Over the last four years, multiple military conflicts have involved petroleum producing states. In the current U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, roughly a fifth of the world’s petroleum and liquefied natural gas has been cut off from global markets, spiking prices and raising concerns about an economic slowdown. While managing short‑term fuel shortages is urgent, Korea also faces a deeper strategic challenge. The rapid battlefield adoption of drones and artificial intelligence (AI) in these conflicts signals long‑term shifts that will reshape Korea’s security environment far beyond the present crisis.
Drones have been used in limited military operations for years. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides used drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in their frozen conflict. The United States also used drones for these purposes, as well as targeted attacks. The most relevant precursor to the Russian invasion of Ukraine may be the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, when Azerbaijan established air superiority over Armenia by using drones.
The war between Russia and Ukraine pushed the evolution of drone warfare further. As both sides began to run short of artillery, they turned to one-way attack drones first as a supplement but now as a primary tool for attacking their opponents’ positions. This has resulted in the rapid evolution of drone technology, a push to develop cheaper drones and shifting battlefield tactics.
In deepening its ties to Russia, North Korea has gained access to Russian drone technology and battlefield tactics. Reports suggest that Pyongyang is both building Iranian-style Shahed drones domestically for Moscow, as well as sending workers to Russian factories to support production. In any future conflict, Seoul should expect North Korea to be better prepared both in terms of production and tactics.
This evolution in drone usage requires defense systems to be rethought. When the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system was initially deployed, it was designed to work with other missile defense systems to protect against different types of missiles.
The wars in Ukraine and now the Middle East have shown the utility of cheap drones as alternatives to missiles. Iran’s Shahed drones cost no more than $50,000, while systems such as Korea’s Cheongung-II interceptors are estimated to cost $1.5 million. While cheaper than a U.S. Patriot missile interceptor, it makes taking down potential North Korean drones a poor cost tradeoff. There will still be a role for this type of system, but new layers of cheaper defenses will need to be added.
The cost differential is not the only reason to augment defensive systems. Cheap drones like those used by Russia and Iran can be produced relatively quickly, in contrast to interceptor missiles. U.S. allies in the Middle East have already used more interceptors than were produced in 2025. While the United States has noted that Iran’s rate of ballistic missile launches has declined by 90 percent, Iran’s pace of drone strikes has not declined. Part of Iran’s strategy is to wear down U.S. and allied defenses over time to be able to conduct unimpeded strikes. Drones are a key part of the strategy.
AI is also rapidly becoming a critical tool for modern warfare. In Ukraine, AI systems analyze vast streams of battlefield data, accelerate targeting cycles and guide autonomous drones. The U.S. is deploying similar capabilities in the current conflict with Iran, and the pace of adoption will only accelerate as advances in autonomy and model performance continue.
Yet the same technologies that create battlefield advantage also introduce new strategic vulnerabilities. AI depends on massive data centers and enormous amounts of electricity. The Nvidia chips Korea agreed to purchase last fall alone will require energy equivalent to what powers 126,000-260,000 homes. Meeting Korea’s future AI needs will demand not only more data center capacity, but also a far more resilient and expanded energy supply.
The need for large data centers and significant power to run them creates two vulnerabilities in war. The first is attacks on the data centers. Iran has already targeted some data centers in the Middle East. The second is attacks on energy infrastructure, which has been a hallmark of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Any integration of AI into defense needs to account for these vulnerabilities to defend critical infrastructure. Even nominally nondefense related AI centers will need protection. In a crisis, companies like Coupang will be critical for supply chain logistics.
For demographic reasons, Korea has been at the forefront of integrating AI into national security. The war in the Middle East highlights the technology’s potential, but also its vulnerabilities. One of those vulnerabilities is the potential for drones to overwhelm traditional missile defenses. While it is imperative for Korea to manage the energy shortages that will develop from the war with Iran, it is also critical that Korea carefully study the evolving use of drones and AI, especially as AI is integrated more deeply into drone technology.
Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.