ED Tariff brinkmanship harms alliance

Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo departs for Washington via Terminal 1 of Incheon International Airport on Jan. 29 to discuss trade issues with his U.S. counterparts. Yonhap

The recent tariff threat issued by U.S. President Donald Trump is shifting rapidly from rhetoric to reality. Despite a series of urgent visits to Washington by Korea’s top foreign affairs and trade officials, Seoul has failed to secure assurances that the threatened tariff hike, raising duties on Korean vehicles and other imports from 15 percent back to 25 percent, will be withdrawn. Reports that the U.S. administration is proceeding with internal steps to formalize the increase through official gazette publication underscore the gravity of the situation.

Korea’s diplomatic efforts have been extensive but ineffective. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun conveyed Seoul’s commitment to implementing the bilateral tariff agreement during his meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, yet received no firm response. Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo was unable even to meet his U.S. counterpart at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative during his visit to Washington. Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, rerouting a trip from Canada for urgent talks with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, likewise returned empty-handed. Collectively, these episodes suggest not merely diplomatic friction but a deeper erosion of trust.

At the core of the dispute lies the delayed implementation of the U.S.-Korea Strategic Investment Memorandum of Understanding signed last November. Under the agreement, Korea pledged roughly $350 billion in U.S.-bound investments in exchange for partial tariff relief. Yet nearly three months later, follow-up measures, most notably a special investment bill required to institutionalize the commitment, remain stalled in the National Assembly. In contrast, Japan, facing similar pressure, has moved swiftly, reportedly preparing to announce multiple large-scale U.S. investment deals after holding several high-level bilateral meetings.

Seoul’s political standstill has undeniably provided Washington with leverage. The ruling and opposition parties have traded blame, as they delay legislation critical to national economic interests while expediting other politically favored bills. Such inconsistency has weakened Korea’s credibility in Washington and reinforced the perception that Seoul’s promises lack urgency. In that sense, responsibility for the current predicament rests heavily with Korea’s political leadership.

Yet it would be both incomplete and unfair to frame this crisis solely as a failure on Seoul’s part. The Trump administration also bears significant responsibility. The renewed tariff threat appears driven less by genuine trade concerns than by domestic political calculation. With U.S. midterm elections approaching, Trump has strong incentives to showcase foreign investment inflows as evidence of economic strength. Leveraging tariffs against allies to extract faster concessions may yield short-term political gains, but it undermines the trust essential to long-term alliances.

More troubling is the administration’s apparent willingness to reopen or reinterpret agreements that have already been concluded. Using tariff escalation as a pressure tactic after a deal has been signed raises serious questions about the reliability of U.S. commitments. For Korea, which has consistently aligned itself with U.S. strategic and economic priorities, such treatment risks crossing the line from hard bargaining into coercion. It also sends an unsettling signal to other partners about the stability of U.S. trade agreements.

Nonetheless, realism must prevail. Korea cannot afford prolonged uncertainty over U.S. tariffs, given its export-dependent economy. Waiting for favorable court rulings in the United States or hoping for a political change in Washington is not a strategy. The immediate priority must be to eliminate pretexts for further retaliation.

The National Assembly must pass the special investment bill without delay, treating it as a matter of national interest rather than a partisan contest. The government, for its part, should move proactively, law or no law, by advancing concrete investment discussions in strategic sectors such as shipbuilding, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and biotechnology. Visible action is now indispensable.

At the same time, Seoul should firmly but calmly demand greater accountability from Washington. Alliances cannot function on shifting goalposts and transactional pressure alone. Mutual respect and adherence to agreed terms are not concessions; they are obligations.

This moment calls for sobriety on both sides. Korea must act decisively to restore confidence, while the United States must recognize that pressuring allies for short-term political gain carries long-term costs. Failure on either side will only deepen uncertainty, at a price neither country can afford.