ED Lesson from France

The despair and anger of France’s youth have spilled out onto the streets, exposing the consequences of years of political paralysis, fiscal mismanagement and delayed structural reform.

On Saturday (local time), approximately 550,000 people reportedly took part in demonstrations across 110 locations nationwide, with some protests escalating into arson and looting. Behind the unrest lies a deeper grievance: a social contract increasingly perceived as unfair to younger generations, who are being asked to shoulder the costs of an aging society while facing diminishing opportunities in return.

At the heart of the crisis is France’s generous pension system. The country’s public pension replacement rate stands at approximately 72 percent of pre-retirement earnings, far above the OECD average of 43 percent. Retirees’ disposable incomes can even exceed the median incomes of workers in their 20s and 30s. The poverty rate among French retirees is around 4 percent, reportedly much lower than among young people, who are already burdened by high housing costs and scarce employment opportunities.

Unlike Korea’s traditional funded pension model, France largely operates a pay-as-you-go system, in which contributions from current workers finance the pensions of retirees. As the population ages, approximately 1.7 to 1.8 workers must support each pensioner. Pension-related public expenditure has consequently consumed a substantial share of government resources, leaving less room for investment in education, infrastructure and other priorities essential to future prosperity. Reports that roughly one-third of France’s education budget goes toward retired public servants’ pensions have further intensified resentment over deteriorating school conditions and teacher shortages.

France’s predicament is not simply a pension crisis; it is a crisis of political will and economic competitiveness. Successive governments have struggled to reform a system protected by powerful vested interests and electoral considerations. Meanwhile, public debt has reportedly approached 119 percent of gross domestic product, and economic growth remains anemic.

With the tax burden already among the highest in the developed world, further taxation offers little room to maneuver. The result is a vicious cycle: sluggish growth constrains revenue, generous entitlements squeeze productive investment and deteriorating public services deepen social discontent.

The broader European context compounds these difficulties. France’s troubles recall the sovereign debt crises that engulfed southern Europe in the early 2010s, when weak competitiveness and unsustainable spending exposed the limits of welfare systems built on optimistic economic assumptions. Germany, too, faces mounting pressure as Chinese competition challenges its automotive industry.

Korea should regard these developments as a warning, not a distant European misfortune. Although the International Monetary Fund has raised its growth forecast for Korea to 3.3 percent, the country’s apparent resilience masks significant vulnerabilities. Growth remains heavily dependent on semiconductors, leaving the economy exposed to fluctuations in global technology demand. Meanwhile, youth employment has declined for 47 consecutive months through the period cited, while soaring property prices and burdensome rents have placed homeownership increasingly beyond the reach of younger households.

Korea’s pension system faces an equally formidable demographic challenge. A reform announced in March last year raised the National Pension contribution rate from 9 to 13 percent and the replacement rate from 40 to 43 percent, with implementation phased in over time. Yet the changes are expected to postpone fund depletion by only eight to 15 years from the previous projection of 2056. Strong investment returns may provide temporary relief, but volatile financial markets make them an unreliable substitute for structural reform. If the fund is exhausted, future workers could face contribution burdens approaching 30 percent of their incomes under some projections.

Nor has the basic pension escaped difficult questions. The government’s recent reform package preserved the eligibility threshold covering the bottom 70 percent of older people, while offering an additional 30,000 won ($22.62) to low-income recipients. Although assistance to vulnerable seniors is necessary, expanding expenditure without reconsidering eligibility and long-term affordability risks shifting an ever-greater burden onto younger taxpayers.

Korea must therefore pursue further pension reform, including automatic adjustments to contributions and benefits in line with demographic and economic conditions, alongside a more carefully targeted basic pension. Fiscal policy must also prioritize productivity, industrial diversification, education and quality jobs for young people rather than rely excessively on semiconductor revenues or indiscriminate spending. Warnings of an artificial intelligence investment bubble only reinforce the need for prudence.

Ultimately, the test of a sustainable welfare state is not how generously it treats today’s retirees, but whether it can honor those commitments without sacrificing tomorrow’s opportunities. If Korea’s political leaders continue to postpone difficult decisions to protect electoral support, the frustration now visible in France may eventually find its own expression at home.

Preventing that outcome requires more than fiscal discipline: It demands a fairer intergenerational compact in which young people can believe that their contributions will secure a future worth building.