The virtual breakdown of Korea-U.S. nuclear talks last week showed the long way Seoul has to go before exercising full sovereignty in its energy policy.
Of course, the current nuclear cooperation agreement, signed in 1974, has helped the country jump to become the world’s fifth-largest nuclear power generator almost from scratch. But this also means Seoul is now like an adult wearing kindergartener’s clothes: It has to either drastically mend the 39-year-old dress or order a new one.
Korea, which operates 23 nuclear power plants and depends on them to meet 35 percent of its energy requirements, boasts world-class technology in building and running atomic power plants. Yet the bilateral deal allows Seoul to neither manufacture its own nuclear fuel nor recycle spent fuel rods, raising concerns about a stable fuel supply and the storage capacity for nuclear waste.
Washington’s nonproliferation concerns are understandable, especially at a time when North Korea and Iran are scrutinizing America’s policy loopholes. The U.S. will also have to think about equity issues between Korea and other similar requests from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Yet the Barack Obama administration, which allowed India to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium in 2008 despite ― or because of ― New Delhi’s defiance of the nonproliferation treaty, won’t have much to say when it comes to the principle of fairness. The U.S. has also let Japan, a former war criminal state, freely complete the full cycle of its nuclear power industry, which starts from making new fuel rods and ends with reprocessing spent ones.
All this shows the bargaining can hardly end up as an all-or-nothing process, and the two sides should be ready to meet each other half-way.
One can’t help but doubt in this regard whether it would be wise for Seoul to focus all its energy on just the two targets of enrichment and reprocessing. Of course, the nation will be able to save up to 900 billion won ($806 million) a year in buying enriched uranium from the U.S. and recycle more than 90 percent of spent fuel rods. Yet too much emphasis on the two goals can lead the public to confuse the ends and means, while raising unnecessary suspicions among foreigners about Seoul possibly launching its own nuclear weapons program.
Korean negotiators should be able to persuade their U.S. counterparts about Seoul’s ultimate goals ― ensuring a stable fuel supply and safely disposing of spent rods. In addition, this country will need considerable time to come up with its own enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technologies even if Washington gives it the go-ahead. We think the negotiators were right to extend the current accord for another couple of years and re-discuss the matter from the ground up rather than cobbling together a new one in time for President Park Geun-hye’s visit to the U.S. early next month.
Seoul, for example, can secure the right to enrich uranium but exercise it under agreed conditions. It also ought to find foreign partners in the disposal of spent rods instead of trying to reprocess them, which is extremely costly and risky.
Winning nuclear sovereignty and exporting nuclear power plants are both important. Yet President Park, who has emphasized the need for renewing the bilateral nuclear accord since her election, needs to be more realistic ― in part to reduce her political burdens, and to win more substantive gains without risking unnecessary suspicion.