pyongyang and met personally with Kim Jong-il, delivering Hu Jintao’s oral message.

In understanding China’s posture toward North Korea, Jakobson said, there is a key figure worthwhile to take notice of. “State Councilor Dai Bingguo is a central person,” she said.

Dai used to be the head of the Zhonglianbu before he was promoted to serve as state councilor, a powerful position within the executive organ of China’s central government, as a national security advisor to Hu Jintao.

“But Dai is not playing the role of ‘China’s Henry Kissinger’ in coordinating China’s foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula because he doesn’t have the independence that U.S. President Nixon gave to Kissinger. That’s the big difference,” said Jakobson.

At the same time, Zhonglianbu is not the only mover and shaker of China’s foreign policy on North Korea.

Above Dai, there is the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, which includes Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao.

Ultimately, Beijing’s decisions on Pyongyang are hammered out by these most important nine individuals, who make collective decisions after going through internal consultations among themselves.

According to Jakobson, however, the nine people’s views on the North are often divided. “For example, there are those who believe that China under no circumstances should do anything to hurt the feelings of China’s historically close ally, while there are those who argue for following international practices in dealing with North Korea,” she said.

“This explains why there was the lapse of the time between the actual sinking of the South Korean navy ship, the Cheonan, and any statement by the Chinese leadership.

“It reflects the situation that there are many voices that are trying to be heard among the top leadership,” said Jakobson.

A telling sign of this internal juggling of opinions was also reflected in China’s recent dramatic shift of posture on North Korea by strengthening its ties with Pyongyang in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, in great contrast to China’s strong 2006 condemnation over the nuclear test.

“North Korea is the most divisive of foreign policy issues among the senior leadership in China,” Jakobson said.

중국의 대북한 정책 … 어디서 정하나?

중국은 2006년 10월 북한의 핵실험 후 북한에 대해 사상 유례없는 강경한 비난을 쏟아냈다.

이런 노골적인 비난은 심지어 중국 외교부가 어떻게 그런 비외교적인 용어를 사용했는지 믿어지지 않는다는 일부 중국의 북한전문가들에게 놀라운 일이었다.

이러한 강경한 용어사용은 중국외교부에서 결정한 것이 아니라 ‘위선’에서 내린 것이라고 정세에 밝은 한 소식통이 전했다.

이 소식통은 “외교부는 이런 용어를 북한의 핵실험에 매우 화가 난 최고위층이 사용한 것이어서 이를 사용하지 않으면 안되었다”며 “외교부는 단지 그 지시를 수행했을 뿐이다”고 덧붙였다.

이런 에피소드는 중국에서 과연 누가 북한에 대한 정책을 결정하는지 질문을 던진다.

외교부에서 외교관계와 관련된 사항을 다룰 것으로 생각되지만 외부 전문가들은 외교부가 중국의 북한정책에 대한 주 입안자가 아닐 것이라고 여겨 왔다.