The relationship between the two Koreas is going from bad to worse, and is unlikely to get any better before getting even worse.
Regrettable as it is, the present deadlock was predicted when President Lee Myung-bak took office two years ago vowing to ``normalize'' inter-Korean relations by sticking to ``principles.'' It turned out soon that he meant to sever almost all ties with North Korea until the latter gives up its nuclear weapons program.
The current inter-Korean tension indicates that the President's goal might be worthwhile but his methods have been less than realistic ― or pragmatic as his administration describes it. Had Lee and his aides anticipated the result of their hard-line policy and made sufficient preparations for them, then?
Unfortunately, the answer seems to be no, as all of us sit and watch.
Defense Minister Kim Tae-young reiterated Sunday that ``there must be a definitive punishment" for the forces that killed 46 South Korean sailors aboard the Navy corvette Cheonan, which broke in two and sank near the disputed borders with North Korea more than a month ago. Kim could neither identify who was to blame nor specify how to punish them, however. It won't be much different when Lee presides over a military commanders' meeting Tuesday, for the first time as the incumbent president.
There is painfully little Seoul can do even if the prime suspect is confirmed to be the real culprit, backed up by hard evidence. Belated military retaliation is unjustifiable and too dangerous, while economic sanctions are ineffective ― if possible at all ― without China's cooperation.
Likewise, the government's countermeasure to the North's seizure and freezing of South Korean assets in the Mt. Geumgang resort complex, which will also be unveiled this week, is not likely to go much beyond further reduction of already negligible joint business projects. The shutdown of Gaeseong Industrial Park could be the strongest step, but it could backfire on Seoul even more fiercely, as an overreaction.
Seoul's dilemma is so visible that some foreign watchers say the naval disaster is highly likely to end up as a perfect crime, and even the Lee administration might want it to remain an eternal mystery. The repeated, intensifying anti-North Korean rhetoric and pledges for an enhanced defense posture are the only things left for damage control with the domestic audience.
Admittedly, North Korea ― especially its leadership ― is one of the least likeable and comprehensible regimes in the world. A mixture of anachronistic communism and feudalistic personality cult, the regime is simply unreal or too surreal as to defy understanding by even the socialistic democracies in Europe.
Add to this the monarchic power transfer and extreme abuses of its people's human rights, and one sees a state unparalleled in its oddity on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula.
But this abnormal cohesion explains why the Lee administration's simpleminded strategy of beefing up pressure under the pretext of adhering to principles brings about little change in Pyongyang. Even if it succeeds to force the North to implode in what analysts here call a ``contingency situation," South Korea's economy cannot cope with the abrupt, unprepared reunification.
All this shows the ``sunshine policy'' of engaging North Korea by the previous two administrations was not just the safest but least expensive ways to change the recalcitrant regime to a less detestable one. Inter-Korean hawks would refute that Pyongyang never ceased to develop nuclear weapons despite ― or because of ― the South's economic aid to the North over a decade.
They may be right, but during the 2000s, the engagement policy managed to notably slow down the nuclearization process. No less true is the incumbent administration's denuclearization-first policy only worked to produce the opposite result.
Conservatives say the Korea-U.S. alliance sharply weakened under the former Roh Moo-hyun administration, as Washington regarded Roh's ``balancer'' role as a pro-China policy. And the Lee administration is credited for repairing the damaged alliance to the strongest level ever.
It is the Lee administration's denuclearization-first policy that pushes North Korea far closer to the embrace of China than ever before. The hard-line policy, whether it is originally aimed at taming North Korea or pleasing Seoul's biggest ally, has produced an adverse effect at least when it comes to the regional power balance. The resultant heightening of tension on the Korean Peninsula is forcing Seoul to ask ― and nearly beg ― for a delay in the takeover of wartime operational command from the Washington. The postponement, if realized, would work against the new U.S. strategy of more mobile forces and force Seoul to foot most of the additional bills.
It is easy to see who is the biggest ― or rather the sole ― beneficiary of the Lee administration's confrontational policy: China. If the Chinese government provided a red-carpet welcome to President Lee last week, it might have been little surprise, as nothing would help Beijing's efforts more to include the northern half of the Korean Peninsula as part of its own history.
Even more serious than these consequences is that the South Korean government might have done all this, not by a carefully-thought strategy, but simply out of shortsighted, narrow-minded tactics to win over its ideological rival and bring it to its knees.
The time has come for President Lee to decide whether to maintain or even step up the pressuring tactics and further destabilize the already volatile situation on this peninsula or turn to a more rational policy that could benefit all the parties involved, including the United States.
Pyongyang has little left to lose, but Seoul needs to seriously reconsider its policy not because the inter-Korean relationship is a game of chicken but because it is the most peaceful and economical way. Nor should it be a matter of deciding which is bigger policy-making factor between ideological difference and national homogeneity.
The peaceful co-existence and soft-landing of North Korea is not just the most rational policy. It is the only sane one.