Korea’s 5-dimensional diplomacy at APEC summit

Lee Jong-eun

Throughout its history, Korea has been burdened by a stark geographic challenge: being surrounded by multiple challenging, even adversarial neighbors. The struggle to navigate complex, multidimensional geopolitics has been a recurrent feature of Korea’s foreign policy.

Contemporary Korea’s challenge is similar. On the surface, the geopolitical landscape appears simpler: a bipolar divide between its continental adversaries (Russia, China, North Korea) and its maritime allies (the United States and Japan). The region’s contemporary geopolitical environment, however, is far more complex.

It is difficult for South Korea to confront North Korea and China unequivocally, not only because of economic and security risks, but also because of hopes for cooperation with the latter on the North's denuclearization and inter-Korean reconciliation. Korea’s strategic partnerships with Japan and the United States are also complicated, marked by diplomatic tensions over historical grievances and disputes about equitable alliance benefits and burden-sharing.

To add to the geopolitical complexity, Korea’s challenge isn’t simply managing individual diplomatic relations, but also responding to interactions amongst its regional neighbors. The escalation of conflicts between South Korea’s strategic partners and competitors has repercussions on South Korea’s own regional diplomacy. Conversely, the resolution of disputes among neighbors — for example, between the United States and North Korea — may also produce negative repercussions if any settlement overlooks South Korea’s interests. Henceforth, any contemporary South Korean government, regardless of its ideological or foreign-policy aspirations, faces a Rubik’s Cube challenge in geopolitical diplomacy.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit takes place this year in Korea. For Lee Jae Myung’s government, the summit presents an opportunity to convene key regional actors across Asia and the Pacific. To advance Korea’s foreign-policy goal, Lee’s government will have to engage in five-dimensional diplomacy with summit participants, with hopes that success at one diplomatic dimension will bolster success at others.

The first dimension is diplomacy with Japan. The recent improvements in bilateral relations during former President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida face a new uncertainty with the election of Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. With Korea wary of Takaichi’s political reputation as a hard-line nationalist, the summit will test prospects for continued partnership between the two governments.

With negotiations on tariffs, investment and defense cost-sharing still unresolved, the planned summit between Lee and U.S. President Donald Trump will shape confidence in the effectiveness of the U.S.-Korea alliance.

The third dimension is diplomacy with China. Although Lee has signaled an intention to strategically prioritize relations with the U.S. over China, the Korean president will likely attempt to achieve China’s acceptance of South Korea’s strategic stance and to maintain prospects for China’s restraint in supporting North Korea.

The fourth dimension is diplomacy regarding North Korea. Despite Pyongyang’s absence from the summit, South Korea will aim to use the forum to coordinate a regional strategy toward the North. For Lee’s government, the objective is to build a regional consensus that avoids excessive confrontation while neither ignoring nor accommodating North Korea’s nuclear armament. As he proposed during his visit to the White House in August, Lee may aspire to be a “pacemaker” in guiding Trump’s overture toward Kim’s regime, while also seeking cross-regional support from Japan and China.

The final dimension is diplomacy with other heads of state attending the APEC events. As the South Korean government strives to expand its international leadership as a “pivotal state” and “regional stakeholder,” APEC provides an opportunity to showcase broader international and regional diplomacy. Korea’s interactions with other APEC members may create momentum for its dealings with more powerful regional actors. Multiple members (including Taiwan, which will send a proxy to the summit) will observe how Korea, a medium power in its own right, balances confidence and conciliation in engaging with other regional actors.

Various outcomes could result from this year’s APEC summit. Like solving a Rubik’s Cube, success in one diplomatic dimension could spur positive momentum in others. By contrast, deadlock in one dimension could create obstacles elsewhere.

The first scenario is that no substantive consensus emerges following the Economic Leaders' Meeting, with participating heads of state engaging in a carefully staged display of cordial disagreements and affirmations of generic principles. For Korea, this would be a missed opportunity to improve the region’s geopolitical status quo, but it may find relief that the summit at least served as a symbol of continued regional diplomacy.

The second scenario is the escalation of one or multiple regional tensions. The summit’s failure to resolve diplomatic disputes may further deteriorate the relationship among regional actors. Korea may face heightened threats of abandonment from its partners, entrapment in escalating conflicts with competitors, or both.

The third scenario is substantive achievement in resolving one or more regional tensions. Korea may achieve a diplomatic accord with Japan and the U.S. A diplomatic resolution on the U.S.-China strategic rivalry or multilateral responses toward North Korea’s nuclearization may be achieved. For Korea, the third scenario is preferred, despite the challenges in achieving such an outcome.

Finally, there is a fourth scenario: a temporary truce. The disputes are not resolved, yet summit participants agree to a truce that mitigates the regional tensions and allows selective cooperation. Korea and Japan have a truce on historical disputes to continue bilateral cooperation; U.S. and China have a truce on trade conflicts and “One China” policy.

While a truce may only postpone regional conflicts, Korea may be inclined to accept a temporary reprieve from regional conflict, as it confronts other pressing domestic and international challenges. For some Koreans, there may also be a calculation that a temporary truce would postpone restructuring of the East Asian geopolitical order to a “post-Trump” U.S. administration, a choice they may be willing to accept.

Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer.