ED Abortive constitutional reform

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik wipes his eye while criticizing the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) for requesting a filibuster against a series of bills, including the proposed constitutional amendment, during the second plenary session of the May extraordinary session at the National Assembly in Seoul, May 8. Woo did not bring the constitutional amendment bill to a vote during the session. Yonhap

Korea’s latest attempt at constitutional reform collapsed in the National Assembly last week, undone by the very partisan calculations that make reform necessary in the first place.

At the heart of the failed amendment was a proposal both modest and profoundly important: to tighten constitutional safeguards on the use of martial law. Under the current Constitution, the president retains broad authority to declare martial law in times of war or national emergency, subject only to later review by the National Assembly. The proposed revision would have required prior parliamentary approval and made clear that a majority vote of lawmakers could immediately terminate any such declaration.

In a democracy shaped by painful memories of authoritarian rule, this should not have been controversial.

The amendment also sought to enshrine in the constitutional preamble the democratic legacy of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising and the Busan-Masan Democratic Protests. The conservative People Power Party largely boycotted the proceedings, denying the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendment bills to pass.

The party’s decision deserves criticism.

For years, conservatives have called for revision to Korea’s constitutional system, saying it concentrates excessive power in the presidency. But when presented with a narrowly focused amendment designed to prevent abuse of one of the most extraordinary presidential powers, they chose obstruction over principle.

A commitment to constitutional reform cannot be conditional on partisan convenience. If a party truly believes in stronger checks and balances, it should support measures that constrain executive authority regardless of who occupies the presidential office.

At the same time, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea is not above reproach.

Its push for this amendment, however substantively justified, also carried an unmistakable political dimension. By forcing a vote on an issue with strong democratic symbolism just weeks before local elections, the party placed its opponents in an uncomfortable position and sought to frame itself as the defender of constitutional democracy.

That may be effective politics. It is not necessarily the best way to build the broad consensus that constitutional reform demands.

Constitutions are not ordinary statutes. They establish the rules of the political game itself. Revising them requires more than a temporary parliamentary majority or a well-timed political maneuver. It requires trust, patience and a genuine willingness to negotiate across partisan lines.

Korea has compelling reasons to revisit the constitutional order established in 1987. The single five-year presidential term encourages short-term governance and weakens accountability. Persistent conflict between the executive and the legislative branches has fueled political paralysis. Recent controversies have underscored the need to clarify and strengthen safeguards against executive overreach.

These issues will not disappear because one vote failed.

Indeed, the collapse of this amendment should serve as a reminder that constitutional reform cannot succeed when either side treats it primarily as a political instrument. The conservative opposition should explain why it was unwilling to support stronger limits on martial law powers. The governing party should acknowledge that constitutional change pursued in the heat of an election season is bound to arouse suspicion.

A wiser course would be to resume negotiations after the local elections, when immediate political incentives have receded. By then, both parties may be better positioned to focus on institutional design rather than campaign messaging.

Korea’s Constitution was born from a national democratic consensus. Any revision worthy of that legacy must be forged in the same spirit.

The country needs constitutional reform. What it does not need is another reminder that even the most important democratic safeguards can become casualties of partisan politics.