ED US must end double standard on Korea's nuclear fuel rights

U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman look on during a bilateral meeting in Riyadh, May 13, 2025. Trump on Thursday said the fate of the U.S. nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia will depend on the kingdom recognizing Israel, throwing the agreement into turmoil just one day after it was signed. Riyadh has long resisted joining the so-called Abraham Accords with Israel, insisting especially after the outbreak of the Gaza conflict. Yonhap

The United States' willingness to permit Saudi Arabia to pursue domestic uranium enrichment for civilian nuclear power has exposed an inconsistency in Washington's nonproliferation policy that is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.

Although the arrangement was thrown into doubt just a day after it was announced, after U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday said that any nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia would ultimately depend on Riyadh recognizing Israel, the administration has already crossed an important policy threshold. It has demonstrated that Washington is prepared, under certain circumstances, to reconsider its long-standing opposition to uranium enrichment by additional partner countries.

If Saudi Arabia — with its comparatively weaker nonproliferation credentials — can even be considered for such a right, there is no credible reason why Korea, one of America's closest allies and among the world's most responsible nuclear states, should continue to face restrictions imposed more than half a century ago.

This is not merely a question of fairness. It is a matter of strategic logic, alliance credibility and the future of the global nuclear energy market.

The proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation framework reportedly envisioned allowing American companies to construct a low-enriched uranium facility in Saudi Arabia following technical and regulatory reviews. While its future is now uncertain because of the political condition attached by Trump, the proposal itself marked a significant departure from Washington's long-standing policy that traditionally discouraged domestic uranium enrichment in newcomer nuclear states because of its dual-use potential.

The contrast with Korea remains striking.

Korea joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1975, 13 years before Saudi Arabia. It ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol in 2004, granting inspectors extensive authority to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Seoul has consistently complied with international safeguards and has repeatedly reaffirmed that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. President Lee Jae Myung has explicitly rejected calls for an independent nuclear arsenal, describing them as irresponsible and contrary to Korea's national interests.

Saudi Arabia, by comparison, has yet to adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol despite years of American encouragement. Yet Washington has shown a willingness to negotiate uranium enrichment with Riyadh while maintaining restrictions on Seoul.

The inconsistency has not gone unnoticed. Even The New York Times described Washington's uneven treatment of Korea and Saudi Arabia as evidence of a conspicuous double standard. Such criticism reflects a broader reality: The credibility of the global nonproliferation regime depends not only on preventing proliferation but also on applying its principles consistently among trusted partners.

Korea's nuclear industry hardly resembles that of an aspiring newcomer. It operates 26 commercial reactors and ranks among the world's leading nuclear power producers and exporters. Yet under the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, first concluded in 1974, Seoul still cannot enrich uranium without prior U.S. approval. For more than five decades, Korea has been compelled to import all of its nuclear fuel despite possessing the technological capability to produce it domestically.

That arrangement no longer reflects strategic realities.

Nor is this simply a Korean interest. The United States itself imports much of its enriched uranium, while seeking to reduce dependence on geopolitical rivals and diversify trusted supply chains. Developing enrichment capacity among reliable allies would strengthen the resilience of the Western nuclear fuel market and reinforce long-term energy security.

Korea is uniquely positioned to contribute to that effort. Its advanced nuclear technology, rigorous regulatory institutions and exemplary nonproliferation record make it one of the most dependable partners the United States could have in securing future supplies of civilian nuclear fuel.

Encouragingly, both governments have acknowledged the need to revisit the bilateral nuclear agreement, and follow-up consultations have begun. Seoul reportedly seeks authority comparable to that enjoyed by Japan, which enriches uranium under internationally accepted safeguards without obtaining case-by-case U.S. approval.

Washington should embrace that objective.

Granting Korea greater autonomy over its civilian nuclear fuel cycle would not weaken the global nonproliferation regime. On the contrary, it would demonstrate that the United States rewards decades of responsible behavior, transparency and steadfast alliance commitments. It would also reinforce confidence that America's alliances are built on trust rather than on outdated restrictions inherited from another era.

If the United States is prepared to contemplate uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, it cannot persuasively argue that Korea — a democratic treaty ally with a far stronger record of compliance — must remain bound by limitations imposed in 1974.

The United States has long described Korea as one of its most trusted strategic partners. Modernizing the bilateral nuclear agreement would not represent a concession. It would be a long-overdue recognition of Korea's maturity as a responsible nuclear power and a strategic investment in a stronger, more resilient Seoul-Washington alliance for decades to come.