ED Shoot' em down or not
US flip-flops on handling NK missile test
U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter threatened to shoot down a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).Virtually overnight, Carter flip-flopped, saying that the U.S. might not.
Carter’s stance and reversal of it followed the North’s dictator Kim Jong-un’s vow during his New Year speech to test a long-range missile. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump followed it by tweeting “It won’t happen.” Then Carter argued for downing the North’s ICBM in a joint opinion piece with his mentor and predecessor Bill Perry but relented in his farewell speech.
The likelihood is that the incoming administration was displeased with the outgoing defense chief setting the tone for it and asked him to put it back to where it was.
Nonetheless, Carter raised an important issue that could have immediate relevance to the Trump administration in dealing with the North.
First, shooting down NK missiles should be included as a valid option for stunting further progress in the North’s missile and nuclear development. As Perry pointed out, Pyongyang may make ICBMs operational “in a few years.” So far, there are no clear rules.
For that, there should be enforceable “red lines” by which the North’s missiles should be countervailed. The first in the series is establishing that the North’s missile poses a clear and present danger to other countries. The identification of a target can be one and the detection of a dangerous malfunction can be another.
The North should inform the pertinent world organization of its plan to send a projectile in advance, obtain the understanding of countries on the flight path and follow the rules regarding such tests.
Another redline should clearly set out what countermeasures the affected countries can take if the North violates these redlines. Say, if the North’s missile overflies Japan without due process, it would give Japan and its allies the right to shoot them down the next time the North makes the same provocation.
The clear rules of engagement are long overdue. Their absence together with the determination to confront the North’s challenge explains why the North has progressed in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
It can’t be overemphasized that the purpose of these rules is part of a bigger plan to stop the North’s WMD programs and separate the two from each other without leading to a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula. So it is a matter of course that the South Korean government should be involved and consulted on every step when the red lines are passed and counteractions are required.
This approach would save a great deal of panic from the Trump administration in dealing with the contingency of the North’s ICBM test on his inauguration day.