Time for N. Korea to Give Up Nuclear Weapons

by Sunny Lee

Korea Times Correspondent

BEIJING ― ``A drastically different policy" will be introduced by Obama in resolving North Korea's nuclear programs. That's the drastically audacious first message by Han S. Park, an expert on North Korea at the University of Georgia. For that matter, Park's bold second message goes, ``It's optimal time for North Korea to give up nuclear weapons."

Park, director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues at the university, is well-connected with Frank Jannuzi, a key foreign policy adviser for U.S. President-elect Barack

Obama. In fact, Park met with Jannuzi before his trip to North Korea where he stayed from Oct. 28 to Nov. 1.

Fresh from his North Korean visit, Park shared his view on how North Korean nuclear saga will proceed under Obama's helm, in a telephone interview with The Korea Times.

Question: You've just returned from North Korea and talked with some key figures at the Obama camp. What can we expect to happen on North Korean nuclear issue?

Answer: The Obama administration and the Kim Jong-il government are expected to make a dramatic stride toward diplomatic normalization.

Q:

What's the key for the deal to happen?

A:

Will North Korea indeed give up its nuclear weapons programs? That is the key question. If North Korea is absolutely determined to hang on to its nuclear weapons and relevant programs, then there is no point in negotiating with North Korea with the agenda of denuclearization of the country. Therefore, improving relations with North Korea during the Obama administration has to deal with that question.

Some people keep raising doubt on whether North Korea will give up nuclear weapons. Will it?

My response to that is yes. North Korea is expected to relinquish its nuclear programs and weapons themselves, if the arrangements are right. Then, you will ask what arrangements will be considered by North Koreans to be sufficient for them to give up their weapons?

Firstly, security assurance. In fact, North Koreans are saying, and I think that's correct from their point of view that they want the United States to give up hostile attitude and policies toward North Korea. For North Koreans, security assurance is the very key. No country, including North Korea, is expected to relinquish its security interest in exchange for economic and political interest. We cannot buy off North Korean nuclear arms. No matter how large the amount, North Korea is not going to relinquish its nuclear arms for money. It's not an economic matter. We have to address North Korea's security concerns if, in fact, we're going to press North Korea effectively to compromise its security means.

What assurances does North Korea want?

Firstly, stop the (South Korea-U.S.) joint military exercises. For North Korea, it's a direct expression of hostility. Secondly, the conversion of armistice agreement into a peace pact. Thirdly, they want the mission of the U.S. military in South Korea to be redefined so that North Korea will not be the primary enemy target. Fourthly, they want American sanctions to be lifted. North Koreans are not interested in symbolic implication of it. They are interested in the prospect of U.S. lifting of trade sanctions and political sanctions imposed on North Korea. Sanctions include not only the bilateral one with the United States, but also the one imposed by the multinational ones, that is, the United Nations. Finally, diplomatic normalization with the U.S. I think that will be sufficient. Then, North Korea will give up everything.

Even with these, there are some people who would ask ``how do you trust North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons?"

There's no way that you can verify any country's nuclear situation, including the United States. Therefore, you need to have a certain degree of trust in North Korea. Secondly, you need to follow North Koreans' possible reasoning behind their thinking.

Right now is the optimal time for North Koreans to negotiate with their nuclear card. It's because they don't want to see a regional arms race, triggered by Japan's nuclearization or rearmament. North Korea's continuing insistence on nuclear programs may trigger nuclear arms race in the region.

How much economic aid will North Korea demand for giving up nuclear weapons?

With diplomatic normalization (with the United States), North Korea doesn't want massive economic aid. They are smart people. If they are able to receive loans from the Asian Development Bank or the International Monetary Fund, they know how to make money. They know all the economic experiments other countries conducted. They are not proud of the fact that they are receiving all this economic aid. They like to develop their economy. They will be able to do that with the diplomatic normalization with the United States.

Why would Obama be motivated to make a deal with North Korea?

Obama's doctrine is to engage in the enemies or potential enemies and carry out direct negotiations, unlike Bush doctrine. So, it is Obama's interest to show that his doctrine works better. The first case Obama can use as an exemplar is North Korea. Why? It's because North Korea is the easiest case in comparison to, say, Iran.

In Iranian case, it's an age-old regional divide, complicated by religious fragmentation, oil interest, the Israel factor and everything. It's not going to be resolved very quickly. Certainly not easily. But North Korea is isolated. In fact, there is no one who seriously objects the denuclearization of North Korea. If, in fact, the Obama administration and the Kim Jong-il government have the political will, the road is not that difficult. It seems to me, for political reasons and for pragmatic reasons, Obama wants to improve relations with North Korea.

What about Kim Jong-il?

Kim has always wanted to improve relations with America. I was in North Korea five days before former Secretary of State Madeline Albright's visit to Pyongyang and remained there for five days after Albright's departure to monitor North Korean responses to the Clinton's visit. They were in fact fully expecting and hoping to see a summit by way of Clinton's visit.

Everything changed with the election of George W. Bush. North Korea now wants to see the development of relations where the Clinton administration left off. In my view, both Pyongyang and Washington have the political will to improve their relationship.

Where does Seoul fit into this picture?

The South Korean government must read the Obama doctrine if it will. It must study the prospect of Obama administration's policy toward North Korea. The Lee Myung-bak government will be in a very embarrassing position if it has to object Obama's policy toward North Korea. Obama's policy toward North Korea will not be determined by South Korean government's wishes. I see an emergence of discordance between South Korea and the United States when the U.S. and North Korea are improving their relationship.

With the new thawing between Pyongyang and Washington, will the six-party talks still play its key role?

To the extent that the U.S.-North Korea dialogue will be carried on forcefully, the six-party umbrella will be dimmed out. However, China can continue to play a pivotal role in developing Northeast Asia security framework. China has diplomatic ties with all of relevant six countries. China is in the ideal position to assume the leadership role. As far as North Korea's denuclearization in its negotiation process with the United States goes, however, China's role will be limited.

You mentioned what North Korea wants from the United States. What does the U.S. want in return?

A complete denuclearization. Nothing short of a complete denuclearization will guide the United States to eventual diplomatic normalization with North Korea. The grand picture is that, if conditions are right, North Korea will be giving up nuclear weapons and the Obama administration is inclined to give what North Korea wants.