It is hard to know exactly what’s happening in North Korea, and harder still to forecast what will happen there.
Only this much seems certain for now: North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has just completed the first phase of another hereditary power transfer to his third son, Jong-un. But that’s almost all there is agreed on by Pyongyang watchers, who offer contrasting views on most other issues.
Some observers, for instance, say the world’s first socialist monarchy will maintain its military-first policy, while others contend the Workers Party will regain its superiority. One group says the junior Kim will make limited provocation to ``show his qualification,” but another refutes he would turn to partial reform and openness to prove his leadership. The so-called North Korea experts also differ widely on the eventual success of the second father-to-son power succession, depending on whether and how long the North Korean people will endure the Kim dynasty.
Presuming or predicting about a regime ruled by an autocrat ― allegedly a whimsical one at that ― can be little more than educated guesses. Still, the glaring extremes of overestimating North Korea’s ability (in military matters) and underestimating it (in national survival) is due to wishful thinking and a common tendency among outsiders: most of them regard the North as an invariable group, a constant in the regional geopolitical equation.
What if other regional players look at the isolationist state as a regime that can be changed and wants to change, too? Actually, the reclusive country has kept adjusting itself to external conditions in its own way, however unnoticeable ― and undesirable ― they may appear to outsiders. What matters is how to turn these changes to more desirable and noticeable ways, and no timing would be better than the power transition to do this.
If the Lee Myung-bak administration has the wisdom and will to change North Korea in this manner, local media wouldn’t be staging a comedy of relying on physiognomists to surmise how Kim Jong-un will behave.
The time has long past for Seoul to differentiate emotion from reason and moral indignation from cool-headed policy. We have repeatedly urged the Lee administration to shift from a denuclearization-first policy to a two-track approach, which sets the nuclear problem apart from economic and humanitarian issues.
This is not because North Korea _ more exactly the North Korean leadership ― is agreeable but the northern half of the peninsula and people living there should be reunified with the south in the least costly way ― politically and economically ― and under Koreans’ own initiatives.
On second-guessing, the ``sunshine policy” of the previous two administrations was not entirely without problems, by failing, most of all, to change Pyongyang’s ways fundamentally even considering the short period of a decade to do that. It’s equally evident, however, the Lee administration’s ``harsh wind policy” has changed nothing, either ― and will not be able to do so in the future ― except showing the south, too, has the guts to confront. To borrow from the German philosopher Hegel, now is the time for synthesis after undergoing thesis and antithesis.
The ongoing resumption of inter-Korean contacts is welcome in this regard. Seoul will need to be more generous with economic and humanitarian aid, on condition of securing transparency in its distribution and use even via international agencies. The South can also attach conditions to major assistance, including better treatment of North Koreans by their rulers, as former West Germany demanded of their East German counterparts more than two decades ago.
As things stand now, the current government will go down in history as the administration that froze or even hampered the reunification process. There is little time left to hesitate or waste.